Iii Palestine

III. PALESTINE A long pause in active operations followed the second battle of Gaza. The Turks, under German leadership, were now gathering their last resources at Aleppo for an attempt to recapture Bagh dad. They christened this force the "Yilderim" ("lightning") group. The British General Staff decided to forestall this enter prise by an attack in Palestine which would divert this army southwards from Aleppo and remove the danger to Baghdad. The British Government also no doubt hoped by a spectacular success in the East to remove some of the disappointment caused to the public by the failure of Nivelle's offensive in France and the mili tary collapse of Russia. Gen. Sir Edmund Allenby succeeded Sir Archibald Murray in July 1917, with instructions to report on the conditions in which offensive operations could be undertaken against the Turkish forces on the Palestine front.

Allenby's Plan Outlined.

Allenby based his plan on an appreciation made some time previously by Lt.-Gen. Sir Philip Chetwode, who now commanded on the Gaza front. The obvious line of advance was by Gaza, which would allow of naval co operation, directly cover the lines of communication, and present comparatively small difficulties of water supply. But the defences of Gaza were too solid to be broken except by a slow and costly process of siege. The Turkish centre was also strong and the ap proach to it difficult. There remained the Turkish left, which rested about Abu Hureira, some 7m. west of Beersheba; the de fences here were weaker and less complete, and might perhaps be rapidly overwhelmed. This would provide an opportunity for the mounted troops, the arm in which lay the chief superiority of the British force over the Turkish.

A preliminary operation was necessary to capture Beersheba, which the Turks held by a detached force ; for there was not room to manoeuvre between Beersheba and the Turkish left ; moreover, possession of the water supply at Beersheba was essential to fur ther operations. The difficulties capturing Beersheba and of placing a sufficient force within striking distance of the Turkish left were, however, serious. The three principal problems to be solved were those of transport, water supply and secrecy. Until

the Gaza-Beersheba line had been passed and the cultivated plain of Palestine reached, it was not practicable to use motor lorries, and the force was dependent on horse transport and camels. This limitation greatly increased the difficulties of water supply, which was the second main problem. Its seriousness is illustrated by the fact that the striking force estimated as necessary for operations against the Turkish left required some 40o,000gal. of water daily. Of the 30,00o camels available the majority would be required to carry water. The third great difficulty was to concentrate a striking force sufficient to overwhelm the garrison of Beersheba rapidly and then attack the Turkish left, without the Turks be coming aware and taking steps to counter or avoid the blow.

In spite of the difficulties to be overcome, Gen. Allenby de cided to attack the Turkish left. He estimated the total force required at seven divisions and three mounted divisions with addi tional artillery and aeroplanes. Four divisions and two mounted divisions were to attack the Turkish left, three divisions were to make a subsidiary attack on Gaza, and one mounted division was to watch the centre between these two wings, which would be separated by some 2om. during the operations.

The number of divisions was made up to the required total by the 1 oth and 6oth from Salonika and by the completion of the 75th, already in process of formation. Allenby formed his three mounted divisions into the Desert Mounted Corps, under Lt. Gen. Sir H. Chauvel, an Australian, and his seven divisions into two corps, the loth, under Lt.-Gen. Sir Philip Chetwode, and the 21st, under Lt.-Gen. Sir E. Bulfin. The elaborate preparations necessitated by the character of the forthcoming operations oc cupied the summer and early autumn. The railway across the desert was doubled and arrangements were made for its rapid ex tension during operations; ammunition and other stores were ac cumulated and the troops underwent special and intensive train ing. The development of the water supply was also a constant preoccupation.