Macedonian Army

MACEDONIAN ARMY. The army created by Philip of Macedon, the military instrument used by his son Alexander the Great in the conquest of the Persian empire, though based on the old Doric hoplite phalanx, was so superior to it that the genius of the great Macedonian cannot be appreciated without a com parison with the older organization.

The Early Greek Army.

The phalanx was the natural tacti cal formation for a military citizen levy, that is, a body of men whose training and tactics had to be of the simplest nature. Battles always took place on level ground, and normally in nar row valleys where the only manoeuvre possible was a forward or backward movement to drive the enemy out of the valley or into his city, or village, situated in it. Generally speaking, sieges were but holding operations carried out in order to enable the valley to be ravaged, for the economic attack was the main object of early Greek warfare. Except in Thessaly and Macedonia, cav alry was practically unknown until after the Persian wars, and though the bow was an old and respected weapon, used on occa sion, as in the Plataea campaign (479 B.c.), it was not suited to a raw citizen force, since a bowman required a far more intensive training than a hoplite.

The phalanx formed a compact tactical body of files of men in varying depth. A file of eight men seems to have constituted the normal number, but frequently this was varied according to the personal predilection of the general from two to as many as twenty-five. In a phalanx of eight deep only two ranks were engaged, the rear ranks constituting a reserve for the replacement of casualties; also their object was to exercise physical and moral pressure on the leading two. The phalanx was based on two principles, producing opposite effects—depth which gave weight, and length which allowed for outflanking. Normally, depth was preferred to length because of the difficulty of moving a long line forward, especially if the ground was rough or at all broken. The difficulty of harmonizing these two principles is clearly seen in the formation made use of by Miltiades in the battle of Marathon, 490 B.C. He was faced by the Persian army, which not only was numerically superior to his own but which possessed a strong cavalry force. The battlefield was a narrow plain flanked by two streams, but his phalanx if maintained eight ranks deep would have provided too narrow a front for him to rest its flanks on these obstacles. He, therefore, weakened the centre

by thinning it to probably four ranks, leaving the flanks at their normal depth. When the two armies clinched, the Grecian centre was driven in but not broken ; the result of this was a double envelopment of the Persians, and their defeat.

All hoplites wore armour, for it was recognized that a man without armour was not equal to one wearing it. This armour consisted of a large oval shield, helmet, breastplate and greaves, weighing 57 lb. The offensive weapons were a strong Doric spear from 6 to 'oft. in length, and a sword. The total weight carried by the hoplite was 72 lb., an impossible load for either long or rapid marches; consequently we find that each hoplite was ac companied by a slave who acted as shield-bearer, and who took part in the engagement as a lightly armed soldier; he was also a forager and a pillager.

The weak points of the phalanx were its flanks. Should the enemy succeed in attacking a flank whilst the front was engaged, the phalanx was lost. The flanking files were not only incapable of resisting an attack, but if forced to halt and face the enemy they immediately compelled the entire phalanx to stand still. When phalanx met phalanx this defect was not serious ; but when, as in the Persian wars, the Greeks were confronted by cavalry the danger of a charge against an exposed flank became obvious, and the result of this was a slow but noticeable interest taken in the cavalry arm. In the normal battle between hoplites, it gen erally happened that both sides tended to bear somewhat to their right ; since each man felt that his right side was the less pro tected, consequently he tried to approach the enemy from the right. The tactical consequence of this was the development of an oblique order of attack, the value of which was first fully grasped by Epaminondas, and made use of by him at the battles of Leuctra (371 B.c.) and Mantinaea (362 B.c.). This famous general was a true artist of war, since he understood how to com bine infantry and cavalry according to the value of the ground fought over. So great was his discovery of refusing one wing and concentrating his main blow in the other, that his tactics formed not only the model for Alexander but for Frederick the Great as well.