Further, the foundations of a general staff had only been laid since the bitter lessons of the South African War, and the interval was too short, the distractions too great, for this to have been developed to the level of Germany and France. For the progress in organization in the years before 1914, the British army owed much to Lord Haldane, and to him also was due the creation of a second line of part-trained citizens—the Territorial Force. Lord Roberts had pleaded for compulsory military training, but the voluntary principle was too deeply embedded in the national mind for this course to be adopted, and Haldane wisely sought to de velop Britain's military effectiveness within the bounds set by traditional policy. As a result, 1914 found England with an expe ditionary force of some 16o,000 men, the most highly trained striking force of any country—a rapier among scythes, and to maintain this at strength the old militia had been turned into a special reserve for drafting. Behind this first line stood the Terri torial Force, which if only enlisted for home defence had a per manent fighting organization unlike the amorphous volunteer force which it superseded. The British army had no special out standing asset in war armament, but it had developed a standard of rifle-shooting unique among the world's armies.
The reforms by which the army was brought into line with Continental models had one defect, which was accentuated by the close relations established between the British and French general staffs since the Entente. It induced a "Continental" habit of thought among the general staff, and predisposed them to the role, for which their slender strength was unsuited, of fighting along side an Allied army. This obscured the British army's traditional employment in amphibious operations through which the mobility given by command of the sea was exploited. A small but highly trained force striking "out of the blue" at a vital spot could produce a strategical effect out of all proportion to its slight numbers.
The last argument brings us to a comparison of the naval situ ation, which turned on the balance between the fleets of Britain and Germany. Britain's sea supremacy, for long unquestioned, had in recent years been challenged by a Germany which had deduced that a powerful fleet was the key to that colonial empire which she desired as an outlet for her commerce and increasing population. To the spur of naval competition the British people eventually responded, determined at any cost to maintain their "two-power" standard. If this reaction was instinctive rather than reasoned, its subconscious wisdom had a better foundation than the catchwords with which it was justified, or even than the need of defence against invasion. The industrial development of the British Isles had left them dependent on overseas supplies for food, and on the secure flow of seaborne imports and exports for industrial existence. For the navy itself this competition was
a refining agency, leading to a concentration on essentials. Gun nery was developed and less value attached to polished brasswork; warship design and armament were transformed—the "Dread nought" ushering in a new era, of the all big-gun battleship. By 1914 Britain had 29 such capital ships and 13 building, to the 18 built and nine building, of Germany. Further, Britain's naval strength had been soundly distributed, the main concentration being in the North sea.
More open to criticism, in view of the forecasts of several naval authorities, was her comparative neglect of the potential menace of the submarine. Here German opinion was shown rather by the number building than those already in commission. It is to Germany's credit that though lacking a sea tradition, her fleet an artificial rather than a natural product, the technical skill of the German navy made it a formidable rival to the British ship for ship, and perhaps its superior in scientific gunnery.
But in the first stage of the struggle the balance of the naval forces would affect the issue far less than the balance on land. For a fleet suffers one inherent limitation—it is tied to the sea, and hence cannot strike direct at the hostile nation. The fundamental purpose of a navy is therefore to protect a nation's sea communi cations and sever those of the enemy, and, although victory in battle may be a necessary prelude, blockade is the ultimate pur pose. And as blockade is a weapon slow to take effect, its influ ence could only be decisive if the armies failed to secure the speedy decision on land, upon which all counted.
In munitions and other war material Britain's industrial power was greatest of all, though conversion to war production was a necessary preliminary, and all, again, depended on the security of her sea communication. France was weak, and Russia weaker still, but the former, unlike the latter, could count on outside supplies so long as Britain held the seas. As Britain was the industrial pivot of the one alliance, so was Germany of the other.