When the parties are at a distance from each other, and the offer is made by letter, it will be presumed to continue for a rea sonable time for the consideration of the party addressed; and if accepted within a reasonable time, and before it is expressly revoked, the contract is then complete; 1 Pars. Contr. 84. No particular form of words is necessary ; Homan v. Earle, 53 N. Y. 267.
A promise of marriage is not within the third clause of the fourth section of the statute of frauds relating to agreements made upon consideration of marriage; but if not to be performed within a year, it has been held to be within the fifth clause, and must, therefore, be in writing in order to be binding; 1 Ld. Raym. 387; Short v. Stotts, 58 Ind. 29 ; Derby v. Phelps, 2 N. H. 515. But the later cases are inclined to construe the statute so as not to affect promises to marry ; Lawrence v. Cooke, 56 Me. 187, 96 Am. Dec. 443 ; Clark v. Pendleton, 20 Conn. 495 ; the marriage may be performed within a year, and that is enough. See Blackburn v. Mann, 85 Ill. 222.
If no time be fixed and agreed upon for the of the contract, it is, in con templation of law, a contract to marry with in a reasonable period, considering the cir cumstances of the age, pecuniary means, etc., of the contracting parties, and either party may call upon the other to fulfil the en gagement, and in case of default may bring an action for damages. If both lie by for an unreasonable period, and do not treat the contract as continuing, it will be deemed to be abandoned by mutual consent. If the parties are somewhat advanced In years, and the marriage is appointed to take place at a remote period of time, the contract would be voidable at the option of either party, as in restraint of marriage ; Addison, Contr. 678.
On a promise to marry within a reasonable time, a plea that the defendant, after the promise and before the breach, became af flicted with occasional bleeding from the lungs and therefore incapable of marriage without great danger to his life, and there fore unfit for the married state, of which plaintiff had notice, was held bad in a much considered case in the Exchequer Chamber; E. B. & E. 746.
The fact that the plaintiff consented to a two years' postponement of the wedding-day does not relieve the defendant from his promise ; Nearing v. Van Fleet, 71 Hun 137, 24 N. Y. Supp. 531.
Upon a refusal by one party, to marry, an action hes at once, although the time set for the marriage has not come ; Leake, Contr. 752; Burtis v. Thompson, 42 N. Y. 246, 1 Am. Rep. 516; so if a party puts it out of his power to perform his promise of marriage; Sheahan v. Barry, 27 Mich. 217; 15 M. &
W. 189. An action lies when one party has given notice that he will not fulfil his prom ise, although the time for fulfilment has not arrived; L. R. 8 G. P. 167; or has ceased his attentions ; Lemke v. Franzenburg (Ia.] 141 N. W. 332 ; see BREACH ; no demand nor tender d performance is necessary before bringing suit; Kelley v. Brennan, 18 R. I. 41, 25 Atl. 346. A refusal to fulfil the con tract may be as well manifested by acts as by words. After the lapse of a reasonable time, if one party, without excuse, neglects or refuses to fulfil his promise, the other' may consider this a breach and sue; Bennett v. Beam, 42 Mich. 346, 4 N. W. 8, 36 Am. Rep. 442.
The defences which may be made to an action for a breach of promise A marriage are, of course, various. If either party has been convicted of an infamous crime, or has sustained a bad' reputation generally, and the other was ignorant of it at the time of the engagement; or if the woman has com mitted fornication, and this was unknown at the time•to the man who promised to marry her, or if the woman prove unchaste subse quently; Von Storch v. Griffin, 77 Pa. 504; Sprague v. Craig, 51 Ill. 288 ; or if the wom an is deeply involved in debt at the time of the engagement, and the fact is kept secret from her intended husband; Add. Contr. 680; but see E. B. & E. 796; or if false representations are made by the woman, or by her friends in collusion with her, as to her circumstances and situation in life and the amount of her fortune and marriage por tion, any of these will constitute a good defence; 1 C. & P. 350, 529; Berry v. Bake man, 44 Me. 164 ; 1 C. & K. 463; Morgan v. Yarborough, 5 La. Ann. 316 ; Butler v. Eschle man, 18 Ill. 44. But it has been held not to be a defence that the plaintiff at the time of the engagement was under an engagement to marry another person, unless the prior en gagement was fraudulently concealed; E. B. & E. 796. But see 2 Pars. Contr. 550. And the defendant's pre-engagement would be no defence ; Schoul. Husb. & W. § 48. It is not justification of a breach of promise to marry a woman, to show that she has been heard to use obscene language; 8 Can. L. J. 426; or is unchaste (if the man knew it); Bowman v. Bowman, 153 Ind. 498, 55 N. E. 422; or that the plaintiff had negro blood in her veins; Van Houten v. Morse, 162 Mass. 414, 38 N. E. 705, 26 L. R. A. 430, 44 Am. St. Rep. 373; and where marriage be tween cousins is not forbidden by statute, such relationship will not mitigate or excuse a breach of promise to marry ; Alberts v. Albertz, 78 Wis. 72, 47 N. W. 95, 10 L. R. A. 584.