Perception of Physical Things

It is significant that in the most natural way of describing an emotion we refer to conative tendency. Anger is the "feeling" that we should like to break or injure the object of aversion, fear the impulse to cringe or run away, and embarrassment a wish "to drop through the floor." So far from it being adequate to say, with James, that if sensation is "thought away" nothing distinctive of the emotion will remain, it would be more to the point to assert that removing its distinctive impulse from the experience of an emotional upheaval, we should find it difficult to decide whether we were angry, frightened or in love.

The fact would seem to be that an emotion is an extremely complex state of mind, involving each of the fundamental "ele ments." Sensations are undoubtedly essential, but cognition feel ing and conation are equally implied.

The nucleus of this complex "psychosis" consists of the pri mary impulses involved in emotional expression, whether of muscle or gland. Emotion is not the mere experience of sensation, but it well may be conation with sensations of the expression (as such expressions are presented to the subject) as the primary objects. In anger, there is a certain satisfaction to be derived from a clenching of the fist and biting the lips. The emotional expres sions are, in fact, constituents of the total object of desire. But in themselves "expressions" are incomplete. They are at best but preparatory adjustments, and from the standpoint of the experiment there is reference to an external object, in relation to which further co-ordinated action is required. For this reason it would be untrue to say that emotional tendencies do not admit of modification. Primitive tendencies persist side by side with later developments ; expression of emotion shades off impercep tibly into the manifestation of instinct, and instinctive action will be found to admit of considerable modification.

Instinct.

Earlier approaches to the subject of instinct were purely biological, the term being employed to designate certain complex trains of activity, serving a useful purpose, which are perfectly executed from the first in total independence of past experience, but blind and invariable, in the species, and, through their period of exercise, in the individual life. Close observation, however, has revealed that none of these characteristics can in strictness be assigned to actions admittedly instinctive.

The Blindness of Instinct.

The distinctively psychological treatment of the subject relates to the nature of the experience which accompanies the performance of instinctive actions. But once it is admitted that there is an experience at all—and the fact is indisputable—it becomes impossible to maintain that the action is wholly blind. Perception of the exciting situation is at

least required, and with the possible exception of the first per formance some dim recollection of the effects of prior action would seem also to be involved. But even on a first performance apprehension is not restricted to the present. The perception of a given situation as one which calls for change would seem to be an essential characteristic of conative experience. The total ap prehension includes a specific reference to the future, and a vague awareness of the sort of change required. There is presumably a measure of expectation, too. The moor-hen on its first dive would at least experience surprise if, as a result of its reaction to the provocative agent, it found itself in a wholly unmodified state of affairs. How determinate expectation may be in such circum stances it is hardly profitable to inquire. What is of general im portance is that to explain the development of instinctive experi ence, and of intelligent foresight, some reference to the future is originally involved. Growth in respect of such experience consists not in the introduction of such reference at a certain point, but in a gradual extension of temporal range, and in progressive definiteness in what is apprehended.

The "Perfection" of the Instincts.

Here, too, closer obser vation has called for a modification of earlier ideas. Some more qualified term than "perfection" seems to be required, and it has reasonably been suggested that the most that we can say is that instinctive action is good enough to be serviceable when it is first employed. But serviceability is relative to the situation. The first flight of the bird will save it from falling to the ground, but will not enable it to evade the attacks of enemies from which in later life it can easily escape. A distinction, too, must be drawn between the earlier and later phases of a chain of instinctive acts. The terminal links may appear to be almost reflex, whilst the earlier may be comparatively inexpert. The distinction is ob scured by the somewhat artificial restriction of such terms as "in stinct" to the more automatic phases of a continuous sequence of behaviour. The distinction is of importance in regard to the range of variability, and the dependence upon previous practice. The laying of the egg may be perfectly performed, whilst the search for material with which to construct the nest may leave much to be desired. The latter, too, will allow of variability on account of local conditions, and perhaps on account of individual difference of temperament. The former does not allow the same degree of scope for originality.