ence actually causes the goodness of everything else to which the name of good can be given. The Forms are thus thought of as a hierarchy with a supreme Form at their head, though no attempt is made at a rational theory of the way in which the supreme Form unites the rest into the system.
The immediate subject of the Phaedrus is the principles of "rhetoric" or, as we should say, prose composition. The Gorgias had told us that "rhetoric" as commonly practised is not a matter of rational principles at all, but a mere empirical trick of adapt ing one's tone to the prejudices of an audience. The Phaedrul aims at showing how a really scientific "rhetoric" might be built on the double foundation of logical method and scientific study of human passions. Plato contrives, however, by making a real or supposed "erotic" composition of Lysias the starting-point of his criticisms, to unite with this topic a discussion of the psy chology of "love," and this, as in the Symposium, leads him to speak of the Forms as the objects of transcendental emotion. The soul is immortal, because it has within itself a native source of spontaneous movement.' In its disembodied state it shared the life of the gods and could enjoy the direct contemplation of "unbodied" reality, that is, of the Forms. It has suffered an ante natal fall into an embodied condition in which it is blind to every thing which does not come in at the avenues of sense.
Now our senses only suggest few and faint images of such Forms as Justice and Temperance, but they can suggest Beauty in a much more impressive and startling way. To "fall in love" is to come under the influence of such sudden and arresting sug gestions of Beauty; the "unreason" and "madness" of the lover mean that he is being awakened to realities which other men ignore. The "wings" of his soul are beginning to grow again, and his experience, rightly used, will be the first step in the soul's return to its high estate. This section of the Phaedrus is the locus classi cus in Plato for the Forms as objects of mystical contemplation.
height and with a single mind ( Ta ai7o1) rpecrretv To live thus is to be in spiritual health; to live otherwise is to be spiritually diseased. The obligation is thus intrinsic and absolute. This position has to be made good against the incoherencies of a morality of uncriticized traditional maxims, as well as against the "inmoralism" of advanced thought (repre sented by Thrasymachus in Bk. I., expounded more intelligently by Glaucon in Bk. II.).
This leads us to consider what would be the general type of life in a society where the principle of Justice had power as well as manifest authority, and how it might acquire that power. Hence the need for a sketch (II., III.) of the institutions of the reformed society, and particularly of its moral and religious education. We have next to satisfy ourselves that the principles which regu late the public life of the morally healthy society are also recogniz ably the principles of the great virtues of private life. For this purpose, we need a psychology of voluntary action which is pro vided (Bk. IV.) by the doctrine of the "tripartite soul." This is not, indeed, a scientific psychology, but proves adequate to de scribe the moral life of the ordinary good citizen of such a society as we have conceived. The foundation of all this moral excellence is thus laid in absolute loyalty to a sound moral tradition enforced by education. To ensure that the tradition shall be thoroughly sound, we must stipulate that the authorities who create it do not themselves depend on tradition for their convictions about good and evil ; they must not "opine," but know, by personal insight. The statesmen at the head of the community must be "philos ophers" as well as kings (Bk. VI.).