World War

The German Breakdown.

His optimism might have been again misplaced but for German mistakes. The first was Moltke's folly in detaching seven divisions to invest Maubeuge and Givet and watch Antwerp, instead of using Landwehr and Ersatz troops as Schlieffen had intended. More ominous still was his decision on Aug. 25 to send four divisions to check the Russian advance in East Prussia. All these were taken from the right wing, and the excuse afterwards given for this violation of the principle of concentration was that the German command thought that the decisive victory had already been won ! Further, the German com mand lost touch with the advancing armies and the movements of these became disjointed. The British stand at Le Cateau and Lanrezac's riposte at Guise (see FRONTIER, BATTLES OF THE : Le Cateau; Guise) were also factors in checking the German envelop ing wing, and each had still greater indirect effects. For Le Cateau apparently convinced the German 1st Army commander, Kluck, that the British army could be wiped from the slate, and Guise led Billow (2nd Army) to call on the 1st Army for support, where upon Kluck wheeled inwards, thinking to roll up the French left. The idea of a Sedan was an obsession with the Germans, and led them to pluck the fruit before it was ripe. This premature wheel before Paris had been reached was an abandonment of the Schlieffen plan, and exposed the German right to a counter envelopment. One further factor must be mentioned, perhaps the most significant of all: the Germans had advanced so rapidly, out-running their time-table, that their supplies failed to keep pace. Thus, in sum, so much grit had worked into the German machine that a slight jar would suffice to cause its breakdown. This was delivered in the battle of the Marne (q.v.).

The Abandoned Plan.

Let us trace the sequence of events. The first, highly coloured, reports from the army commands in the battles of the Frontiers had given the German supreme com mand the impression of a decisive victory. Then the compara tively small totals of prisoners raised doubts in Moltke's mind and led him to a more sober estimate of the situation. The new pessi mism of Moltke combined with the renewed optimism of his army commanders to produce a fresh change of plan, which con tained the seeds of disaster. When, on Aug. 26, the British left wing fell back southwards badly mauled from Le Cateau, Kluck had turned south-westwards again. If this direction was partly due to a misconception of the line of retreat taken by the British, it was also in accordance with his original role of a wide circling sweep. And by carrying him into the Amiens-Peronne area, where the first elements of the newly formed French 6th Army were just detraining after their "switch" from Alsace, it had the effect of dislocating Joffre's design for an early return to the offensive— compelling the 6th Army to fall back hurriedly towards the shelter of the Paris defences.

But Kluck had hardly swung out to the south-west before he was induced to swing in again. For, in order to ease the pressure on the British, Joffre had ordered Lanrezac to halt and strike back against the pursuing Germans, and Billow, shaken by the threat, called on Kluck for aid. Lanrezac's attack, on Aug. 29, was stopped before Billow needed this, but he asked Kluck to wheel in nevertheless, in order to cut off Lanrezac's retreat. Before acceding Kluck referred to Moltke. The request came at a mo ment when Moltke was becoming perturbed in general over the way the French were slipping away from his embrace and, in par ticular, over a gap which had opened between his 2nd and 3rd Armies through the latter having already turned south, from south-west, to help the 4th Army, its neighbour on the other flank. Hence Moltke approved Kluck's change of direction—

which meant the inevitable abandonment of the original wide sweep round the far side of Paris. Now the flank of the wheeling German line would pass the near side of Paris and across the face of the Paris defences. By this contraction of his frontage for the sake of security Moltke sacrificed the wider prospects inherent in the wide sweep of the Schlieffen plan. And, as it proved, instead of contracting the risk he contracted a fatal counterstroke.

The decision to abandon the original plan was definitely taken on Sept. 4, and in place of it Moltke substituted a narrower envelopment, of the French centre and right. The 4th and 5th Armies were to press south-east while the 6th and 7th Armies, striking south-westwards, sought to break through the fortified barrier between Toul and Epinal, the "jaws" thus closing inwards on either side of Verdun. Meantime the 1st and 2nd Armies were to turn outwards and, facing west, hold off any counter move which the French attempted from the neighbourhood of Paris.

The Allied Counter.

But such a counter move had begun before the new plan could take effect.

The opportunity was perceived, not by Joffre, who had ordered a continuance of the retreat, but by Gallieni, the military governor of Paris. On Sept. 3 Gallieni realized the meaning of Kluck's wheel inwards, directed Maunoury's 6th Army to be ready to strike at the exposed German right flank, and next day with some difficulty won Joffre's sanction. Once convinced, Joffre acted with decision. The whole left wing was ordered to turn about and return to a general offensive, beginning on Sept. 6. Maunoury was already off the mark on the 5th and as his pressure developed on the Germans' sensitive flank, Kluck was constrained to draw off first one part and then the remaining part of his army to support his threatened flank guard. Thereby a 3o m. gap was created between the ist and 2nd German Armies, a gap covered only by a screen of cavalry. Kluck was emboldened to take the risk because of the rapid retreat of the British opposite, or rather with their backs, to this gaping sector. Even on the 5th, when the French on either flank were turning about, the British continued a further day's march to the south. But in this "disappearance" lay the unintentional cause of victory. For, when the British re traced their steps, it was the report of their columns advancing into the gap which, on Sept. 9, led Billow to order the retreat of his 2nd Army. The temporary advantage which the 1st Army, already isolated by its own act, had gained over Maunoury was thereby nullified, and it fell back the same day. By the rith the retreat had extended, independently or under orders from Moltke, to all the German armies. The attempt at a partial envelopment, pivotting on Verdun, had already failed, the jaw formed by the 6th and 7th Armies merely breaking its teeth on the defences of the French eastern frontier. The attack by Rupprecht's 6th Army on the Grand Couronne, covering Nancy, was a particularly costly failure. It is difficult to see how the German command could have reasonably pinned their faith on achieving as an improvised expedient the very task which in cool calculation before the war had appeared so hopeless as to lead them to take the momentous decision to advance through Belgium as the only feasible alterna tive.