During the early morning of the 13th the reports brought to Napoleon at Gera partially cleared up the situation, though the real truth was very different from what he supposed. However, it was evident that the bulk of the Prussians lay to his left, and instructions were at once despatched to Davout to turn westward from Naumburg towards Kosen and to bring Bernadotte with him if the two were still together. The letter, however, ended with the words "but I hope he is already on his way to Dornburg." Now Bernadotte had neglected to keep the emperor informed as to his whereabouts. He was still with Davout, but, concluding that he had missed an order directing him to Dornburg, he thought to conceal his error by assuming the receipt of the order evidently alluded to in the last words, and as a result he marched towards Dornburg, and his whole corps was lost to the emperor at the crisis of the next day's battle.
On the road from Gera to Jena Napoleon was met by intelli gence from Lannes announcing his occupation of Jena and the discovery of Prussian troops to the northward. Knowing the emperor's methods, he wisely restrained the ardour of his sub ordinates and asked for instructions whether to attack or wait. The emperor rode forward rapidly, reached Jena about 3 P.M., and with Lannes proceeded to the Landgrafenberg to reconnoitre. From this point his view was, however, restricted to the im mediate foreground, and he only saw the camps of Hohenlohe's left wing. At this moment the Prussians were actually on parade and ready to move off to attack, but just then the "evil genius" of the Prussian army, Massenbach, an officer of the Headquarters Staff, rode up and claiming to speak with the authority of the king and commander-in-chief, induced Hohenlohe to order his troops back to camp. Of all this Napoleon saw nothing, but from all reports he came to the conclusion that the whole Prussian army was actually in front of him, and at once issued orders for his whole army to concentrate towards Jena, marching all night if need be. Six hours earlier his conclusion would have been correct, but early that morning the Prussian headquarters, alarmed for the safety of their line of retreat on Berlin by the presence of the French in Naumburg, decided to leave Hohenlohe and Ruchel to act as rear-guard, and with the main body to com mence their retreat towards the river Unstrutt and the Eckhardts berge where Massenbach had previously reconnoitred an "ideal" battlefield. This belief in positions was the cardinal principle of Prussian strategy in those days. The troops had accordingly commenced their march on the morning ef the 13th, and now at 3 P.M. were settling down into bivouac ; they were still but a short
march from the decisive field.
On the French side, Lannes' men were working their hardest, under Napoleon's personal supervision, to make a practicable road up to the Landgrafenberg, and all night long the remaining corps struggled through darkness towards the rendezvous. By daybreak on the 14th, the anniversary of Elchingen, upwards of 6o,000 men stood densely packed on the narrow plateau of the mountain, whilst, below in the ravines on either flank, Soult on the right, and Augereau on the left, were getting into position. Fortunately a dense fog hid the helpless masses on the Landgrafenberg from sight of the Prussian gun ners. Hohenlohe had determined to drive the French into the ravine at daybreak, but had no idea as to the numbers in front of him. For want of room, only a few Prussian battalions were sent forward, and these, delaying their advance till the fog had sufficiently lifted, were met by French skirmishers, and small columns, who rapidly overlapped their flanks and drove them back in confusion. Hohenlohe now brought up the remainder of his command, but in the meanwhile the French had poured across the neck between the Landgrafenberg and the main plateau, and the troops of Soult and Augereau were working up the ravines on either hand. In view of these troops the Prussian line, which had advanced faultlessly as if on parade, halted to prepare its bayonet attack by fire, and, once halted, it was found impossible to get them to go on again. The French, who had thrown themselves into houses, copses, etc., picked off the officers, and the flanks of the long Prussian lines swayed and got into confusion. The rival artilleries held each other too thoroughly to be able to spare attention to the infantry, whilst the Prussian cavalry, which had forgotten how to charge in masses of eighty or more squadrons, frittered away their strength in isolated efforts. By io A.M. the fourteen battalions which had initiated this attack were out numbered by three to one, and drifted away from the battlefield. Their places were taken by a fresh body, but this was soon out numbered and outflanked in its turn. By 2 P.M. the psychological moment had come, and Napoleon launched his guards and cavalry to complete the victory and initiate pursuit. Riichel's division now arrived and made a most gallant effort to cover the retreat, but their order being broken by the torrent of fugitives, they were soon overwhelmed by the tide of the French victory and all organized resistance had ceased by 4 P.M.