PROMISE OF MARRIAGE. A contract mutually entered into by a man and a wo man that they will marry each other.
Every marriage is necessarily preceded by an express or implied contract of this de scription, as a wedding cannot be agreed upon and celebrated at one and the same in stant ; Addison, Contr. 1196.
When a man and a woman agree to mar ry and subsequently either one refuses, the other may bring suit for damages, such suits being called breach of promise suits. Before the Reformation no action for breach of promise could be maintained, for marriage was a matter of spiritual jurisdiction. It w^ • not till the middle of the seventeenth century that marriage was recognized by our law as a temporal benefit, and a breach of promise as cognizable by the temporal courts; 20 Q. B. D. 494, 505.
A promise of marriage is not to be likened to an actual marriage. The latter is not a contract, but a legal relation ; while the for mer is an executory contract in the strict sense of the term, and governed in general by the ordinary law of contracts, though it has certain peculiarities of its own. As in other contracts, the parties must be sui ju ris. If, therefore, the man or the woman be an infant, or labor under any other legal dis ability, he or she will not be bound by a promise of marriage; but if one of the par ties be an infant and the other be an adult, the promise will be binding upon the latter ; Stra. 937; Hunt v. Peake, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 475, 15 Am. Dec. 475 ; Warwick v. Cooper, 5 Sneed (Tenn.) 659; McConkey v. Barnes, 42 Ill. App. 511. A promise made during infancy may be ratified after the infant at tains majority. An English statute requires a new and distinct contract, after majority, in order to bind the infant on his promise to marry after he comes of age; but a new con tract may be inferred from continued ac ceptance of the engagement; L. R. 5 C. P. 410. Neither does it follow that a promise of marriage is not binding because the par ties to the promise cannot form a valid mar riage ; they may be competent to contract though not competent to marry.
There must be a legal and valid considera tion; but as there are always mutual prom ises, they are a sufficient consideration for each other. There must be a meeting of the minds of the parties, i. e. a request or propo sition on the one side, and an assent on the other. If the communications between the
parties are verbal, the only questions which usually arise relate to evidence. The very words or time or manner of the promise need not be proved, but it may be inferred from the conduct of the parties, and from the cir cumstances which usually attend an engage ment to marry : as, visiting, the understand ing of friends and relations, preparations for marriage, and the reception of the man by the woman's family as a suitor; Wightman v. Coates, 15 Mass. 1, 8 Am. Dec. 77; Moritz v. Melhorn, 13 Pa. 331; 2 C. & P. 553; South ard v. Rexford, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 254; Waters v. Bristol, 26 Conn. 398; Clark v. Hodges, 65 Vt. 273, 26 Atl. 726. But as to the evi dence of a contract to marry, more direct proof is now commonly required than for merly, since modern statutes permit parties themselves to take the stand; Schoul. Husb. & W. § 43. Therefore a promise cannot be inferred from devoted attention, frequent visits, and apparently exclusive attention; Homan v. Earle, 53 N. Y. 267; nor from mere presents or letters not to the point ; see Com. v. Walton, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 487; [1891] 2 Q. B. 534; nor from the plaintiff's wedding preparations, unknown to the de fendant; Cates v. McKinney, 48 Ind. 562, 17 Am. Rep. 768; Walmsley v. Robinson, 63 EL 41, 14 Am. Rep. 111; nor from the woman's unexplained possession of an engagement ring; Com. v. Walton, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 487.
Under the law allowing parties to an ac tion to testify, a promise of marriage cannot be inferred from the mere proof of circum stances such as usually attend an engage ment to marry. In the absence of fraud, there must be proof of an actual contract; a meeting of minds of the two parties. Courtship alone or mere intention to marry is not enough. Thorough acquaintance with character, habits, and disposition is essen tial in order to enter into such a contract intelligently, and an opportunity must be al lowed to form the acquaintance which is re qffired, without raising the inference of a contract; Yale v. Curtiss, 151 N. Y. 598, 45 N. E. 1125. Mere courtship is not an agree ment to marry ; Burnham v. Cornwell, 16 B. Mon. (Ky.) 284, 63 Am. Dec. 529; Walmsley v. Robinson, 63 Ill. 41, 14 Am. Rep. 111.