The equal protection of the laws is not denied to a railroad company by a constitu tional provision which prohibits it from charging more for a shorter than for a longer haul except by peimission of a railroad com mission ; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U. S. 503, 22 Sup. Ct. 95, 46 L. Ed. 298.
The power to determine what compensa tion a public service corporation, as a tel ephone company, may charge for its service is a legislative and not a judicial function; Nebraska Tel. Co. v. State, 55 Neb. 627, 76 N. W. 171, 45 L. R. A. 113 ; Knoxville v. Water Co., 212 U. S. 1, 29 Sup. Ct. 148, 53 L. Ed. 371. Whether existing rates are rea sonable is a judicial question; MadisOn v. Gas & Electric Co., 129 Wis. 249, 108 N. W. 65, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 529, 9 Ann. Cas. 819 ; Coving ton & L. T. R. Co. v. Sanford, 20 S. W. 1031, 14 Ky. L. Rep. 689 (a turnpike company); or whether they are so unreasonably low as to deprive the carrier of its property with out compensation and therefore without due process of law ; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 18 Sup. Ct. 418, 42 L. Ed. 819. A state may authorize its railroad commission to reduce, as unreasonable, a joint through rate agreed upon by two or more railroad companies and apportion the same among the com panies ; Minneapolis & St. L, R. Co. v. Minne sota, 186 U. S. 257, 22 Sup. Ct. 900, 46 L. Ed. 1151.
The legislature may act directly, or, in the absence of constitutional restriction, it may. commit the authority to fix rates to a sub ordinate body ; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Com., 206 U. S. 1, 27 Sup. Ct. 585, 51 L. Ed. 933, 11 Ann. Cas. 398 ; Honolulu Rapid Transit & L. Co. v. Hawaii, 211 U. S. 282, 29 Sup. Ct. 55, 53 L. Ed. 186. The state may create a commission and give it the power of regulating rates and the judiciary will only interfere with such commission when it ap pears that it has clearly transcended its powers ; Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. R. Com., 231 U. S. 457, 34 Sup. Ct. 152, 58 L. Ed. -. The state may delegate its power to regulate charges of common carriers to a municipal corporation ; Chicago Union T. Co. v. Chi cago, 199 Ill. 484, 65 N. E. 451, 59 L. R. A. 631; but a county board of supervisors could not delegate its power to fix rates by entering into a contract that the question of charges should be referred, though, after a decision under the reference, it could adopt the rates fixed with the same effect as if they had been fixed by it in the beginning; San Francisco Gas Light Co. v. Dunn, 62 Cal. 580. An order of a railroad commis sion fixing rates is a legislative act under its delegated power. It has the same force as if made by the legislature; Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Ind. R. R. Comm., 221 U. S. 400, 31 Sup. Ct. 537, 55 L. Ed. 786; within the
meaning of the contract clause of the con stitution it is a law passed by the state; St. Paul Gas Light Co. v. St. Paul, 181 U. S. 142, 21 Sup. Ct. 575, 45 L. Ed. 788. But as such an order had full legislative effect, a provision of a contract which bad previous ly become subject to legislative operation could not be asserted against its operation ; Louisville & N. It. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 318, 34 Sup. Ct. 48, 58 L. Ed.
Every legislative rate case presents three questions of prime importance: Reasonable value of the plant ; probable effect of the reduced rate upon the net income ; deductions from gross receipts as a fund to preserve the plant from depreciation ; Lincoln Gas & E. L. Co. v. Lincoln, 223 U. S. 349, 32 Sup. Ct. 271, 56 L. Ed. 466.
A statute regulating railroad rates does not impair the obligation of contracts unless the effect is to take from the company all the profits ; Beardsley v. R. Co., 162 N. Y. 230, 56 N. E. 488.
"Reasonable" rates must be based upon the "fair value of the property being used by it for the convenience of the public"; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 18 Sup. Ct. 418, 42 L. Ed. 819, where evidence was taken at the trial as to the investments and earnings of the railroad company, and the court said: "The question is not how much he makes out of his volume of business, but whether in each particular transaction the charge is an unreasonable exaction for the services ren dered He has a right to charge for each separate service that which is a rea sonable compensation therefor ; and the legis lature may not deny him such reasonable compensation and may not interfere simply because, out of the multitude of his transac tions, the amount of his profits is large." A state may prescribe what shall be rea sonable charges for intrastate transportation. The Commerce Act expressly leaves it with the states ; Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 33 Sup. Ct. 729, 57 L. Ed. 1511. This is a legislative and not a judicial act, and the legislature may act directly or, in the ab sence of constitutional restriction, commit the authority to a subordinate body ; Louis ville & N. R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298, 34 Sup. Ct. 48, 58 L. Ed. Such rates are presumptively valid, but the company is en titled to have the question of whether they are confiscatory determined in judicial pro ceedings. And while a state may double or treble damages upon a carrier for over charging, it cannot impose a fixed amount as liquidated damages in every case, regard less of, and in many cases many times in excess of, the actual damages ; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Tucker, 230 U. S. 340, 33 Sup. Ct. 961, 57 L. Ed. 1507.