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With similar disregard of superior authority, the German Crown Prince, commanding the pivotal 5th Army between Metz and Thionville, attacked when he had been ordered to stand on the defensive. The lack of what Col. Foch had termed "intellec tual discipline" was to be a grave factor in Germany's failure, and for this the ambitions of "court" generals were to be largely responsible.
While this "see-saw" campaign in Lorraine was taking place, more decisive events were occurring to the north-west. The attack on Liege awakened Joffre to the reality of a German advance through Belgium, but not to the wideness of sweep. And the sturdy resistance of Liege confirmed him in the opinion that the German right would pass south of it, between the Meuse and the Ardennes. Plan XVII. had visualized such a move, and prepared a counter. Grasping once more at phantoms, the French command embraced this idea so fervently that they transformed the counter into an imaginary coup de grace. Their 3rd Army (Ruffey) and the reserve 4th Army (de Langle de Cary) were to strike north-east through the Ardennes against the rear flank of the Germans advancing through Belgium. The left wing (5th) Army, under Lanrezac, was moved further to the north-west into the angle formed by the Sambre and Meuse between Givet and Charleroi. With the British expeditionary force coming up on its left, it was to deal with the enemy's forces north of the Meuse and to converge on the supposed German main forces in conjunction with the attack through the Ardennes. Here was a pretty picture—of the Allied pincers closing on the unconscious Germans ! Curiously, the Germans had the same idea of a pincer-like manoeuvre, with roles reversed, and with better reason.
The fundamental flaw in the French plan was that the Germans had deployed half as many troops again as the French Intelligence estimated, and for a vaster enveloping movement. The French 3rd and 4th Armies (23 divisions) pushing blindly into the Ardennes against a German centre supposedly denuded of troops, blundered against the German 4th and 5th Armies (20 divisions) ( and were heavily thrown back in encounter-battles around Virton Neuf chateau. Fortunately the Germans were also too vague as
to the situation to exploit their opportunity.
But to the north-west the French 5th Army (13 divisions) and the British (four divisions) had, under Joffre's orders, put their head almost into the German noose. The German masses of the 1st and 2nd Armies were closing on them from the north, and the 3rd Army from the east—a total of 3o divisions. Lanrezac alone had an inkling of the hidden menace. All along he had suspected the wideness of the German manoeuvre, and it was through his insistence that his army had been permitted to move so far north west. It was due to his caution in hesitating to advance across the Sambre, to the arrival of the British on his left unknown to the German Intelligence, and to the premature attack of the German 2nd Army, that the Allied forces fell back in time and escaped from the trap.
The British, after concentrating near Maubeuge, had moved up to Mons on Aug. 22, ready to advance further into Belgium as part of the offensive of the Allied lef t wing. On arrival, however, Sir John French heard that Lanrezac had been attacked on the 21st and deprived of the crossings of the Sambre. Although thus placed in an exposed forward position, he agreed to stand at Mons to cover Lanrezac's left. But next day Lanrezac had word of the fall of Namur and of the appearance of the German 3rd Army (Hansen) on his exposed right flank near Dinant, on the Meuse. In consequence, he gave orders for a retreat that night. The British, after resisting the attacks of six German divisions during the day, fell back on the 24th in con formity with their allies. Not a moment too soon in view of the fact that the rest of the German 1st Army was marching still further westward to envelop their open left flank. • At last Joffre realized the truth and the utter collapse of Plan XVII. Resolution was his greatest asset, and with imperturbable coolness he formed a new plan out of the wreckage. He decided to swing back his centre and left, with Verdun as the pivot, while drawing troops from the right and forming a fresh 6th Army on his left to enable the retiring armies to return to the offensive.