But a crisis was approaching. Sheridan's success at Five Forks induced Grant to deliver a general assault on April 2. The Con federate lines were bombarded all night, and on April 2 with Wright's corps (VI.), Grant attacked the weakest part of Lee's line and broke through, losing i,ioo men in 15 minutes. A. P. Hill was killed and his corps broke and was cut off from Peters burg. At the same time Parke's corps (IX.), on the right of the VI., attacked the eastern front near Fort Stedman but was re pulsed; then Humphreys' corps (II.) on the left attacked a Con federate division and forced it to retreat to the South Side rail road, where at Sutherland station a final attack dispersed it. Wright, supported by Gen. Ord (commanding the Army of the James), afterwards won the strong redoubts called Fort Whit worth and Fort Gregg, and thus in a day the Confederate right had been destroyed from Five Forks to a point some two or three miles west of the Weldon railroad; rom. of works had been abandoned, and if Grant had been able to press his advantage at once the campaign must have ended. But Grant was not aware of the enemy's plight, and so resolved to wait until the morrow before completing his victory.
Meanwhile Lee perceived that the hour had come at last when Richmond must fall, and at 3 P.M. he had issued orders for the march of the remains of his army to Lynchburg via Amelia Court House, a march which evidently must partake of the character of a forlorn hope, hastily planned, ill prepared, and undertaken by troops whom the disasters and hardships of the past six months had weakened physically and morally. Yet if Lee had negotiated a peace on April 2 military history would have lost one of the finest examples of the strategic pursuit. Lee's proposed movement involved the transfer of the army and its baggage room. on bad roads across the front of an enemy, and nothing but mischance could prevent the Federals intercepting Lee's columns by a shorter route and seizing the South Side railroad, on which sup plies were to be forwarded from Lynchburg to meet the retreating army at Appomattox station, Pamplin's station or Farmville station. The Appomattox river must be crossed two or three times at its bends. Various creeks and swamps must be bridged, and the bridges destroyed after crossing. The wagons must move on separate roads so as to be covered by the columns during marches and combats and the infantry were to follow the artil lery on the roads. Longstreet, Gordon and Mahone's division from Richmond all crossed the Appomattox at Goode's bridge. Ewell from Richmond crossed the Appomattox by the Danville railroad bridge north of Goode's bridge. Anderson commanded
the flank guard which moved south of the Appomattox with Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry. Lee gained a day's start by moving at 8 P.M., for Grant was making preparations to attack the entrench ments next day (April 3), but the start was lost in waiting for President Davis and the Government to escape from Richmond. Sheridan's cavalry got in touch with Lee's flank-guard early on April 3 near Namozine creek, and at nightfall the Federal ad vance-guard was at Deep creek. On April 4 Sheridan reached the Danville railroad at Jetersville, and on April 5, when Lee had halted at Amelia Court-House on the railroad to get supplies, the Federals had three corps (II., V., VI.) in support of Sheridan 8m. nearer than Lee to Sailor's creek, the point where he must again cross the Appomattox.
Interception was now a fait accompli, though neither side sus pected it. Lee was unaware of the enemy's proximity, and Grant believed that Lee would remain at Amelia Court-House, but Lee moved west, crossing Flat creek at sunset on April 5, to the Lynchburg railroad (Longstreet, marching all night, reached Rice's station at sunrise on April 6), while the Federals moved north ward on the same day to attack Lee at Amelia Court-House, and on discovering Lee's evasion the three Federal corps effected a wheel to the left and advanced on Deatonsville after bridging Flat creek. Meanwhile the Federal cavalry had located and destroyed a convoy at Painesville, but had in turn been attacked by Fitz hugh Lee's cavalry and driven back on the main body at Flat creek. The rearguard of Lee's army was Gordon's command, which was at Amelia springs at 8 A.M. on the 6th of April. Lee's army stretched out for r5m., and when its advance-guard was at Rice's station its rearguard was still at Amelia Court-House. Rice's station is 62m. from Lynchburg. Here Longstreet waited all day for Anderson, Ewell and Gordon to close up, and then at night he moved 8m. to Farmville station (68m. south-west of Richmond), where 8o,000 rations had been railed from Lynch burg; then Longstreet crossed the Appomattox, and on April 7 moved forward towards Lynchburg, covered by Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry. Meanwhile the remainder of Lee's army had been prac tically destroyed within a few miles of the point where Longstreet had halted. Sheridan's cavalry and two corps (II., VI.) had caught it entangled with the trains of the army attempting the passage of Sailor's creek; and Ord would even have attacked Longstreet (whom he had located late at night) had his march been delayed.