There is an obvious distinction between tangible and intangible property in' the fact that the latter is held secretly, and there is no method by which its existence or owner ship can be ascertained in the state of its situs, except, perhaps, in the case of mort gages and shares of stock. So, if the owner be discovered, there is no way by which he can be reached by process in a state other than that of his domicil. In this class of cases the tendency of modern authorities is to apply the maxim mobilia sequuntur per sonam, and to hold that the property may be taxed at the domicil of the owner as the real situs of the debt, and also more par ticularly in the case of mortgages, in ,the state where the property is; Tappan v. Bank, 19 Wall. (U. S.) 490, 22 L. Ed. 189; Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491, 25 L. Ed. 558; Sturges v. Carter, 114.U. S. 511, 5• Sup. Ct. 1014, 29 L. Ed. 240; Kidd v. Alaba ma, 188 IL S. 730, 23 Sup. Ct. 401, Ed. 669. If this occasionally results in double taxation, it more frequently happens that this class of property escapes Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 26 Sup. Ct. 36, 50 L. Ed. 150, 4 Ann. Cas. 493.
State taxation of credits arising out of loans made in the regular course of business by the local agent of a foreign insurance company to its policy holders is not forbid den by the fourteenth amendment, where the loans were negotiated, the notes signed, the taken, the interest collected, and the debts paid within the state, because the promissory notes which are the evidences of such credits are kept in the home office at all times when not needed in the state ; Met ropolitan L. Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 205 U. S. 395, 27 Sup. Ct. 499, 51 L. Ed. 853 ; affirming 115 La. 698, 39 South. 846, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1240, 116 Am. St. Rep. 179.
The arguments in favor of the taxation of intangible property at the domicil of the owner have no application to tangible prop erty. The fact that such property is visible, easily found, and difficult to conceal, and the tax readily collectible, is so cogent an argu ment for its taxation at its situs that of late there is a general consensus of opinion that it is taxable in' the state where it is permanently located and employed, and where it receives its entire protection, irre spective of the domicil of the owner ; Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622, 5 sup. Ct. 1091, 29 L. Ed. 257; Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, 6 Sup. Ct. 475, 29 L. Ed. 715 ; Western U. Tel. Co. v. Attorney General, 125 U. S. 530, 8 Sup. Ct. 961, 31 L. Ed. 790 ; Pittsburg & S. Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U. S. 577, 15 Sup.
Ct. 415, 39 L. Ed. 538 ; Old Dominion S. S. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U. S. 299, 25 Sup. Ct. 686, 49 L. Ed. 1059, 3 Ann. Cas. 1100.
In Buck v. Beach, 206 U. S. 392, 27 Sup. Ct. 712, 51 L. Ed. 1106, 11 Ann. Cas. 732, where neither the person assessed nor the debtor was a resident of, or present in, the taxing state, and wherein no business was done by the owner of the notes or his agent relating in any way to the capital evidenced by the notes assessed for taxation, it was held that the mere presence of evidences of debt could not amount to the presence of property within the state, though such notes had been sent to an agent in Indiana for the express purpose of evading taxation in Ohio. On the ground that the assessment was made upon property which was never within the jurisdiction of Indiana, the tax was held to be a taking without due process of law (Mr. Justice Day dissenting).
It is undoubtedly true that by the gener ally acknowledged principles of public law, personal chattels follow the person of the owner, and that, upon his death, they are to be distributed according to the law of his domicil, and, in general, any transfer of chattels good by the law of his own domicil will be good elsewhere. But this rule is a legal fiction, adopted from considerations of general convenience and policy, for the benefit of commerce and to enable persons to dispose of property at their decease, agreeably to their wishes, without their be ing embarrassed by their want of knowledge in relation to the laws of the country where the same is situated. But even this doctrine is to be received and understood with this limitation, that there is no positive law of the country where the property is in fact which contravenes the law of his domicil; for, if there is, the law of the owner's domi cil must yield to the law of the state where the property is in fact situated; Catlin v. Hull, 21 Vt. 152, cited and followed in New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309, 20 Sup. Ct. 110, 44 L. Ed. 174.
The state of origin remains the situs of personal property, though it occasionally is sent to foreign parts ; a state may tax its own corporation for all its property in the state during the year, even if every item should be taken into another state for a year and then brought back (here it did not appear that any specific cars or any average of cars were so continudusly in another state as to be taxable there); New York v. Miller, 202 U. S. 584, 26 Sup. Ct. 714, 50 L. Ed. 1155.