Iii Palestine

On the other hand, it was believed by many that neither side could force an issue on the Western Front, so formidably en trenched, and that the war could be won by the elimination of Germany's weaker Allies. They held that one more blow would force exhausted Turkey to sue for peace ; and consequently advocated a further offensive in Palestine. This policy was even tually adopted. Two divisions, the 3rd and 7th Indian, were moved from Mesopotamia to reinforce Allenby's army, and all preparations for a fresh great offensive were being made, when the storm broke on the Western Front. The success of the Ger man offensive of March 21 caused a demand on Allenby for all the troops he could spare, which of course necessitated the post ponement of his operations. During April and May, two com plete divisions (the 52nd and 74th), 24 additional British bat talions, nine regiments of yeomanry and heavy batteries were withdrawn from the Egyptian Expeditionary Force and despatched to France. These were gradually replaced by Indian cavalry from France and Indian units from India, and the Egyptian Expedi tionary Force was reorganized on an Indian basis. It required much training and organization to weld all these new, and in some cases raw, units into an effective whole ; but by the end of the summer the Egyptian Expeditionary Force was again ready to strike a decisive blow.

Preliminary Operations in 1918.

Meanwhile, in March and May, Allenby had carried out two raids to the east of the Jordan. These raids were an important part of his strategical plan. He had decided that his next great advance should be initiated from his left flank along the coastal plain, where his great superiority in the mounted army could be exploited. Therefore, the more of

the Turkish army he could draw over to the opposite flank, east of the Jordan, the easier would it be to break through on the coast when the time came. The railway junction at Deraa was a vital point in the Turkish communications. If the Turkish command could be persuaded by demonstrations east of the Jordan that a move in force up the Hejaz railway was a possi bility, and if Feisal's Arabs could be encouraged to attack Deraa and the railway where it ran down the Yarmuk valley, the Turks would be obliged to move troops east of the Jordan. With these objects the raids east of the Jordan were undertaken. Neither was a complete tactical success. The first raid reached the rail way near Amman and cut it in several places, but failed to capture Amman before supply difficulties caused by vile weather necessi tated its withdrawal. In the second raid, the mounted troops reached Es Salt; but the Turks could not be driven from their strong positions in the Shunet Nimrin pass ; and the defeat of the left flank guard of the mounted troops, with the loss of nine guns, compelled their withdrawal from Es Salt.

But the two raids had the desired effect of seriously alarming the Turks for their left flank. After the second, Liman von Sanders, who was now in command, had been induced to place one-third of his total force east of the Jordan, with a correspond ing weakening of his forces west of the Jordan. Allenby kept alive the opposing commander's fears for this flank by maintain ing throughout the summer, in spite of the heat, a considerable force in the valley of the Jordan. In July the German units operating with the Turks made an abortive attack on part of the position of the Desert Mounted Corps.