Perception of Physical Things

Primary and Secondary Tendencies.

Within such com plex systems a distinction must be drawn between conative ten dencies which are relatively independent in their ends, and others which only come into play in a purely subsidiary role. The former have primary ends, but the secondary tendencies have only deriva tive ends. The distinction is clearly present in certain classifica tions of the instincts. Whilst the search for certain sensory pleasures may, prima facie, be regarded as providing an "absolute end," "pugnacity" is dependent upon the thwarting of some more primary impulse. The instinct of escape in some of its forms at least would also seem to presuppose some prior tendency.

The distinction is to some extent, obscured by the fact that, in accordance with the tendency for means to become ends, secondary trends may acquire a certain primary character. "Pugnacity" may become an art, and danger may be sought, but the primary and the secondary forms in this case may still clearly be dis tinguished by their ends. In the secondary form, pugnacity in volves a tendency to break down some opposition in order to get on with something else, whereas, when indulged in for its own sake, a conventional or fictitious opposition is established in order to break it down. "Means" and "end" from the standpoint in the first case are in the second reversed.

The secondary tendencies in general are adaptive differentia tion of conative activity in response to certain typical vicissitudes of the primary conation, but such terms as "pugnacity" and "anger," "flight" and "fear" are wholly inapplicable to these tendencies in their primitive forms. The first clear lines of dif ferentiation correspond to the distinction between relative success and failure as appreciated by the experient. "Nothing succeeds like success." Partial success, in other words, exercises a special directive influence upon the course of future endeavour. Action tends to be restricted to the lines which have proved successful, whilst in failure there is a corresponding increase in the range of experimental variation. This, relatively to any given direction of activity implies a corresponding variation in the intensity of conation. But whilst success does not admit of great difference of kind, there are many forms of failure, and certain typical kinds of obstacle call for special kinds of adjustment. The char

acteristic difference between pugnacity and fear will thus gradu ally emerge. Both have their origin in hindrance and opposition, and it is not easy to determine with precision the conditions under which one rather than the other is likely to find expression. Roughly, one may say that fear is more commonly the adjunct of an aversive reaction, whilst pugnacity is employed in the serv ice of appetition. Exceptions, however, are many and obvious. Pugnacity tends to arise in relation to other wills or in regard to objects which admit of "personification," and when the opposition is from a source not disproportionate to the agent's powers. Fear on the other hand is more readily evoked by dangers which are inadequately understood, by impersonal forces of nature, and by opposing wills of such overwhelming power that resistance will not avail.

But in the course of conative differentiation and elaboration, many complex systems may develop, which blend in such varied ways as to render hard and fast classification, totally misleading. In tracing the course of such elaboration, certain typical systems may be selected for brief analysis.

Emotion.

Emotions have been supposed by various thinkers in turn to be almost everything which might theoretically be imagined, sensations, the memory of past feelings, peculiar mode of present affective tone, or specific forms of conation. The principal issues involved may perhaps be indicated by a brief consideration of the doctrine espoused by William James (1842– 1910) that emotions are the sensations which arise from the reflexly determined actions which are generally regarded as emo tional expressions.

The objections to this view—which it is generally felt must be mistaken—do not arise from the data of physiological observa tions (which at present are inconclusive) but from a question of general principle. The matter is primarily one of psychological analysis. To those who adopt a strict sensationalism (and to the sensationalistic tradition this doctrine is largely due) the issue is predetermined in favour of James's view; but once distinc tively affective and conative modes of experience are elsewhere recognised, their place in the experience of emotion is not difficult to observe.