Battles of Luck or Lutsk

The Break-through at Luck.—The sector of attack chosen by Kaledin, commander of the 8th Army, centred on the village of Olika, east of Luck. The bombardment began on June 4 and the assault was made by the 4oth and 8th Corps early on June 5. The 4oth Corps carried three lines of enemy trenches and penetrated over two miles, and the 8th Corps, though less suc cessful, made considerable progress. The advance continued on June 6 and on June 7 reached Luck. By this time a wide gap had been made between the Austrian 4th Army and the 2nd Army farther south, and a great opportunity for the numerous Russian cavalry seemed to have come. But of the four cavalry divisions allotted to Kaledin's army, two had been used to hold trenches so as to enable infantry to be concentrated for the assault and one was despatched by Brusilov in a fruitless raid along the railway towards Kowel through marshes entirely un suited for cavalry action. The one remaining division could accomplish little. Meanwhile the left wing of the 8th Army occupied Dubno on June 9; on June io the front of the army lay along the line of the rivers Styr and Ikwa, from Rozyszcze through Luck to Dubno.

Attacks of the 11th, 7th and 9th Armies.—The attack of the nth Army north-west of Tarnupol was a failure. Shcher bachev's 7th Army attacked in a sector on its extreme left near the village of Jaziowec. After two days' bombardment the in fantry assaulted early on June 6 and carried the enemy positions; next day the Austrians were driven behind the Strypa. The Rus sians crossed the river on the 8th and gained further ground dur ing the next two days. Counter-attacks then arrested their ad vance for the time being. Lechitski's 9th Army attacked some 20M. north of Czernowitz, near the village of Okna, with com plete success. By June 1 o the front was broken and the Austrians retreated in disorder behind the Prut. Czernowitz was captured on June 17.

Consequences of Brusilov's Success.

Thus by the middle of June the Austro-German front south of the Pinsk marshes was completely broken on both flanks, and two armies, the 4th and 7th, were in full retreat. In the centre Bohm-Ermolli's and von Bothmer's armies still held, though their outer flanks had been driven in. On three-quarters of the whole Russian south-western front their armies were moving forward. These entirely unex pected results of an offensive undertaken purely as a demonstra tion reacted instantly on the whole strategy both of the Russians and of the Central Powers. On the Russian side the new situation demanded the immediate transfer of the principal reserves from the north, where they had been grouped for the Molodeczno of fensive, if Brusilov's success in the south were to be exploited.

The decision was taken promptly enough : the Molodeczno of fensive was abandoned. Lesh's 3rd Army astride the Pripet was added to Brusilov's command and troops were hurried south as rapidly as the capacity of the railways would permit. Unf or tunately for the Russians the poverty and the low efficiency of their communications gave the enemy time to concentrate suffi cient reinforcements to restore their front before the full weight of the Russian reserves could give a fresh impetus to the advance.

For the Germans the sudden reverse came at a difficult time, for they were fully engaged at Verdun and were expecting a Franco-British offensive at an early date; obviously, too, events might have a decisive influence on the attitude of Rumania. Re inforcements were at once collected to restore the situation; to close the principal gap it was decided to stage a counter-attack on a large scale on both sides of the Kowel-Rowne railway. This attack was entrusted to von Linsingen, the German commander of the Austro-German army holding the area of the Pinsk marshes opposite the Russian 3rd Army. He was reinforced by three German divisions from the northern part of the Eastern front, four from France and two Austrian divisions from the Trentino. During the whole of the latter half of June, as these reinforce ments arrived, he counter-attacked persistently towards Luck and to the north and south of it. These attacks, though they brought the Austro-German forces little gain of ground, had at least the effect of limiting Kaledin's break-through. On July 4 the left of Lesh's 3rd Army, in conjunction with Kaledin's right, launched an attack in the bend of the Styr east of Kowel and drove von Linsingen's army back to the Stochod river. This put an end to the Austro-German counter-attacks, and there were no further important operations on this part of the front till the end of July.

Meantime, Lechitski in the south with the Russian 9th Army was completing the conquest of the Bukovina. After the capture of Czernowitz, part of the Austrian 7th Army retreated pre cipitately south to the Carpathians, pursued by the left wing of Lechitski's army, which occupied Kimpolung on June 24. His right wing, advancing between the Dniester and the Prut, won a victory on June 28 and occupied Kolomyja on the following day. At the beginning of July the Austrians in the south received re inforcements and made a series of counter-attacks opposite Kim polung and Delatyn. These were defeated, and Lechitski's right wing occupied Delatyn on July 10. His army was now, however, enormously extended and had to halt to await reinforcements.