Macedonian Army

Nor was this all, for these elements were so combined as to form a single co-operative organization, probably the most wonderful ever devised by a single man, and one much more scientifically perfect than any existing to-day. In the attack, the tactical base is the phalanx, for it can engage the enemy and hold him, and whilst the left wing guards the left flank of the phalanx the right wing can punch out from it with terrific force. The Hypaspists assault, and do not merely hold; the heavy cavalry charge, and do not merely wash round the enemy, and they can do so because their outer flank is well protected by light infantry, who are se cured against being ridden over by light cavalry who not only are ever ready to support them, but who, by swarming round the enemy's left wing and rear, pin down his initiative. By means of this superb organization Alexander won victory after victory. Not only was he never defeated, but whether he fought on the plains or in the mountains, his army proved itself equally adapt able to the work it was asked to carry out. That it never failed him is the greatest possible proof of the organizing genius of his father.

The Tactics of Alexander the Great.

The tactics devel oped from Philip's organization by Alexander were multiform, especially in his lesser campaigns. In his great battles, however, may be discovered two tactical constants which are deserving of careful study. The first is the rear attack on the enemy, and the second, the protection of this attack. The rear attack was devel oped out of the oblique order. The phalanx advancing in echelon with its left refused struck the enemy with its right division. This division held in its grip such of the enemy as confronted it; the rest of the enemy, unopposed, moved forward until they came into contact with the divisions on its left, and when they were also fixed, the enemy's right wing attempted to envelop the left flank of the Macedonian phalanx, but was held off by repeated charges of the left-wing cavalry. Whilst this action was being fought out the right-wing cavalry smashed through the enemy's left wing, and by wheeling to the left took the enemy's obliqued front in rear. Now as to the protection of the decisive attack which is closely connected with this operation.

If the phalanx were to advance in a solid line parallel to the enemy's front, it could simultaneously fix the enemy's front and protect the left flank of the decisive attack. (See fig. 3). But if it advances in echelon (a) (see fig. 4) it can protect not only the inner flank of (f) but also its rear should an enemy attack break through (g) the archers and javelin-men (e). Similarly

(d) and (e) advancing in echelon with their left forward, protect the right flank of the decisive attack. The rapid advance of (f) pulls forward the right of the phalanx and the left of (e) form ing a protective funnel for the charge and probably forcing the enemy at (h) to (10. Should attack of (f) towards (i) succeed, (f) can move by (5) and attack (Ii') in rear.

The Siege Train and Artillery of the Macedonian Army. —Before the days of Philip of Macedon siege warfare had been little studied by the Greek city states, consequently the defensive remained the stronger form of war. Until fortresses could be stormed there was small likelihood of any centralization of gov ernment, and this had been the outstanding curse of Greece. Philip, realizing this, turned his attention to siege warfare, and, though during his reign his siege operations were not uniformly successful, no fortress, even the immensely strong city of Tyre, successfully withstood the engineering ability of his son. In the Macedonian army there was established a special corps of engi neers equipped with all the necessary machinery for carrying out sieges, and for crossing rivers. At the siege of Tyre, movable towers, rams and floating battery were used, and in India a pon toon train was added to the army so that the Indus, Jhelum and other rivers could rapidly be crossed. Though siege artillery had long been known in the east, Philip introduced field artillery in the form of wagon-carried catapults and ballistae, of which Alex ander made frequent use in his mountain campaigns and in river crossing operations. It was quite as much due to the Macedonian siege train as to the field army that Alexander was able to over throw the Persian empire, for all its more important cities were strongly fortified.

Command and Administration of the Macedonian Army.—Though little information is forthcoming on the in terior economy of the Macedonian army, it is known that its command rested absolutely in the hands of Philip, and of ter him in those of Alexander. This was an enormous advantage, since in most of the Greek states generals were elected yearly, and fre quently more than one was placed in supreme command. Philip is reported to have said : "I envy the good luck of the Athenians; each year they are able to find ten men fit to command their armies, whilst I have only been able to find Parmenio to lead mine." Lack of unity of command was the ruin of Athens.