PRESUMPTION. An inference affirmative or disaffirmative of the truth or falsehood of any proposition or fact drawn by a pro cess of probable reasoning in the absence of actual certainty of its truth or falsehood, or until such certainty can be ascertained. Best, Presump. 4.
An inference affirmative or disaffirma tive of the existence of a disputed fact, drawn by a judicial tribunal, by a process of probable reasoning, from some one or more matters of fact, either admitted in the cause or otherwise satisfactorily estab lished. Best, Presump. 12.
A rule of law that courts and judges shall draw a particular inference from a particular fact, or from particular evidence, unless and until the truth of such inference is disproved. Steph. Ev. 4; Ulrich v. Ulrich, 136 N. Y. 120, 32 N. D. 606, 18 L. R. A. 37.
Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptorily that it will not allow them to be overturned by any contrary proof, however strong. Best, Presump. 20. They are called, also, abso lute and irrebuttable presumptions.
Disputable presumptions are inferences of law which hold good until they are inval idated by proof or a stronger presumption Best, Presump. 29; Livingston v. Livingston, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 287, 8 Am. Dec. 562.
Presumptions of fact are inferences as to the existence of some fact drawn from the existence of some other fact;,. inferences which common sense draws from circum stances usually occurring in such cases. 3 B. & Ad. 890.
Presumptions of law are rules which, in certain cases, either forbid, or dispense with any ulterior inquiry. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 14. Inferences or positions established, for the most part, by the common, but occasion ally by the statute, law, which are obliga tory alike on judges and juries. Best, Presump. 17. They are either conclusive or disputable.
Micied presumptions hold an intermediate place and consist of presumptive inferences which, from their strength, importance, or frequent occurrence, attract the observation of the law, and, from being constantly recom mended by judges and acted on by juries, become as familiar to the courts as presump tions of law, and occupy as important a place in the administration of justice. They have been termed quasi legal presumptions, and are divided into three classes; 1st, Where the inference is one which common sense would have made for itself ; 2d, Where an artificial weight is attached to the evi dentiary facts, beyond their mere natural tendency to produce belief ; and 3d, Where from motives of legal policy, juries are rec ommended to draw inferences which are purely artificial. Chamb. Best, Ev. § 324.
The distinctions between presumptions of law and presumptions of fact are—first, that in regard to presumptions of law a certain inference must be made whenever the facts appear which furnish the basis of the in ference ; while in case of other presump tions a discretion more or less extensive is vested in the tribunal as to drawing the in ference. See 9 B. & C. 643. Second, in case of presumptions of law, the court may draw the inference whenever the requisite facts are developed in pleading; Steph. Pl. 382; while other presumptions can be made only by the intervention of a jury. Presumptions of law are reduced to fixed rules, and form a part of the system of jurisprudence to which they belong; presumptions of fact are derived wholly and directly from the cir cumstances of the particular case, by means of the common experience of mankind. See 2 Stark. Ev. 684; Douglass v. Mitchell's Ex'r, 35 Pa. 440.
It has been said that a more useful and accurate division of presumptions of fact is obtained by treating them with refer ence to their effect upon the burden of , proof and designating them in this aspect as slight and strong; Chamb. Best, Ev. § 319. Slight presumptions, though sufficient to excite suspicion or produce an impression in favor of the truth of the facts they indi cate, do not, when taken singly, either con stitute proof or shift the burden of proof ; id. Strong presumptions shift the burden of proof even though the evidence to rebut them involved the proof of a negative; id. § 321. These are of great weight and in the ab sence of other evidence are decisive in civil cases ; id. § 322. It has been suggested as the characteristic distinction between pre sumptions of law and presumptions of fact, either simple or mixed, that when the for mer are disregarded by a jury, a new trial is granted as matter of right, but that the disregard of any of the latter, however strong and obvious, is only ground for a new trial at the discretion of the court; Chamb. Best, Ev. § 327; 1 Term 167; Turn ley v. Black, 44 Ala. 159; Goggans v. Mon roe, 31 Ga. 331.