Unfortunately, Ney with his VI. corps about Gilgenberg had received the most poverty-stricken district in the whole region, and to secure some alleviation for the sufferings of his men he incautiously extended his cantonments till they came in contact with the Russian outposts. Apparently seeing in this movement a recommencement of hostilities, Bennigsen concentrated his troops towards his right and commenced an advance westwards towards Danzig, which was still in Prussian hands. Before his advance both Ney and Bernadotte (the latter, between Ney and the Baltic, covering the siege of Danzig) were compelled to fall back. It then became necessary to disturb the repose of the whole army to counter the enemy's intentions. The latter by this movement, however, uncovered his own communication with Russia, and the emperor was quick to seize his opportunity. He received the information on Jan. 28. His orders were at once issued and complied with so rapidly that by the 31st he stood prepared to advance with the corps of Soult, Ney, Davout and Augereau, the Guard and the reserve cavalry (8o,000 men on a front of 6om.) from Myszienec through Willenberg to Gilgen , berg; whilst Lannes on his right towards Ostrolenka and Lefebvre (X.) at Thorn covered his outer flanks.
Bernadotte, however, was missing, and this time through no fault of his own. His orders and the despatch conveying Napoleon's instructions fell into the hands of the Cossacks, and just in time Bennigsen's eyes were opened. Rapidly renouncing his previous intentions, he issued orders to concentrate on Allen stein; but this point was chosen too far in advance and he was anticipated by Murat and Soult at that place on Feb 2. He then determined to unite his forces at Joukendorf, but again he was too late. Soult and Murat attacked his rearguard on the 3rd, and Bennigsen, learning from his Cossacks that the French corps were designing to swing round and enclose him, he withdrew by a night march and ultimately succeeded in getting his whole army, with the exception of Lestocq's Prussians, together in the strong position along the Alle, the centre of which is marked by Preussisch-Eylau. The opportunity for this concentration Bennig
sen owed to the time gained for him by his rearguard at Jouken dorf, for this had stood just long enough to induce the French columns to swing in to surround it, and the next day was thus lost to the emperor as his corps had to extend again to their manoeuvring intervals. The truth is that the days were too short and the roads too bad for Napoleon to carry out the full purpose his "general advance guard" was intended to fulfil. It was designed to hold the enemy in position by the vigour of its attack, thus neutralizing his indep'endent will power and com pelling him to expend his reserves in the effort to rescue the troops engaged. But in forests and snowdrifts the French made such slow progress that no sufficient deployment could be made until darkness put a stop to the fighting. Thus, when late on Feb. 7, 1807 Murat and Soult found the enemy's rearguard near Eylau (q.v.) the fighting was severe but not prolonged. This time, however, Bennigsen, with over 6o,000 men in position and 15,00o Prussians expected to arrive next morning, had no desire to avoid a battle, and deployed for action.
During the night Augereau and the Guards had arrived, and Ney and Davout were expected on either flank in the forenoon.
This time the emperor was determined that his enemy should not escape him, and about 8 A.M. ordered Soult and Augereau on the left and right respectively to assail the enemy, Murat and the Guards remaining in the centre as reserve. Napoleon's own forces thus became the "general advance guard" for Ney and gear, or for the cavalry to replace their jaded horses from cap tured Prussian resources, he set Davout in motion towards War saw on Nov. 2, and the remainder of the army f ollowed in suc cessive echelons as rapidly as they could be despatched.