Meanwhile, Gen. von Falkenhayn, in command of the Turkish army at Aleppo, had realised that the security of the Palestine front was essential to the successful prosecution of the plan for the recapture of Baghdad. It was accordingly decided to drive the British back into the Sinai desert before committing the Yil derim force to the Mesopotamian adventure. All troops available at Aleppo (only three divisions) were ordered to south Palestine during September.
Both Turks and British were thus aiming to strike a blow on the Palestine front in the autumn of 1917, and each hoped to f ore stall the other. The poverty of the Turkish lines of communica tion decided this issue by the delay it imposed on the southward movement of men and stores. From Haidar Pasha, the Turkish main base on the Asiatic shore of the Bosporus, to railhead in Palestine was a distance of 1,275m., with a single line of rail only, which, up to Aleppo, had also to serve the Mesopotamian front. The incomplete tunnels in the Taurus and the differences in gauge of the various lines necessitated five or six transhipments of all stores before they reached Palestine. Scarcity of fuel and jealousies between the German commanders and staff and the Turkish officials who controlled the working of the communica tions further accentuated the difficulties. Consequently, the supply problem crippled Turkish movements throughout these campaigns. The force from Aleppo was still in process of arrival on the Pales tine front when Allenby struck his blow.
During the days previous to Oct. 31, the date fixed by Allenby for the attack on Beersheba, the Desert Mounted Corps and the loth Corps (loth, 53rd, 6oth, 74th Divisions) were gradually and secretly moved across to the right wing from behind Gaza, where they had been in training camps by the sea. There could be no question of concealing entirely the preparations for a movement against Beersheba ; but Allenby did hope to persuade the Turks that this movement was only a feint and that the real main attack was against Gaza. To this end the 21st Corps (52nd, 54th and 75th Divisions), left opposite Gaza, began on Oct. 26 a heavy bombardment of the Turkish defences, assisted by British and French warships from the sea. The in tended deception as to the real point of attack was aided by the natural nervousness of the Turk of operations by sea against his right flank. He was also aware of the great difficulties of transport and water supply in the country opposite his left flank, which he believed was sufficiently safeguarded by these natural obstacles.
The Turkish forces at the end of Oct. consisted of the 8th Army (six divisions) under Kress von Kressenstein, holding Gaza and the Turkish centre, and the 7th Army (three divisions), holding Beersheba and the Turkish left. The 7th Army was not yet com
plete, one of the divisions from Aleppo being still on the lines of communication. Falkenhayn, who was to combine the action of these two armies, only arrived at Jerusalem on Nov. 1. The ap proximate fighting strengths of the Turkish and British forces were: Turks, 5o,000 rifles, 1,500 sabres, 30o guns; British, 95,000 rifles, 20,000 sabres, 500 guns.
Allenby's plan for Oct. 31 was as follows: Two divisions of the loth Corps, the 6oth and 74th, were to attack the south-western defences of Beersheba, which lay some 4m. from the town itself, with the 53rd Division protecting the left flank of this attack. The Anzac and Australian Mounted Divisions, which had concentrated at El Khelasa and Bir 'Asluj, were to reach a position east of Beersheba by dawn, close the Beersheba-Hebron road, and then attack and carry the town as rapidly as possible, before the Turks could destroy the wells.
During the night of Oct. 3o-31 the assaulting infantry and artillery moved some 8m. to their posi tions of deployment, while the mounted troops undertook a ride of over 25m. to reach a position east of Beersheba. These long and complicated night movements were only made possible by careful preparation and good staff work. At dawn on Oct. 31 the attack of the loth Corps commenced. A Turkish forward work, Hill 1030, had to be taken, to allow the artillery to get within wire-cutting range of the main position. Hill 1030 was taken at 8.3o A.M.; the main assault was delivered at 12.15 P.M. and was successful; by early afternoon the British infantry were masters of the Turkish defences south-west of the town; they were still, however, some miles from the town itself. Meanwhile, the mounted troops, after closing the Hebron road, had been held up by a Turkish strong point at Tel es Saba, 3m. east of Beer sheba. When this was at last taken, little time remained if the town was to be captured before dark. Gen. Chauvel accordingly ordered a mounted attack at 4 P.M. The 12th Australian Light Horse Brigade charged over the Turkish trenches and rode straight into the town. This daring and well-executed charge resulted in the capture of over 'Jo° prisoners and io guns, and saved the all-important wells from demolition. The infantry had captured another 90o prisoners, and the Turkish 27th Division had suffered practical annihilation. While the preparations for the decisive attack on the Turkish left were being made, the 21st Corps carried out a holding attack at Gaza on the night of Nov. 1-2. A considerable portion of the Gaza defences was carried and heavy losses caused to the Turks.