When Alexander ascended the throne of Macedon, in every sense, he was commander-in-chief. Under him came two deputy chiefs—Parmenio and Antipater. The first represented the mili tary and the second the civil government, for whilst Parmenio accompanied Alexander to Asia, Antipater was left at home as viceroy. In battle Alexander commanded the right wing and Parmenio the left. For his personal staff Alexander had seven aides-de-camp, or Somatophylaxes, who were frequently ap pointed to command special detachments. Of his administrative directors and officers next to nothing is known, but those services which to-day would fall under the quartermaster-general's and adjutant-general's departments, and the ordnance and medical services, must have been highly organized, otherwise it would have been impossible for him to maintain the army in Asia. To do so demanded most careful supply work and security of the lines of communication, for whilst he was in Babylonia, Persia and India, thousands of recruits were sent out to him as well as great quantities of arms and armour. To despatch reinforcements and stores across land from Greece to the Indus and beyond would require even to-day the highest administrative ability, and without these reinforcements Alexander could not have continued his conquests. Eventually, when he reached the Sutlej, the aban donment of a further advance was probably due as much to the immense time it took to supply and reinforce his army as to any other cause.
During the wars of the Diadochi, though generalship was fre quently of a high order, and strategical combinations were far more intricate than in the days of Philip and Alexander, the de cline, and eventually the decay, of the Macedonian army was rapid and pronounced, until under Ptolemy II. (309-246 B.c.) we find a return to the old horde system, for according to Appian this monarch possessed an army of 200,000 infantry, 40,000 cav alry, 30o elephants and 2,000 war chariots, and a fleet of 1,500 warships and 2,000 transports. Efficiency and organization had once again been replaced by numbers and mass. There were three immediate reasons for this decline. The first was the sudden loss of Alexander's genius ; the second, the imitation of his actions without understanding them, and the third the immense influx of gold from Persia. The first two have been patent to military his tory, the third was exceptional, and is, consequently, of particu lar interest.
The influence of gold on the art of war of this period was a twofold one : first, it placed mercenary service more than ever on a commercial footing; and, secondly, through the stimulus it gave to science and industry, projectile weapons began to replace shock. From the death of Alexander onwards for some so years
the money he intended to spend on the reconstruction of his empire was expended on war, in which mercenaries were sold and bought, frequently on the battlefields themselves, as if they were commodities. Though this did not necessarily destroy the discipline of the soldiers, leadership rapidly deteriorated, and the heroism of Alexander, which was the soul of his generalship, was replaced by a more intellectual form of command, the leader of men evolving into the diplomatic commander of armies. When the campaigns of such a man as Eumenes are examined, the change is astonishing. He is as crafty as a fox, in fact is an epitome of his age. Not only does he have to keep his plans secret from his men, but even the enemy they are to battle with.
Witness the artfulness of Seleucus at the battle of Ipsus ; he rides round his enemy, but he does not charge home ; he can charge, but he refrains from doing so until he has won over the de serters. What is seen in all these subtler actions is the replace ment of the old physical attack by the moral attack but without changing the physical means. Blows give way to suggestions, and are aimed at the brain rather than the body. It is an occult transformation of military power, but once the clue is found, the change is clearly discernible, and becomes more and more so until, under Hannibal, it is developed to so high a pitch that his presence in any quarter of Italy paralyses Roman action.
The other influence of gold was the founding of great cities such as Alexandria, in which was collected the intellect of the age. Gold-power was transformed into brain-power, and, as these were warring times, warfare became more and more mechanized, muscle being supplemented by machinery. It has often been as serted by historians that the introduction of war engines caused a decadence in the art of war. This is only a half-truth, for the decline of the Macedonian system was due not to the introduc tion of elephants and artillery, but to generalship which took little notice of them, and which attempted to use men against them in the same manner as bef ore their adoption. Valour was thus destroyed, not by invention but by stupidity. It was be cause so many generals of this epoch did not understand the in fluence of new weapons on tactics and moral that a decadence set in, and not because these weapons were more powerful than the older ones. Intelligence was the foundation of Philip's military system, and lack of it destroyed it rather than such weapons as the Polybolos of Dionysius, an arrow-throwing "machine-gun," or the cross-bow of Ctesibius, which was geared by pistons working in cylinders filled with compressed air. ( J. F. C. F.) BIBLIOGRAPHY.-Rtistow and Kochly, Geschichte der griechischen Kriegswesen (1852) ; A. Holm, History of Greece (1894) ; Arrian, Anabasis of Alexander; Pausanias; D. G. Hogarth, Philip and Alex ander of Macedon (1897) ; • G. Grote, History of Greece (1906) ; H. Delbriick, Geschichte der Kriegskunst (1908) ; • J. G. Droysen, Ge schichte Alexanders des Grossen (1917) ; The Cambridge Ancient His tory, vol. vi. (19a7).