Battles of Luck or Lutsk

army, front, command, july, south, aug, guard and von

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Reorganization of Command by the Central Powers.— The German command, which had since the beginning of June sent 16 divisions to the front south of the Pinsk marshes, nat urally claimed an increased influence on the direction of opera tions on this front. Very shortly after the first break-through at Luck they had insisted on the removal of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand from his command of the 4th Army and on the ex tension of von Linsingen's sphere of command southwards to the northern frontier of Galicia. The greater portion of Pflanzer Baltin's 7th Army had also been transferred to von Bothmer commanding the German Southern Army. It was now proposed to appoint Hindenburg to the supreme command of the Eastern front as far south as Lemberg ; the remainder of the front, on both sides of the Dniester and in the Carpathians, was to be under the Austrian heir apparent, the Archduke Charles, with the German Gen. von Seeckt as his chief of staff.

This arrangement was eventually brought into force early in August. The Archduke Charles had originally come from the Italian front at the beginning of July to command a 12th Army, which was to be formed from troops on the spot and fresh rein f orcements, and was to deliver a counter-attack on a large scale on both sides of the Dniester in a south-easterly direction. But as the incoming reinforcements had always to be thrown into the battle as soon as they arrived, the formation of the 12th Army and the proposed counter-offensive never took place. Instead, the 3rd Army command from Tirol took over the troops between the Carpathians and the Dniester. The Archduke's command thus comprised the 7th, 3rd and Southern armies.

Concurrently during the latter half of July, while the Russian 8th and 9th Armies on the flanks paused to await reinforcements, Brusilov ordered Sakharov's i 1th Army, which had extended its front northwards to beyond Dubno, to take the offensive. It at tacked near Boromel, south-west of Luck, on July 16, and drove the enemy back across the Lipa. Sakharov then moved south on Brody, which he captured with 40,000 prisoners on July 28—a fine victory. Meanwhile Shcherbachev's 7th Army, in spite of re peated attacks north-west of Buczacz towards Monasterzyska, had failed to make much impression on von Bothmer's Southern Army. Lechitski, however, at the end of July gained some ground towards Stanislau.

Attack on Kowel.

Towards the end of July the Russian Guard Army (1st and 2nd Guard Corps, 1st Corps, 3oth Corps, Guard Cay. Corps) detrained from the north and took up a front between the 3rd and 8th Armies. The Guard had not been in action since the previous September and had been carefully trained and kept in hand for a great occasion. It was now de

cided to use it to force the line of the Stochod river and capture Kowel. It is difficult to understand why this line of advance was chosen for a supreme effort. The terrain is mainly marsh and advance is usually possible only on narrow causeways. The at tacks, which commenced on July 28 and were continued up to Aug. 10, resulted in a complete and costly failure. The Guard Army lost 55,00o men for a trifling gain of unimportant ground. Brusilov thereafter abandoned the direct advance on Kowel, but continued up till the middle of October attempts to enlarge the Luck salient in the direction of W}odzimierz Wolynski. All these attempts ended in failure.

In the south the Russian Army commander, Lechitski, at tacked again south of the Dniester on Aug. 7 and drove back Kovess' 3rd Army. He occupied Stanislau on Aug. Io and Nad worna on Aug. 12. On this latter date the 7th Army occupied Monasterzyska. Under the threat from this flank and pressure from Sakharov's army south of Brody, von Bothmer now at last gave up the original line which he had held throughout all the tur moil and withdrew towards Brzezany.

Austro-German counter-attacks in the Carpathians in the first half of August had little success. On Aug. 20 the Russians re organized their front so as to allow Lechitski's 9th Army to have as its only task the forcing of the Carpathian passes between Del atyn and Kimpolung in order to protect the right flank of the Rumanians, who joined the Allies on Aug. 27. In spite of severe fighting throughout September little progress was made on this front. Nor was any appreciable advance made elsewhere on the south-western front in spite of repeated assaults. In October the defeat of the Rumanians necessitated the transfer of troops to that theatre and the abandonment of further offensive opera tions. The summer which had opened so brilliantly ended in disappointment and failure.

Results of the Offensive.

Although Brusilov had recap tured practically the whole of the Bukovina and large portions of Eastern Galicia and Volhynia and had taken some 350,000 prisoners and over 400 guns, the cost had been exceedingly heavy. The casualties on the south-western front were over r,000,000. These losses and those suffered in the abortive attacks on the Northern and Western fronts in 1916, at Lake Naroch, Barano wicze and Riga, were in the end the principal cause of the rapid infection of the army with anti-war propaganda when the Revo lution came. Hailed by her Allies as proof of the complete re generation of the Russian army, Brusilov's offensive was really its death-knell.

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