There seemed now little to tie Lee to the lines he had so pain fully constructed, for his army was without coffee, tea or sugar, and though of foreign meat they had 31 million rations and of bread million rations in reserve, the troops lived chiefly on corn bread. A. P. Hill on the right held on from Hatcher's Run to Fort Gregg, whence Gordon and Anderson prolonged to the left as far as the Appomattox river, and Longstreet continued the line northwards along the Bermuda front across the James as far as White Oak swamp (37m. in all). The winter was very severe, and the continual trench-work and outpost duty overtaxed the patriotism of Lee's 50,000 infantry and stimulated desertion. Supplies were brought in by wagons, as the rolling stock on the railways was worn, and on Feb. 5, 1865, Gen. Gregg moved out to the Boydton Plank road to intercept the Confederate convoys. Gregg failed to locate the wagons, and Lee, hearing of the expe dition, sent out a force which drove him back. Sheridan, after driving Early from the Valley in Oct., destroyed the railways about Staunton, Charlottesville, Gordonsville and Lynchburg, and even rendered the James canal useless as a line of supply.
Grant recalled Sheridan to the main army in March, and at the end of the month prepared for a turning movement westward with the object of drawing Lee out of his lines. Lee had antici pated such an attempt, and had resolved to abandon his lines and unite with Johnston in North Carolina, but the roads were not yet in a state for the movement of artillery and wagons, and it was to gain time that he now ventured upon a bold offensive stroke—a night attack upon a strong point in the Federal right called Fort Stedman—the success of which might cause Grant to call in the detachments on his left and so facilitate the proposed movement of the Confederates towards Danville. Gen. Gordon was selected to conduct the operation and his corps was strongly reinforced for the occasion. The opposing lines east of Petersburg were only i5oyds., and the sentries of each side 5oyds. apart. Gordon's men dashed across the intervening space at 4:3o A.M. on March 25, surprised the garrison and occupied Fort Sted man, but when daylight broke and the Federal guns could be brought to bear the fort was found to he untenable. Parke's corps (IX.) recaptured the work at a cost of i,000 men, and Gordon fell back, leaving nearly 2,000 men in the hands of the Federals.
At this time Sherman visited Grant at City Point and proposed to move at the end of ten days on Burkesville junction and so cut off Lee from Danville and Lynchburg; it was while Sher man was preparing for this operation that Grant finished the campaign. Secure behind his formidable entrenchments, Grant had no fear for his base on the James river, and transferred large bodies of troops to his left without Lee's knowledge. Sheridan
was instructed on March 29 to gain the enemy's right and rear, moving by Dinwiddie Court-House and across Hatcher's Run. But the Confederates were on the alert and quick to extend their right. Sheridan got into a flat country of dense forest, tangled under growth, streams and swamps, and the soil of clay and sand was impassable for wagons and guns until he had corduroyed the route. On March 29 Lee perceived that the object of Grant was to seize the routes south of the Appomattox river, by which a movement south-west could be made to unite with Johnston's army, and he endeavoured to cover these roads, including the South Side railway, without losing his hold upon his works about Richmond and Petersburg, but in such a contest it was evident that numbers must prevail.
Sheridan's cavalry had reached Five Forks on the White Oak road on March 31, and on his right Humphreys and Warren (II. and V.) held the Confederates to their works along Hatcher's Run astride the Boydton Plank road; yet Lee was able to concen trate his three cavalry divisions, and supported them by Pickett's five infantry brigades. Sheridan was attacked and driven south as far as Dinwiddie Court-House; but Humphreys and Warren held their ground (action of White Oak ridge) at a cost of 2,000 men. Pickett and the cavalry fell back to Five Forks during the night and hastily entrenched, for he had been ordered to defend this position ; since the Boydton Plank road could no longer be held, the possession of White Oak road and the South Side rail way became necessary for the flank movement which Lee had resolved to attempt. Grant meanwhile had ordered Warren to support Sheridan in an attack on Pickett at daybreak. Sheridan advanced on April i and at 3 P.M. issued his orders for attack, explaining verbally a diagram he had prepared for the use of divisional commanders. Pickett held a front of 2m. with a division of cavalry on either flank and Rosser's cavalry guarding the baggage behind Hatcher's Run, and when attacked at 4 P.M. he was with Rosser 1 Zm. in rear. Before Pickett was made aware of a battle being in progress his left was destroyed. Lee seems to have made no arrangements to support him in this direction. Pickett's position on the right was finally carried by Sheridan's cavalry dismounting and storming the entrenchments frontally. Pickett's routed brigades were rallied at the South Side railroad, but the Confederates had lost White Oak road, and unless Lee was capable of a vigorous counterstroke on his extreme right it was evident he must also lose the South Side railroad.