The question much discussed both in fed eral and state courts as to obligation of the latter to enforce acts of congress, and how far that body may invest the state courts with judicial power, was considered very ful ly in an opinion in Zikos v. Oregon R. & N. Co., 179 Fed. 893, where cases on the subject are collected and the conclusion reached that, where substantive rights were created in vir tue of the power of congress under a particu lar subject (as interstate commerce), they may be availed of in any court of competent juris diction. The enforcement by the state courts or rights so created does not depend on comity only, but there is a stronger reason growing out of the more intimate relation of the states to the general government. The court said (p. 901): "The constitution of the United States be ing the supreme law of the land, state and fed eral courts are alike subject to its provisions, and the refusal of the former to enforce rights conferred by congress would put them in the same category as would a refusal to entertain causes flowing from any other recognized source of authority. It would be an anomaly in our system if state tribunals, after having so long entertained the grievances of liti gants, where rights are traceable to congres sional legislation, should refuse to further do so because of the fact that there Las been provided, by a power clearly competent, dif ferent rules of liability for those engaged in interstate commerce from those which may be fixed by statute or recognized by decisions in the several states. . . . It is not to be supposed that state courts will or can re fuse to abide by the result when the supreme court, the final arbiter, has decided that they have jurisdiction. If that should occur, the constitution would cease to be the supreme law of the land, and its express provisiOn that the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding,' would become null and its application inop erative." The Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 57, 32 Sup. Ct 169, 56 L. Ed. 327, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 44, were cases in which the state court had declined to entertain a suit for the enforcement of rights accruing under the act of congress, holding that such rights could not be enforced, as of right, in the state courts, although their jurisdiction was ade quate to the occasion, and the suggestion was made as one of the grounds for declining ju risdiction that the act of congress was not in harmony with the policy of the state. That suggestion was said by the supreme court to he "inadmissible," because it presupposes what in legal contemplation does not exist. The opinion proceeded: "When congress, in the exercise of the power confided to it by the constitution, adopted that act, it spoke for all the people and all the states, and thereby established a policy for all. That policy is as much the policy of Connecticut as if the act had emanated from its own leg islature, and should be respected accordingly in the courts of -the state. As was said by this court in Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130, 136, 137, 23 L. Ed. 833: 'The laws of the United States are laws in the several states, and just as much binding on the citi zens and courts thereof as the state laws are. The United States is not a foreign sovereign ty as regards the several states, but is a con current, and within its jurisdiction para mount, sovereignty. . . . If an act of congress gives a penalty [meaning civil and remedial] to a party aggrieved, without spec ifying a remedy for its enforcement, there is no reason why it should not be enforced, if not provided otherwise by some act of con gress, by a proper action in a state court. The fact that a state court derives its ex istence and functions from the state laws is no reason why it should not afford relief, be cause it is subject also to the laws of the United States, and is just as much bound to recognize these as operative within the state as it is to recognize the state laws. The two together form one system of jurisprudence, which constitutes the law of the land for the state; and the courts of the two jurisdictions are not foreign to each other, nor to be treat ed by each other as such, but as courts of the same country, having jurisdiction partly dif ferent and partly concurrent. . . . It is true, the sovereignties are distinct, and nei ther can interfere with the proper jurisdic tion of the other, as was so clearly shown by Chief Justice Taney, in the case of Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. (U. S.) 506, 16 L. Ed. 169 ; and hence the state courts have no power to revise the action of the federal courts, nor the federal the state, except where the fed eral constitution or laws are involved. But this is no reason why the state courts should not be open for the prosecution of rights growing out of the laws of the United States, to which their jurisdiction is competent, and not denied.' " This decision, in which the opinion was de livered by Van Deventer, J., disposed of two cases, In one of which (Walsh v. R. Co., 173 Fed. 494) the federal Employers' Liability Act of April 22, 1908, was held constitutional by the circuit court in Massachusetts, and in the other of which (Hoxie v. R. Co., 82
Conn. 352, 73 Atl. 754, 17 Ann. Cas. 324) the state court held that it was not bound to en force that act ; in the opinion in the lat ter case will be found the argument in sup port of that view. The first case was affirm ed and the second reversed, and the opinion of the supreme court may be considered as a sufficient statement of the law on the subject as declared by the tribunal of last resort.
