The charging or receiving a greater com pensation for the shorter than for the longer haul is only forbidden when both are under substantially similar circumstances and con ditions ; Interstat9 Commercb Commission v.
R. Co., 50 Fed. 295 ; Behlmer v. R. Co., 71 id. 835 ; and competition in transportation does not prevent substantially similar circumstanc es and conditions ; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Com., 104 Ky. 226, 46 S. W. 707, 47 S. W. 210, 598, 43 L. R. A. 541 (this suit involved the con struction of a state statute including a long and short haul provision similar to that in the act of congress to regulate commerce) ; but the right of the carrier to take into con sideration the existence of competition as the producing cause of dissimilar circumstances and conditions was recognized ; Louisville & N.
R. Co. v. Behlmer, 175 U. S. 648, 20 Sup. Ct. 209, 44 L. Ed. 309 ; and allowed ; East Ten nessee, Va. & G. R. Co. v. Commission, 181 U.
S. 1, 21 Sup. Ct. 516, 45 L. Ed. 719, where it was held that competition which is control ling on traffic and rates produces in and of itself the dissimilarity of circumstances and conditions described in the statute (revers ing East Tennessee, Va. & G. R. Co. v. Com mission, 99 Fed. 52, 39 C. C. A. 413) ; Inter state Commerce Commission v. R. Co., 168 U.
S. 144, 18 Sup. Ct. 45, 42 L. Ed. 414 ; Behlmer v. R. Co., 71 Fed. 835 ; Interstate Commerce Commission v. R. Co., 73 Fed. 409; Inter state Commerce Commission v. R. Co., 209 U. S. 108, 28 Sup. Ct. 493, 52 L. Ed. 705. Ocean competition may constitute a dissimi lar condition ; and circumstances and con ditions which exist beyond the seaboard of the United States can be legitimately re garded for the purpose of justifying a dif ference in rates charged by railroads be tween import and domestic traffic; Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Commission, 162 U. S. 197, 16 Sup. Ct. 666, 40 L. Ed. 940. The possibili ty of competition arising at a. particular point does not render freight rates to that point, though higher than those for a longer haul to • a point where competition prevails, ob noxious to the prohibition of the interstate commerce act against a greater charge for a shorter than for a longer haul under sub stantially similar circumstances and condi tions ; Interstate Commerce Commission v. R. Co., 190 U. S. 273, 23 Sup. Ct. 687, 47 L. Ed. 1047.
Where a railroad company charged one coal company less for transportation than it charged the plaintiffs, it was not a justifica tion that it was done in consideration of the coal company selling coal to the railroad company for its own use at a certain price and of the compromise and settlement of a claim of the coal company against the rail road company ; Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Good
ridge, 149 U. S. 680, 13 Sup. Ct. 970, 37 L. Ed. 896, 149 U. S. 680.
In the absence of congressional legislation, public service Corporations are amenable to common law rules of the state of the forum relative to discrimination in rates for inter state service ; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pub. Co., 181 U. S. 92, 21 Sup. Ct. 561, 45 L. Ed. 765, affirming id. 58 Neb. 192, 78 N. W. 519.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION ; REBATE.
An agreement to adopt an act performed by another for us.
Eopreis ratifications are those made in ex press and direct terms of assent. Implied ratifications are such as the law presumes from the acts of the principal ; as, if Peter buy goods for James, and the latter, knowing the fact, receive them and apply them to his own use.
Ratification of a contract implies an ex isting person on whose behalf the contract might have been made at the time. There cannot, in law, be a ratification of a con tract which could not have been made bind ing on the ratifier at the time it was made, because the ratifier was not then in exist ence. McArthur v. Print. Co., 48 Minn. 319, 51 N. W. 216, 31 Am. St. Rep. 653.
A party from whom a contract has been wrung by duress must disclaim it on the re covery of freedom, subsequent recognition is the equivalent of ratification ; Sternback v. Friedman, 23 Misc. Rep. 173, 50 N. Y. Supp• 1025.
A ratification, to be efficacious, must be made by a party who had power to do the act in the first place, and it must be made with knowledge of the material facts ; West ern N. Bank v. Armstrong, 152 U. S. 346, 14 Sup. Ct. 572, 38 L. Ed. 470.
Wheie there has been actual and positive fraud, or the adverse party has acted niala fide, there can be no such thing as a con firmation ; Chamberlain v. McClurg, 8 W. & S. (Pa.) 36. The ratification of the sign lug of a bond by an obligor whose signature has been forged, does not render him liable thereon, there being no new consideration ; McHugh v. Schuylkill Co., 67 Pa. 391, 5 Am. Rep. 445; Workman v. Wright, 33 Ohio St. 405, 31 Am. Rep. 546; Pollock, Contr. 114. But if a contract be merely against con science, then if a party, being fully informed of all the circumstances of it and objections to it, voluntarily confirms it, his ratification will stand; Negley v. Lindsay, 67 Pa. 217, 5 Am. Rep. 427; Hefner v. Vandolah, 62 DI. 483, 14 Am. Rep. 106.
As to the ratification of a contract made or an act done by a person claiming to act as the agent, and as to the creation of an agen cy by the ratification of acts previously done, see PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.
As to ratification of treaties, see TREATY.