Lindsay, 47 Ind. 286 ; Bates v. Relyea, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 340.
"The only use of authorities, or decided eases, is the establishment of some principle which the judge can follow out in deciding the case before him. . . . Where a case has decided a principle, although I myself do hot concur in it, and although' it has been only the decision of a tribunal of co-ordinate jurisdiction, I have felt bound to follow it where it is of respectable age and has been used by lawyers as settling the law, leaving to the appellate court to say that a case is wrongly decided, if the appellate court should so think." 13 Ch. D. 712, per Jessel, M. R.
"Without minutely examining all the cas es, or saying whether I do or do not agree with them, it is sufficient for me to abide by the principle established by them; the Principle is the thing we are to ex tract from cases, and to apply it in the de cision of other cases." 7 Term 148, per Lord Kenyon, C. J.
"Now, I have often said, and I repeat it, that the only thing in a judge's decision binding as an authority upon a subsequent judge is the principle upon which the, case was decided ; but it is not sufficient that the case should have been decided on a prin ciple, if that principle is not itself a right principle, or one not applicable to the case ; and it is for a subsequent judge to say whether or not it is a right principle, and, if not, he may himself lay down the true prin ciple. In that case the prior decision ceases to be a binding authority or guide for any subsequent judge, for the second judge who lays down the principle in effect reverses the decision." 13 Ch. D. 785, per Jessel, M. R.
The same judge is quoted in 23 L. Q. Rev. 88, as saying: "If a case lays down a prin ciple, it is a guide to other judges, but a mere decision where you cannot find out the principle is of no use at all." "If one authority were produced to me, and my own opinion were the other way, I would not follow that authority ; but if the authorities are numerous, I admit that I must be bound." L. R. 19 Eq. 460, per Jessel, M. R.
"It is the principle of the decision by which we are bound, not a mere rule that in ex actly the same circumstances we are to ar rive at the same conclusions. Therefore to say that the decisions are wrong in point of principle, if that principle was clearly laid down, does not relieve us from the ob ligation of following the principle of the de cision, because the whole theory of our sys tem is that the decision of a superior court is binding on an inferior court and on a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, in so far as it is a statement of the law which the court is bound to accept." James, L. J., in L. R.
7 Ch. Ap. Ca. 750.
"Courts should be careful not to over rule decisions which, not being manifestly erroneous and mischievous, have stood for some time unchallenged, and from their na ture and the effect which they may rea sonably be supposed to have produced upon the conduct of a large portion of the com munity, as well as of parliament itself, in matters affecting rights of property, may fairly be treated as having passed into the category of established and recognized law." 15 Ch. D. 336, per Thesiger, L. J.
"Where an old case is contrary to the principles of the general law, the court of appeal ought not to shrink from overruling it even after a considerable lapse of time. But when an old decided case has made the law on a particular subject, the court of appeal ought not to interfere with it, be cause people have considered it as establish ing the law and have acted upon it." 9 Q. B. D. 352, per Jessel, M. R., cited by Lord Esher, M. R., in 22 Q. B. D. 619. See also 12 Q. B. D. 318. In [1909] 1 Ir. R. 172, the court after some deliberation felt itself bound to follow a case decided in 1726.
"Where there is a decision which has stood for more than two hundred years in respect of a subject-matter constantly aris ing in practice, the court does not overrule it unless absolutely obliged to do so. . . . Even if the court did not agree with the decision, it would not overrule it." [1895] 2 Q. B. 665. Where a dictum of law has been accepted, and is likely to have affected divers contracts and dealings between man and man, and if not followed, many trans actions done on the 'faith of it would be disturbed, the court will follow the dictum; 26 Ch. De 821. But where a decision had not stood wholly unquestioned the court need not feel bound to follow it merely because it has stood for twelve years without being authoritatively overruled; 27 Ch. D. 154.