Upon the admissicon of a new state it enters into an indissoluble relation as complete and perpetual as the union between the original states; Texas v. White, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 700, L9 L. Ed. 227. It was competent for the fram ?rs of the state constitution to provide against in interregnum in the government in the change from the territory to a state; State v. Meadows, 1 Kan. 90.
Since congress has no power to admit a state into the Union except on an equal foot ing with the original states, the admission fixes its status, anything in the enabling act to the contrary notwithstanding, and confers on the state the exclusive power to enact its own laws regulating intrastate commerce and the introduction and sale of intoxicating liq uors; U. S. v. U. •S. Express Co., 180 Fed. 1006.
When a state is admitted to the Union, it stands upon the footing of the original states and possesses all the powers which inherently belonged to a state, and its powers are not limited by savings or exceptions in the en abling act; Smith v. State, 28 Okl. 235, 113 Pac. 932; Coyle v. Smith, 28 Old. 121, 113 Pac. 944, affirmed id., 221 U. S. 559, 31 Sup. Ct. 688, 55 L. Ed. 853; where a condition in the enabling act that the capital of the state should be located at a certain place, and not changed therefrom previous to 1913, ceased to be a valid limitation on the power of the state after its admission; and this applies even where the enabling act also required that the constitutional convention should accept its terms and adopt an ordinance in accordance therewith; McCabe v. Ry. Co., 186 Fed. 966, 109 C. C. A. 110. Congress may not, save in the exercise of a power conferred by the con stitution, reserve to itself, in the admission of a new state, police power exercised by the other states; U. S. v. Sandoval, 198 Fed. 539.
An offence committed in a territory before its admission may be prosecuted in the courts of the state after its admission; Ex parte Bailey, 20 Okl. 497, 94 Pac. 553; Ex parte Warford, 3 Old.' Cr. 381, 106 Pac. 559; but the trial must proceed under the laws in force in the territory at the time of admis sion; Birdwell v. U. S., 4 Oki. Cr. 472, 113 Pac. 205; but where the action was com menced after statehood, the procedure in force in the state applies, though the cause arose prior to statehood; Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Bank, 32 Okl. 290, 122 Pac. 499.
Constitutional Guarantee of a Republican Form of Government. The fourth section of the fourth article of the constitution directs that "the United States shalt guarantee to every state in the Union a republican form of government." Mill. Const. U. S. 640. The form of government is to be guaranteed, which supposes a form already established; and this is the republican form of government the United States have undertaken to pro tect. See Story, Const. § 1807.
In the sense of the constitutional guaran tee of a republican form of government, the term "state" is used to express the idea of a people or political community, as distinguish ed from the government ; Texas v. White, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 700, 19 L. Ed. 227.
A republican government, once established, may be endangered so as to call for the ac tion of congress : 1. By the hostile action of some foreign power, and taking possession of the territory of some state, and setting up a government therein not established by the people. 2. By the revolutionary action of the people themselves in forcibly rising against the constituted authorities and set ting the government aside, or attempting to do so, for some other. In either of the above cases, it will be the duty of the federal gov ernment to protect the people of the state by the employment of military force. Cooley, Const., 2d ed. 202; see Texas v. White, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 700, 19 L. Ed. 227; Luther v. Borden, 7 How. (U. S.) 1, 3, 12 L. Ed. 581. Even in strict accordance with the forms prescribed for amending a state constitution, it would be possible for the people of the state to ef fect such changes as would deprive it of its republican character. It has been suggested that it would then be the duty of congress to intervene. In any case there could probably be no appeal from the decision of congress. Cooley, Const. 196. And such is now definite ly settled as the law by the supreme court, which has decided that the guarantee to every state of a republican form of govern ment is a political question belonging to con gress; Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Ore gon, 223 U. S. 118, 32 Sup. Ct. 224, 56 L. Ed. 377; Kiernan V. Portland, Oregon, 223 U. S. 151. It means government by the citizens en masse, acting directly, though not personally, according to rules established by the majori ty; Kiernan v. Portland, 57 Or. 454, 111 Pac. 379, 112 Pac. 402, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 339.