LUCK or LUTSK, BATTLES OF. Under this heading are described the Russian attacks on their south-western front, which extended from the Pinsk marshes to the northern frontier of Rumania, during the summer and autumn of 1916. These at tacks are generally known as "the Brusilov offensive." The orig inal break-through of the Austrian front occurred near the town of Luck (Lutsk), in Volhynia, on the river Styr, which thus gives its name to the whole series of operations.
The general situation in May 1916 was such that despite the failure of the attacks in March which it had launched, the Russian supreme command had set to work to prepare a large scale offensive on the front west of Molodeczno as its contribu tion to the great general Allied offensive which was to open on all fronts on July 1. Since the great offensive of the Central Powers against Russia had come to an end in the autumn of 1915, their forces on the Eastern front had been considerably reduced. The Germans had taken troops for their Verdun offensive, and the Austrians during the spring had withdrawn formations for an offensive against Italy. The Russians, on the other hand, had re covered rapidly from their disasters of the previous year; the ranks were full and munitions more plentiful than they had been formerly.
Preparation of Brusilov's Offensive.—Gen. Brusilov suc ceeded Ivanov as Commander-in-Chief of the south-western front in March. He was a cavalry soldier and had commanded the 8th. Army since the commencement of the war with conspicuous suc cess. He received instructions to prepare attacks on the south western front to distract the enemy's attention from the main Russian effort at Molodeczno. The four armies under Brusilov were: the 8th (Kaledin) from the Kowel-Kiev railway near Rafalowka to about Kremenets, 1 r divisions and four cavalry divisions; the nth (Sakharov) from Kremenets to near Tarnu pol, eight divisions and one cavalry division; the 7th (Shcher bachev) from near Tarnupol to Potok, seven divisions and cavalry divisions; and the 9th (Lechitski) from Potok to the Rumanian frontier, ten divisions and three cavalry divisions.
There was one corps (two divisions) in reserve.
The Austrian 4th Army (Archduke Joseph Ferdinand), from near Rafalowka to Dubno, with 1o2 divisions and one cavalry division, and the 2nd Army (Bohm-Ermolli), from Dubno to near Kremenets, with eight infantry and two cavalry divisions, were opposed to Kaledin; the German Southern Army (von Bothmer) with one German and nine Austrian divisions and two cavalry divisions, held a long front, corresponding approximately with those held by the Russian iith and 7th Armies; while the Aus trian 7th Army (Pflanzer-Baltin), with 8-1 divisions and four cavalry divisions, opposed Lechitski. In the actual number of divisions there was little disparity between the total forces at the disposal of either side; the Russians had 38 divisions and 12 'cavalry divisions to the Austro-German 37 divisions and nine cavalry divisions ; but the Russian divisions were larger. The Austrian front had been strongly fortified and organized, and in spite of the removal of some of their most reliable divisions and much heavy artillery to the Italian front the Austrians were confident of being able to hold their ground.
About the middle of April, Brusilov had ordered each of his army commanders to select a sector of attack and to make prep arations with the resources at his disposal within his own army to penetrate the enemy's front in that sector. Preparations were to be complete before the middle of May. These attacks were designed simply as aids to the main Russian offensive in the north, timed for July 1. On May 14, however, the Austrians began an offensive in the Trentino against Italy. The Italians appealed to the Russians to relieve the pressure by attacking the Austrians on their front. Brusilov accordingly launched his at tacks on all four army fronts on June 4, without any expectation of a decisive break-through or arrangements for exploitation of success on a large scale.