Briefly summarized, the battle came to this—in four successive efforts the Prussians failed because they were locally outnum bered. This was the fault of their leaders solely, for, except for the last attack, local superiority was in each case attainable. Organization and tactics did not affect the issue directly, for the conduct of the men and their junior officers gave abundant proof that in the hands of a competent leader the "linear" principle of delivering one shattering blow would have proved superior to that of a gradual attrition of the enemy here, as on the battlefields of the Peninsula and at Waterloo, and this in spite of other defects in the training of the Prussian infantry which simultaneously caused its defeat on the neighbouring field of Auerstadt.
Here the superiority of French mobility showed its value most conclusively. Davout in obedience to his orders of the previous morning was marching over the Saale at Kosen, when his advanced guard and that of the Prussian main army came unexpectedly in contact. The latter with at least so,000 men was marching in two columns, and ought therefore to have delivered its men into line of battle twice as fast as the French, who had to deploy from a single issue, and whose columns had opened out in the passage of the Kosen defile and the long ascent of the plateau above. But the Prussians attacked at the old regu lation speed of seventy-five paces to the minute, and the French manoeuvred at the quick or double of 120 or 15o. The conse quence was that the French always succeeded in reinforcing their fighting line in time to avert disaster. Nevertheless by mid-day their strength was well-nigh exhausted, whilst the Prussian re serve, eighteen battalions of guards under Kalckreuth, stood intact and ready to engage. But at the critical moment the duke of Brunswick fell mortally wounded, and Scharnhorst, his chief of the staff, was at the time absent on another part of the field. Mean while rumours from the battlefield at Jena, magnified as usual, began to reach the staff, and these may possibly have influenced Kalckreuth, for when called upon to attack with his eighteen battalions and win the day, he declined to move without the direct order of the commander-in-chief to do so, alleging that it was the duty of a reserve to cover the retreat and he considered himself personally responsible to the king for the guards entrusted to his care. Even then the day might possibly have been saved had Bliicher been able to find even twenty squadrons accustomed to gallop together, but the Prussian cavalry had been dispersed amongst the infantry commands, and at the critical moment it proved impossible for them to deliver a united and decisive attack Seeing further efforts hopeless, Scharnhorst in the duke's name initiated the retreat and the troops withdrew north-west towards Buttelstedt, almost unmolested by the French, who this day had put forth all that was in them, and withstood victoriously the highest average punishment any troops of the new age of warfare had as yet endured. So desperate had been their resistance that
the Prussians unanimously stated Davout's strength at double the actual figure. Probably no man but Davout could have got so much out of his men, but why was he left unsupported? Bernadotte, we have seen, had marched to Dornburg, or rather to a point overlooking the ford across the Saale at the village of that name, and reached there in ample time to intervene on either field. But with the struggle raging before him he remained un decided, until at Jena the decision had clearly fallen,
then he crossed the river and arrived with fresh troops too late for their services to be required.
During the night the Prussians continued their retreat, the bulk of the main body to Sommerda, Hohen lohe's corps towards Nordhausen. The troops had got much mixed up, but as the French did not immediately press the pursuit home, order was soon re-established and a combined retreat was begun towards the mouth of the Elbe and Ltibeck. Here help was expected to arrive from England, and the tide might ultimately have turned, for the Russian armies were gathering in the east. It was now that the results of a divorce of the army from the nation began to be felt. Instead of seizing all provisions and burning what they could not remove, the Prussian generals en forced on their men the utmost forbearance towards the inhabi tants, and the fact that they were obeyed, in spite of the inhu manity the people showed to their sick and wounded country men, proves that discipline was by no means so far gone as has generally been believed. The French marching in pursuit were received with open arms, the people even turning their own wounded out of doors to make room for their French guests. Their servility awakened the bitterest contempt of their con querors and forms the best excuse for the unparalleled severity of the French yoke. On Oct. 26 Davout reached Berlin, having marched 166m. in twelve days including two sharp rearguard actions, Bernadotte with his fresh troops having fallen behind. The inhabitants of Berlin, headed by their mayor, came out to meet him, and the newspapers lavished adulation on the victors and abuse on the beaten army. On the 28th Murat's cavalry overtook the remnant of Prince Hohenlohe's army near Prenzlau (north of Berlin) and invited its capitulation. Unfortunately the prince sent Massenbach to discuss the situation, and the latter completely lost his head. Murat boasted that he had Doo,000 men behind him, and on his return Massenbach implored his chief to submit to an unconditional surrender, advice which the prince accepted, though as a fact Murat's horses were completely ex hausted and he had no infantry whatever within call. Only Bliicher now remained in the field, and he too was driven at length into Ltibeck with his back to the sea where he capitulated Nov. 7.