Legislation by two states authorizing the union of two corporations, one of each state, does not, in the absence of legislation by Con gress to the contrary, come within the con stitutional prohibition of compacts between states; Mackay v. R. Co., 82 Conn. 73, 72 Atl. 583, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 768.
The indestructibility of the states' of the Union is well illustrated by the recognition of the existence of de facto governments, so far as required to preserve their political en tity, of the states which composed the Con federate States. The rule laid down by the supreme court as to the validity of their leg islation during the civil war was that acts necessary to domestic peace and good order and the administration of the ordinary func tions of government must be regarded as valid and that acts in furtherance or support of rebellion against the United States, or in tended to defeat the just rights of citizens, were void ; Texas v. White, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 700, 19 L. Ed. 227; Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176, 24 L. Ed. 716.
A state has an inherent right to fix the character of property acquired by its citizens, and the terms under which it shall be held, independently of the federal government ; Curry v. Wilson, 57 Wash. 509, 107 I'ac. 367.
There is nothing in the federal constitution to prevent a state from changing the coalition law, as In authorizing damages where they were not allowed at common law ; Ivy v. Telegraph Co., 165 Fed. 371.
Federal laws may be affected by state stat utes, not by disputing their authority, but by sometimes changing their application; Ma guire v. U. S., 43 Ct. Cl. 400.
The title of the state to the seacoast and the shores of tide rivers is different from the fee simple which an individual holds in lands. It is not a proprietary, but a sovereign right. It is an incident to and is a part of its sov ereignty, that cannot be surrendered, alienat ed or delegated, except for some public pur pose or some reasonable use for the public benefit ; Coxe v. State, 144 N. Y. 396, 39 N. E. 400 ; Cooley, Const. Lim. 651, 524.
In New Jersey It was held in an early case that the state as sovereign, having both the legal and equitable estates, might ma ke such disposition of tide lands as they saw fit, but that it could not make a direct and absolute grant, divesting all the citizens of their com mon rights ; Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N. J. L. 1,
10 Am. Dec. 356. This decision was criticised In Gough v. Bell, 22 N. J. L. 459 ; and in Wooley v. Campbell, 37 N. J. L. 163, where it was said the trust doctrine in regard to the state's title to tide lands in New Jersey may be said to extend no further than that the legislature cannot destroy navigation, to the material injury of the public.
In New York, though the state was said to hold the title as trustee of a public trust, the legislature, as representing the people, was held to be empowered to grant the soil or confer an exclusive privilege in tide waters, or to authorize a use inconsistent with the public rights, subject to the paramount con trol of congress ; People v. New York & S. I. Ferry Co., 68 N. Y. 71; Saunders v. R. Co., 144 N. Y. 75, 38 N. E. 992, 26 L. R. A. 378, 43 Am. St. Rep. 729 ; Langdon v. New York, 93 N. Y. 129. Such privileges should not im pair the rights of the whole people of the state in the use of the waters or the lands thereunder for the purposes 'implied by law; State v. Black River Phosphate Co.. 32 Fla. 82, 13 South. 640, 21 L. R. A. 189 ; State v. Gerbing, 56 Fla. 603, 47 South. 353, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 337, where a statute providing for limited privileges to Individuals to plant oysters in the public waters of a state was held not to authorize the conveyance of title to the land.
A state may lose its sovereignty and ju risdiction over its territory by prescription and acquiescence, where the facts are clearly established ; Moore v. McGuire, 142 Fed. 787, where it was said that whether this was so had never been authoritatively determined, but several cases between states were cited at length as tending to show that In the opin ion of the supreme court such was the law. The decision of the circuit court was reversed on the facts, and this question was therefore not considered by the supreme court ; Moore v. McGuire, 205 U. S. 214, 27 Sup. Ct. 483, 51 L. Ed. 776. That long acquiescence by states in a given situation with respect to the boundary line between them may by length of time become conclusive was held in Fran zini v. Layland, 120 Wis. 72, 97 N. W. 499.