"Where the decision is really one as to the jurisdiction of another court there is no reason why, at any distance of time, a superior court may not overrule it." 13 Q. B. D. 591, per Brett, M. R.
"Speaking for myself, I do not pay much attention to the dicta of modern judges, as I consider it my duty to decide for myself. This, of course, does not apply to decisions of modern judges, nor to old recognized dicta by eminent judges." 23 Ch. D. 49, per Jessel, M. R. See, also, 23 Ch. D. 127 ; [1891] 3 Ch. 376.
Decisions on the constructions of instru ments, if the words are similar, are not strictly binding ; L. R. 10 Ch. App. 397, with footnote giving the judgment of Jessel, M. R., in the court below ; or if the "instruments are couched in somewhat similar language ;" 22 Ch. D. 488; and this is true even of the decisions of the appeal court; 23 Ch. D. 111.
In 25 Q. B. D. 57, Lord Esher drew a dis tinction between "fundamental propositions of law," which could be changed only by par liament, and "tbe evidence of the existence' of such a proposition," which was within the disposition of the court.
In 44 L. T. 440, Jessel, M. R., stated that he had frequently differed from the courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction, and the same was said by Brett, L. J., in 10 Q. B. D. 328, in reference to a decision in the Exchequer Chamber, where the judges were equally di vided ; and it was said by Brett, M. R., in 13 Q. B. D. 355, that a court of law is not justified in overruling the decisions of an other court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, cit ing Jessel, M. R., in 13 Ch. D. 130.
In L. J. N. S. 57 Ch. D. 157, Kekewich, J., said : "I think that the proper and safe course is to follow a decision of a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, unless some cogent reason is given to the contrary." "For us to reverse the judgment of a lord chancellor would require a tremendous case —a case of a clear error." 12 Ch. D. 47, Per James, L. J. While the decisions of the lord chancellor, at all events sitting alone, are not absolutely binding, yet the greatest weight ought to be given to them, and unless manifestly wrong, they ought not to be over ruled ; 12 Ch. D. 54, per Thesiger, L. J. The
old lord chancellors overruled one another, and sometimes they overruled their own de cisions without the slightest trouble; 21 Ch. D. 346, Jessel, M. R.
It is said that the house of lords has the same power that every other tribunal has in subsequently applying the law laid down by it to other cases ; 5 H. L. Cas. 63. The observations made by the members beyond the ratio decidendri, which is propounded and acted upon in giving judgment, although they may be entitled to respect, are only to be followed in so far as they may be consid ered agreeable to sound reason and to prior authorities. But the house of lords, as a tribunal, is bound by its own precedents which it will not overrule, and the doctrine on which the judgment of the house is found ed must be universally taken for law, and can only be altered by act of parliament; 3 H. L. Cas. 391; 8 id. 391; 9 id. 338; L. R. 8 C. P. 313. This doctrine was again laid down, after argument, in [1898] A. C. 375. In [1898] A. C. 375, 381, Halsbury, L. C. said: "A decision of this house upon a ques tion of law is and nothing but an act of parliament can set right that which is alleged to be wrong in a judgment of this house." See 15 Law Quart. Rev. 340. If two cases in the house of lords are not to be reconciled, the more recent ought to prevail ; 5 App. Cas. 798 ; 7 id. 294, 302.
The judicial committee of the privy coun cil is not bound by its own precedents; see 4 Moore, P. C. 63; but where a decision of the privy council has been reported to the queen, and been sanctioned and embodied in an order in council, it becomes the decree or order of the final court of appeal, and every subordinate tribunal to whom the order is addressed should carry it into execution ; 6 App. Cas. 483.
A series of decisions based upon grounds of public policy however eminent the judges by whom they were delivered, cannot possess the same binding authority as decisions which deal with and formulate principles which are purely legal; Lord Watson in L. R. [1894] A. C. 553.