Perception of Physical Things

Automatisation.

It is a familiar observation that actions originally requiring attention come to be performed "uncon sciously." We do not, for instance, give the same attention to the buttoning up of a coat as a child who is learning to do so. There would seem to be two stages whereby a movement becomes auto matic. The first is that in which attention is merely withdrawn from the movement and concerns itself with the external cues alone. In threading our way through a crowd we do not think of the movements of turning to right or left, or increasing our speed or stopping as occasion requires. Action follows directly upon the perception of the obstacles which we have to avoid. In variable situations automatisation does not advance beyond this stage; but in relatively constant sequences of events attention can also be withdrawn to a very large extent from the external cues as well. Thus in walking on even ground we do not attend to the sensations in touching the ground though these in fact condition each successive step. If the process advances so far that atten tion is wholly withdrawn an act originally conscious is then indis tinguishable from a reflex.

Variations in Strength.

Repetition or exercise we have noted sometimes results in a tendency becoming more pronounced, sometimes in its progressive disappearance. Behind this diversity a single principle would seem to be involved. So far as the performance of any movement produces satisfaction the tendency to perform it is confirmed, so far as it fails to promote the ends in view the tendency is weakened.

This is the well known "Law of Effect" expressed in conative terms, and is identical with the principle already dealt with as the "Law of Association." Here, too, the law has sometimes been supposed to operate in conjunction with other laws—Recency and Frequency, and the same modification is here required. Re cency and Frequency are dependent and possibly counter acting laws but further determinations of the primary law. The more frequently and the more recently a given response has proved successful the more likely it is to recur.

Transference of Interest.

Interest may be transferred from one object to another, and conative activity from one direction to another. The simplest cases are among those which externally viewed, may appear to be conditioned reflex actions. An object B originally accompanying A evokes the interest and acquires the power to provoke the response originally due to A. Sounds of a certain kind provoke the response of fear, and attendant circumstances may acquire a similar power. So far, however, there is merely an extension of the range of objects possessing a frightening character. The term "transference" may be em ployed when the acquisition of interest in B is accompanied by loss of interest in A. There must, however, be conative continuity

between the two situations; the interest in B must be derivative from the interest in A or both must have a common origin. Many examples are to be found in the changes in theoretical interest. Practical construction may generate an interest in Physics, and this in turn may lead to Mathematics, the original practical in terest being weakened or wholly lost. A more primitive case of great importance is transference in the tendency to respond to a specific situation in a given way. The primitive response to opposition is destructive and aggressive. Under certain conditions this may be displaced by subtler and more delicate reactions. In general, the relative efficiency of different modes of response is the chief determinant of this form of modification.

Chains of Action.

Particular importance attaches to con stant secondary features in a perceptual situation when they have the advantage of temporal priority. They serve then as signs and portents of what is about to come, or may be brought about. This fact accounts for the increasing predominance of the "dis tance receptors" such as eye and ear, in perceptual development.

The secondary features will according to circumstances either immediately evoke the original response or elicit a new one calcu lated to hasten the situation in which this response will be ap propriate. At the sound of danger, flight may ensue without awaiting the arrival of the enemy. But the distant perception of prey tends not to an immediate attempt to seize it, but to antecedent pursuit, until a situation arises in which the use of the jaws will be effective.

Situations to which the right response is known and productive of satisfaction themselves become the object of appetition. In this way chains of activity, considerable in length, will in course of time develop. This would seem to be the origin of the familiar "behaviour cycles." In following out such cycles awareness of the ultimate end is by no means likely to be present. Each step need only involve prevision of the initial phase of the next.

But as we have noted, from another point of view, such devel opments do not consist merely in the elaboration of actions in single file. Attention is directed not only to the central feature of the situation and its antecedents but extends to all attendant conditions. More particularly, when a given response is not con sistently successful a certain hesitancy will arise conducive to further discrimination and further variation. The successful re sponse will vary according to the context. Hence, relatively to any given presentation there will be alternative responses. The whole will constitute an extremely complex conative disposition.