One person cannot have two domicils for the purpose of taxation; Richards v. Dag get, 4 Mass. 534 ; nor can one be abandoned until another is acquired ; Borland v. Bos ton, 132 Mass. 89, 42 Am. Rep. 424. See DOMICIL, There may be a tax upon occupations even if it duplicates taxes; Cooley, Tax. 385. They are usually by way of license, as dis tinguished from a tax upon the business au thorized by the license to be carried on; Home Ins. Co. v. Augusta, 50 Ga. 530.
Such taxes have been laid on bankers, auc tioneers, lawyers; Simmons v. State, 12 Mo. 268, 49 Am. Dec. 131; Ould v. Richmond, 23 Grat. (Va.) 464, 14 Am. Rep. 139; clergy men; Miller v. Kirkpatrick, 29 Pa. 226; ped dlers, etc. See License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 462, 18 L. Ed. 497, as to federal li cense taxes.
A license fee is a charge for the privilege of carrying on a business or occupation and is not the equivalent or in lieu of a proper ty tax; New York v. Tax Com'rs, 199 U. S. 48, 25 Sup. Ct. 705, 50 L. Ed. 65, 4 Ann. Cas. 381. A privilege tax may both regulate the business under the police power, and produce revenue, if authorized by the law of the state; Bradley v. Richmond, 227 U. S. 477, 33 Sup. Ct. 318, 57 L. Ed. 603. Its bleness is within the discrimination of the state; In re Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U. S. 576, 34 Sup. Ct. 372, 58 L. Ed. A state may classify occupations and impose different tax es upon different occupations; Kehrer v. Stewart, 197 U. S. 60, 25 Sup. Ct. 403, 49 L.
Ed. 663. The classification of merchants sell ..
ing sewing machines at regular places of business and manufacturers selling by trav eling salesmen is not unreasonable; such laws will not be set aside as discriminatory if there is any rational basis for the classi fication; Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Brick ell, 233 U. S. 304, 34 Sup. Ct. 493, 58 L. Ed. -. So of grading dairies; Birmingham v. Goldstein, 151 Ala. 473, 44 South. 113, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 568, 125 Am. St. Rep. 33; but not of discriminating between oil wagons and other wagons; Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Hot Springs, 85 Ark. 509, 109 S. W. 293, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1035.
While the amount of the license or fee is usually a question for the taxing power, yet the rule is subject to the limitation that the tax should not be a prohibition of any legit imate business; Fiscal Court, Owen Co., etc., v. F. & A. Cox Co., 132 Ky. 738, 117 S. W.
296, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 83; Morton v. Macon, 111 Ga. 162, 36 S. E. 627, 50 L. R. A. 485. A license tax of $800 on private bankers is valid; Bradley & Co. v. Richmond, 110 Va. 521, 66 S. E. 872; and one of $100; Seattle v. Barto, 31 Wash. 141, 71 Pac. 735; and one of $200 on pawnbrokers; Van Baalen v. Peo ple, 40 Mich. 258; and one of $100 on the privilege of selling cigars; Gundling v. Chi cago, 177 U. S. 188, 20 Sup. Ct. 633, 44 L. Ed. 725.
As to licensing physicians, see State v. Matthews, 81 S. C. 414, 62 S. E. 695, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 735, 128 Am. St. Rep. 919, 16 Ann. Cas. 182.
The federal corporation tax act (August 5, 1909) provided that every corporation for profit and having a capital stock represented by shares and engaged in business in any state should be subject to pay annually a special excise tax with respect to the carry ing on or doing business by such corporation equivalent to one per centum upon the en tire net income, over and above five thou sand dollars, received by it from all sources, exclusive of amounts received by it as divi dends upon stock of other corporation sub ject to the tax. This act was held valid in Flint v. Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342, 55 L. Ed. 389, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1312 (followed In McCoach v. R. Co., 228 U. S. 295, 33 Sup. Ct. 419, 57 L. Ed. 842), as being an impost or excise tax on the doing of busi ness, and not a direct tax.
It was also there held that it complies with the provision for uniformity through out the United States, that franchises of cor porations are not governmental agencies of the state, and that the tax is properly meas ured by the entire income of the companies subject to it, notwithstanding a part of such income may be derived from non-taxable property.
While the legislature cannot by a declara tion change the real nature of a tax it im poses, its declaration is entitled to weight in construing the statute and determining what the actual nature of the tax is; id. It is an excise tax measured by the corporate in come; Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231 U. S. 399, 34 Sup. Ct. 136, 58 L. Ed. -; imposed upon the doing of business and not upon the franchises or property of the cor poration; McCoach v. R. Co., 228 U. S. 295, 33 Sup. Ct. 419, 57 L. Ed. 842. The act was repealed by the tariff act of 1913.