This power is held not to extend to real estate, which a single partner cannot trans fer without special authority ; Story, Part. § 101; Anderson v. Tompkins, 1 Brock. 456, Fed. Cas. No. 365; Piatt v. Oliver, 3 McLean, 27, Fed. Cas. No. 11,116. Since the power to transfer the firm property must be exer cised for the ordinary purposes of the part nership business, it is held that a partner's employment of firm capital in a new partner ship, which he forms for his firm with third persons charges him for a conversion of the fund to his own use ; Reis v. Hellman, 25 Ohio St. 180.
Guarantees. A partner derives no author ity from the mere relation of partnership to bind the firm as guarantor of the debt of another ; 4 Exch. 623 ; Rollins Stevens, 31 Me. 454 ; Langan v. Hewett, 13 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 122 ; McQuewans v. Hamlin, 35 Pa. 517. If the contract of guaranty is strictly within the scope of the firm business, one partner may bind the firm by it ; First N. Bk. v. Carpenter, Stibbs & Co., 41 Ia. 518; or if guaranty is usual in that kind of busi ness or is such as the firm has frequently recognized ; Pars. Partn. § 144; and where a partner sold notes and applied the proceeds to firm use; Sweet v. Bradley, 24 Barb. (N. Y.) 549.
Insurance. One partner may effect an in surance of the partnership goods ; 1 M. & G. 130 ; Hillock v. Ins. Co., 54 Mich. 531, 20 N. W. 571. The assignment of a partner's interest in the firm stock without the insur er's consent, 'does not violate a policy of in surance upon it ; West v. Ins. Co., 27 Ohio St. 1, 22 ,Am. Rep. 294.
Leases. The rule is that a partner has no power to contract on behalf of the firm for a lease of a building for partnership pur poses ; 22 Beay. 606. But it is held that a partner may bind the firm for the rent of premises necessary for partnership purposes, and so used ; Stillman v. Harvey, 47 Conn. 26; but see 22 Beay. 606. A partner can give a valid notice to quit ; 1 B. & Ad. 135.
Statute of limitations. Before dissolution an acknowledgment by one partner of a debt barred by the statute will bind the firm ; Pars. Part. § 127; as to whether it will do so, if made after dissolution, the authorities are conflicting ; the better view appears to be that it will not ; id.; Cronkhite v. Herrin, 15 Fed. 888 ; Espy v. Corner, 76 Ala. 501; Mayberry v. Willoughby, 5 Neb. 368, 25 Am. Rep. 491; some cases distinguish between acknowledgments made before and after the statutory period has run; if made after, it does not bind; Newman v. McComas, 43 Md. 70 ; if made before, it does; Beardsley v. Hall, 36 Conn. 270, 4 Am. Rep. 74 ; McClurg v. Howard, 45 Mo. 365, .100 Am. Dec. 378. Some cases hold that it binds though made after dissolution and after the statutory pe riod has run ; Mix v. Shattuck, 50 Vt. 421,
28 ,4m. Rep. 511; Brockenbrough v. Hack ley, 6 Call (Va.) 51. If made after dissolu tion by a liquidating partner, it is binding ; Houser v. Irvine, 3 W. & S. (Pa.) 345, 38 Am. Dec. 768 ; but not otherwise ; Wilson v. Waugh, 101 Pa. 233. In England and in many states statutes have rendered the ac knowledgment of one partner insufficient to toll the statute.
Majority, power of. The weight of au thority seems to be in favor of the power of a majority of the firm, acting in good faith, to bind the minority in the ordinary trans actions of the partnership business ; 3 Kent 45 ; 33 Beav, 595 ; Peacock v. Cummings, 46 Pa. 434; Johnston' v..Dutton's Adm'r, 27 Ala. 245; Campbell v. Bowen, 49 Ga. 417. But see 1 Yo. & Jer. 227; Yeager v. Wallace, 57 Pa. 365. It is said that, in the absence of an express stipulation, a majority may de cide as to the disposal of the partnership property ; 3 Chitty, Com. L. 234; but the power of the majority must be confined to the ordinary business of the partnership ; 14 Beay. 367; 2 De G. M. & G. 49; it does not extend to the right to change any of the provisions therein ; Abbot v. Johnson, 32 N.
H. 9 ; nor to engage the partnership in trans actions for which it was never intended ; 3 Manic & S. 488 ; and all must be consulted ; Western Stage Co. v. Walker, 2 Ia. 504, 65 Am. Dec. 789. Where a majority is authoriz ed to act, it must be fairly constituted and must proceed with the most entire good faith ; 10 Hare 493; 5 De G. & S. 310. A majority cannot change the place of business after a lease has expired ; 8 Ch. Div. 129. The American cases are said to have enlarg ed the power of the majority ; Pars. Partn. § 147; but the question is not clearly settled ; id.
Mortgages. A partner has no implied pow er to make a mortgage of partnership real estate ; Lind. Part., 2d Am. ed. *139 ; Napier v. Catron, 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 534; Cottle v. Harrold, 72 Ga: 830 ; Hardin v. Dolge, 46 App. Div. 416, 61 N. Y. Supp. 753 ; McGahan v. Bank, 156 U. S. 218, 15 Sup. Ct. 347, 39 L. Ed. 403. See Horton v. Bloedorn, 37 Neb. 666, 56 N. W. 321. But one partner may exe cute a valid chattel mortgage of firm prop erty, without the consent of his co-partners; Hembree v. Blackburn, 16 Or. 153, 19 Pac. 73; Williams v. Gillespie, 30 W. Va. 586, 5 S. E. 210; McCarthy v. Seisler, 130 Ind. 63, 29 N. E. 407; Rock v. Collins, 99 Wis. '630, 75 N. W. 426, 67 Am. St. Rep. 885 ; Union N. Bk. v. Bank, 136 U. S. 223, 10 Sup. Ct. 1013, 34 L. Ed. 341; Beckman v. Noble, 115 Mich. 523, 73 N. W. 803. The power to pledge re sults by implication from the power to bor row money on the firm's credit ; George v. Tate, 102 U. S. 564, 26 L. Ed. 232; Harris v., Baltimore, 73 Md. 22, 17 AD. 1046, 20 Atl. 111, 8 L. R. A. 677, 25 Am. St. Rep. 565.