STARE DECISIS (Lat.). To abide by, or adhere to, decided cases. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. It is a general maxim that when a point of law has been settled by decision, it forms a precedent which is not afterwards to be departed from. The rule as stated is "to abide by former precedents, stare decisis, where the same points come again in litigation, as well to keep the scale of justice even and steady, and not liable to waver with every new judge's opinion, as also because, the law in that case being sol emnly declared and determined, what before was uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now become a permanent rule, which it is not in the breast of any subsequent judge to alter or swerve from according to his private sentiments ; he being sworn to determine, not according to his own private judgment, but according to the known laws and customs of the land,—not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one—jus dicere et non jus dare." Broom, Leg. Max., 7th ed. 147. As it was said by Al derson, B., "My duty is plain. It is to ex pound and not to make the law ; to decide on it as I find it, not as I may wish it to be ;" 7 Exch. 543, quoted by Coltman, J., in 4 C. B. 560.
"What I desire to point out is that I wish the law was not so, but being the law I must follow it." Romer, J., in L. R. 1, C. P. 605 (1899). "I agree that It is the law, though I think it is a hard law ; but we have noth ing to do with the question of hardship." Lord Esher, M. R.,' in L. R. 24 Q. B. D. 618 (1890).
Settled principles of law cannot be dis regarded in order to remove the hardship of special cases ; Buchanan v. Litchfield, 102 U. S. 278, 26 L. Ed. 138 ; the doctrine should not be departed from except in extreme cas es; Brennan v. New York, 47 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 178; or except in a case of grave ne cessity ; State v. Ross, 43 Wash. 290, 86 Pac. 575. It is very serious for a judge, whp does not agree with particular decisions, to deal in distinctions from those decisions; Jessel, M. R., in L. R. 6 0. P. 559.
The doctrine of stare decisis is not always to be relied upon; for the courts find it nec essary to overrule cases which have been decided contrary to principle. It should not be pressed too far ; 8 Gr. Bag 257. Many hundreds of such overruled cases may be found in the American and English re ports.
The rule is founded on public policy and does not require a court to follow a clearly erroneous authority ; Mason v. Cotton Co., 148 N. C. 492, 62 S. E. 625, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1221, 128 Am St. Rep. 635; it should be applied to a judgment of four out of five judges (a majority of the whole number, Seven), where the case was fully argued and was considered at great length, where there has been no change in the trend of judicial opinion and the decision has been favorably received by the profession; L. D. Willcutt &
Sons Co. v. Driscoll, 200 Mass. 11.0, 85 N. E. 897, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1236. • "The rule of stare decisis means, In gener al, that when a point has been once settled by judicial decision, it forms a precedent for the guidance of courts in similar cases." It should "in the main be strictly adhered to. An adherence to it is necessary to preserve the certainty, the stability and symmetry of our jurisprudence. Nevertheless there are occasions when a departure from it is ren dered necessary in order to vindicate plain and obvious principles of law, and to remedy a continued injustice." These are the two grounds of justification in departing from a decision which has become a precedent. La mar, J., in The 'Madrid, 40 Fed. 677, where it was held that decisions of the circuit courts of appeal, not being uniform as to the rela tive'priority of statutory and maritime liens, have not become a rule of property within the doctrine; id.
The doctrine is a salutary one and is to be adhered to on proper occasions, in respect of decisions directly upon points in issue; but the supreme court should not extend any decision upon a constitutional question if it is convinced that error in principle might supervene; Pollock v. Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 15 Sup. Ct. 673, 39 L. Ed. 759; and there are cases in which a court of last resort has felt constrained by a sense of duty to disregard all precedents, even their own. This is particularly so in con stitutional questions involving the validity of statutes affecting public interests, but where no right of property or contract inter partes Is involved. In such a case, said Bleckley, C. J., the maxim for a supreme court "supreme in the majesty of duty as well as in the majesty of power," is not stare decisis, but fiat justitia mat coelum; Ellison v. R. Co., 87 Ga. 691, 13 S. E. 809; and it was said by Howard, J., in quoting this language: "Let this decision be right whether other decisions were right or not ;" Denney v. State, 144 Ind. 539, 42 N. E. 929, 31 L. R. A. 726 (involving the validity of statutes of apportionment of legislative rebresentatives). It has been said that the doctrine applies with less force in constitu tional cases than in ordinary cases of prop erty rights; Robinson v. Schenck, 102 Ind. 307, 1 N. E. 698; but in Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U. S. 34, 27 Sup. Ct. 419, 51 L. Ed. 696, 10 Ann. Cas. 525, it was held that a long established and steadily adhered to principle of constitutional construction precludes a judicial tribunal from holding a legal enact ment, federal or state, Pinconstitutional and void unless it is manifestly so ; Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U. S. 34, 27 Sup. Ct. 419, 51 L. Ed. 696, 10 Ann. Cas. 525.