PETERSBURG CAMPAIGN (1864-65). The name of Petersburg is associated with operations in the American Civil War, which formed the sequel of the Wilderness Campaign (q.v.) and the last act in the struggle between the armies of Grant and Lee for supremacy. Petersburg and Richmond, Virginia, connected by rail and covered north, east and south by 40m. of entrench ments, formed the salients of a vast fortress, into which rein forcements and supplies could be poured from the rear by means of the James canal, the Virginia Central, the Lynchburg, the Dan ville and the Weldon railroads—the latter bringing up to Peters burg from Wilmington (225m. distant) the cargoes of blockade runners. Petersburg became a strategic point as soon as Grant determined to carry the army of the Potomac—defeated at Cold Harbor on the Chickahominy (see WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN )— south of Richmond, and, being joined by Butler's Army of the James (momentarily checked in the Bermuda Hundred peninsula by a small army under Beauregard), to operate from the east, depending on the James river as his line of supply. The policy of the Confederate president was to employ Robert E. Lee's army to protect his capital. Petersburg was nearer than Richmond to the navigable part of the James river—City Point is only iom. distant—and the capture of Petersburg would involve the fall of Richmond and the capitulation or flight of Lee's army.
As early as June 9, 1864, while the main armies were still north of the James and Petersburg was garrisoned by a brigade under Gen. Wise, a Federal expedition from the Army of the James approached the city. The column on the City Point road discovered strong earthworks, and that on the Jerusalem Plank road experienced a repulse : the total force of the Federals was 4,500, and Wise's brigade (2,400) had been quickly reinforced from Beauregard's central position at Bermuda Hundred. A week later a more serious attempt was made to break through the defences, while Gen. Lee's main army was detained north of Richmond. Grant detached the II. and XVIII. Corps under Gen erals Smith and Hancock, who were to unite and operate along the City Point railroad and capture the outer line of works about 2111. from Petersburg while a demonstration was made along the Norfolk railroad by cavalry under Kautz. On June 15 Smith attacked and captured five redans before Hancock came up, and when next day Burnside's corps (IX.) arrived and Gen. Meade assumed control of the three corps, he attacked again at 6 P.M. On June 17 Warren's (V.) corps ..rrived, and Meade made a third assault with two corps (V., IX.). On June 18 the attack was renewed with three corps (II., V., IX.) late in the afternoon, and the results of the four days' fighting were so far satisfactory that ground was won which could be entrenched and held against any sortie of the Petersburg garrison. Probably on June 18 the town
of Petersburg might have been captured by Meade, for at this crisis Lee was in temporary eclipse.
It was late on June 17 when Beauregard, who had for three days valiantly held his main lines south of Richmond with some 14,00o infantry against three Federal corps, succeeded in con vincing Lee that the main army was in the wrong place. But when at last the Confederate leader was aroused to a sense of his danger he soon filled every road with divisions marching to save Peters burg : they marched all night ; they slept in the trenches on arrival, and on June 19 these reinforcements convinced Meade that his main attack between the Appomattox river and the Jeru salem Plank road was delivered a day too late. At a cost of 0,000 casualties Meade had gained half a mile of ground, but the Confederates in falling back had concentrated, and now that the new plan of operations was exposed and the main bodies were again face to face the power of defensive tactics reasserted itself. Yet June was not to close without adding some 8,000 men to the Federal casualties, for in addition to daily losses by sharp shooting along the front, over 5,000 men fell or were captured in operations directed against the southern railroads. Grant had resolved to deprive his enemy of these lines of supply : his plan was to prolong his line of investment westward and construct re doubts (such as Fort Davis, Fort Stedman and Fort Sedgwick) as a continual menace to the Confederate garrison and a defence against sorties, while his cavalry and portions of five corps (II., V., VI., IX. and XVIII.) engaged in enterprises which it was hoped would tempt Lee to fight outside his works. A decisive vic tory in the field, a successful assault on the defences between Rich mond and Petersburg, or the complete destruction of the railroads, would precipitate disaster to the South, and of these three methods the last would be the surest in its effects. But such a method was necessarily slow. Wilson's cavalry (5,500) destroyed 3om. of the Lynchburg or South Side railroad, and 3om. of the Danville railroad, together with Burkesville junction and Ream's station on the Weldon railroad; but Wilson was caught by the Confederate cavalry loom. from Petersburg and escaped only by destroying his wagons and limbers and abandoning I2 guns. Even the Virginia Central railroad could not be held by the Federals after Sheridan with the main body of the cavalry had been called back to White House on the Pamunkey to escort a great convoy.