Plato

But the vision of "the Good" will only dawn on them if they have been prepared for it by an intellectual discipline in hard thinking which leads them through the curriculum of the exact sciences to the critical study of the metaphysical principles in volved in science (Bk. VII.). The central books of the Republic thus present us with an outline of metaphysics and a philosophy of the sciences. We now turn back to consider the various stages of degeneration through which national and personal character pass when the true moral ideal is allowed to fall more and more completely out of view. As we pass them in review, we are increas ingly confirmed in our conviction that, in respect of happiness, the life of regard for right is immeasurably superior to that of sating one's cupidities or gratifying one's personal ambitions (VIII.— IX.), and this conclusion is finally clinched (X.) by re-affirmation of the immortality of the soul. Since the soul is immortal, the issue which hangs upon our choice to live well or ill is one of infinite moment (X.).

The ethical scheme of the

Republic, like that of the Gorgias and Phaedo, is dominated by the conception of the "three lives," ascribed by credible tradition to Pythagoras. The "lives" are those of the philosopher, the "man of action" (4nXOrtp.os), the votary of enjoyment (4,LXioovos, 4LX0XPII-taros). The end of the first is wisdom, of the second, distinction, of the third, the gratifications of "appetite." Distinction is a worthier end in life than mere satisfaction of appetite ; the supremely worthy end is wisdom. In a well-lived life, then, the attainment of wisdom will be the paramount end, and ambition and appetite will only be allowed such gratification as is compatible with loyalty to the pursuit of that paramount end. The psychological foundation of this doctrine is the theory of the "tripartite" soul, expounded fully in Rep. IV. Analysis of familiar experience reveals three "ele ments" (p,Opi.a, et5n) or "active principles" within us, (I) con sidered rational judgment of good (r6 Xo-yto-rucov); (2) a multi tude of clamant appetites for particular gratifications, which may be in violent conflict with our own considered judgment of good (To ircOv,unruc6v) ; (3) a factor of "spirit," higher "ideal emotion," which manifests itself as "resentment" against both the infringe ment of our just rights by others and the rebellion of our own appetites against our judgment ( TO The same distinctions reappear in the structure of society. A society naturally falls into three divisions, the statesmen, who direct the public life, the general civilian population, who carry on the business of providing for material needs, and the executive force (army and police), whose function is, in a rightly ordered society, to give effect to the counsels of the statesmen by repress ing attacks from without and rebellion from within.

These three "orders" are thus respectively, the judgment, the "appetitive" and "spirited" elements in the national soul. On this basis, we can proceed to work out an ethical and political theory. In ethics we can define the great leading types of "goodness," the quadrilateral, later known as the four "cardinal" virtues. Wisdom is the "excellence" of the "thinking part," clear and as sured knowledge of the good ; courage, the fighting man's virtue, is the "excellence" of the "spirited" part, unswerving loyalty, unshaken by pain, by danger, by the seductions of pleasure, to the rule of life laid down by judgment temperance, the special excel lence of the "appetitive" part, is the contented acquiescence of the non-rational elements in the soul in the plan of life prescribed by judgment justice is just the state in which each of the elements is vigorously executing its own function and confining itself within the limits of that function. In the rightly ordered society, the national wisdom has the statesmen as its organ, the national courage the executive force ; the national temperance is shown in the loyal contentment of each class in the community with its prescribed place and its duties.

Such a society is a true aristocracy, or rule of the best ; "timoc racy" the military state, in the better sense of that phrase, arises when the mere "man of action," only competent to fill the part of a good soldier, takes the place which rightly belongs to the thinker as directing statesman; "oligarchy" (i.e., the dominance of "mer chant princes," plutocracy), is a further deviation from the ideal, which arises when political power is bestowed on property as such. A still worse system is democracy, in which no attempt is made to connect political power with any special qualifications. Worst of all is tyranny, exercise of irresponsible power by the positively disqualified, the man of "criminal" will. The psychological scheme on which this construction is based is not given by Plato as a piece of strict science. We are carefully warned that exact truth is not to be reached by such an analysis of prima facie facts of social life (435 d.), and reminded later on that this apparent triplicity of the soul may prove to be only a temporary consequence of its conjunction with the body (6i i b.).' The "tripartite" psychology, it is meant, enables us to give an account of the moral life, as it actually appears in a good citizen, which will fairly describe the facts. It is good popular psychology, useful for the moralist, but it is no more.