Stare Decisis

court, rule, law, decisions, decision, courts, ed and co

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This rule urges the court against revers ing a long series of decisions where state legislation has been enacted in reliance thereon and a reversal would involve the promulgation of a new rule of constitutional Inhibition on state legislation; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge Co., 231 U. S. 493, 34 Sup. Ct. 167, 58 L. Ed. And a court when asked to do so should consider how far its action would affect transactions en tered into and acted upon, under the law as it exists; Sydnor v. Gascoigne, 11 Tex. 455. Where there have been a series of decisions by the supreme judicial tribunal of a state, the rule of stare decisis may usually be re garded as impregnable, except by legislative act; Harrow v. Myers, 29 Ind. 470. Espe cially is this the case where the law has become settled as a rule of property, and titles have become vested on the strength of it; Reed v. Ownby, 44 Mo. 206; Brown v. Finley, 157 Ala. 424, 47 South. 577, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 679, 131 Am. St. Rep. 68, 16 Ann. Cas. 778; and even an isolated decision will not be reversed when it has remained undis puted for a long time, and rights to land have been acquired under it; Hihn v. Courtis, 31 Cal. 402. The court will not overrule cases upon which conveyancers may have relied, even though the court does not consider the case a sensible decision; [1891] 1 Ch. 258.

In Saffell v. Orr, 109 Va. 768, 64 S. E. 1057, there had been two previous decisions overruled by a third, and the title in ques tion had been taken since the two decisions and prior to the third; and the court held that the first two cases established no rule of property and followed the third case. This case is severely criticised in 15 Va. L. Reg. 967.

It has been said that the doctrine of stare decisis has greater or less force according to the nature of the question decided, those questions where the decisions do not consti tute a business rule, e. g. as where personal liberty is, involved, will be met only by the general considerations which favor certain ty and stability in the law ; but where a decision relates to the validity of certain modes of transacting business, and a change of decision must necessarily invalidate every thing done in the mode prescribed by the for mer case, as in the manner of executing deeds or wills, the maxim becomes impera tive, and no court is at liberty to change it; Kneeland v. Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 691. An

erroneous decision subsequently overruled, though the law of the particular case, and binding on the parties, does not conclude other parties having rights depending on the same question; Bradshaw v. Mill Co., 52 Minn. 59, 53 N. W. 1066. The United States courts will follow the decisions of those of the several states in interpreting state laws ; but when the decisions of the state courts are unsettled and conflicting the rule does not apply; Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. (U. 'S.) 205, 17 L. Ed. 520 ; Supervisors v. Schenck, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 772, 18 L. Ed. 556. When titles to real estate depend on any compact between states, the rule of de cision will not be drawn from either of the states ; Marlatt's Lessee v. Silk, 11 Pet. (U. S.) 1, 9 L. K4..609.

In matters relating to the construction of treaties, constitutional provisions, or laws of the United States, the authority .of the fed eral courts is paramount, while e converso in the construction of state constitutions and state laws, the decisions of the state courts are final within their jurisdiction; Doe v. Hamilton, 23 Miss. 498, 57 Am. Dec. 149; Wells, Res. Adj. & Stare Decisis 583.

On a question not of statutory construc tion, but of the application of a rule of the common law, the circuit court of appeals is bound by a decision of the United States supreme court, but not by those of the high est courts of the various states ; Methven v. Power Co., 66 Fed. 113, 13 C. C. A. 362, 35 U. S. App. 67.

See Cooley, Const., 2d ed. 137 Green]. Over ruled Cases; 1 Kent 477; Livingston, Syst. of Pen. Law 104.

In [1899] 2 Q. B. 439, there were found two cases in the House of Lords all but con tradictory (10 App. Cas. 438 and 14 id. 381). The court "did under these circumstances the best they could." They undertook to dis tinguish the two cases. "Whether their judg ment, should it come before the House of Lords, will be upheld, is a matter on which it were rash to pronounce an opinion." 15 L. Q. Rev. 340.

See Jenkins, Century vi., for a list of curious aphorisms on this subject ; also an essay on the doctrine, its reasons and extent, by Daniel H. Chamberlain, N. Y. St. Bar Ass'n, 1885; AUTHORITIES ; PRECEDENTS ; COMITY; LAW OF THE CASE; JUDGE-MADE LAW; JUDICIAL LEGISLATION ; JUDICIAL POW ER. See Lonstorf v. Lonstorf, 118 Wis. 159, 95 N. W. 961, and the dissenting opinion, for a full discussion.

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