This unfriendly act bared the eastern flank of the Entente army, and gave the whole of Eastern Macedonia into the hands of the enemy. To meet the danger the British occupied the Struma line in force. Further, the Entente Governments insti tuted an economic blockade of the Greek coast, sent a brigade to Athens, and by the ultimatum of June 21 enforced the demob ilization of the Greek army and the resignation of the Govern ment. As it proved, however, the seizure of Rupel and Eastern Macedonia did not develop into a general offensive by the Ger man-Bulgarian forces.
Handicaps of the Allies' Army.--While these external troubles with Greece beset the Entente Powers, they were far from the sum of the handicaps which hindered effective action by the Salonika force. The idea of an offensive was constantly discussed between the French and British Governments, as also between Joffre and Sarrail ; but, apart from reluctance to provide adequate forces, it depended on too many contingencies, in partic ular the uncertain and often postponed intervention of Rumania. Furthermore the internal troubles of the Salonika force were no torious. Sarrail had the title of "Commander-in-chief of the Al lied Armies in the Orient," and with him Cordonnier commanded the French forces ; but his status was a nebulous one. Not only was the British commander to all intents independent, but also the Italian—a detachment arrived from Italy in Aug. 1916.
Apart from the defect that Sarrail's orders were issued from French headquarters without consultation with the other Allied Powers, Sarrail's own personality was not such as to weld this loose understanding into an effective co-operation. In a hetero geneous force, composed of French, British, Italians, Serbians and Russians, it was hardly a recommendation that the chief commander should be known not to have the confidence of his own supreme command, and that even the suspicion should exist that he was conducting operations with one eye on the political game at home. The British, by polite but firm insistence on their independence, maintained tranquil relations; wrangles and dis putes between the other Allied commands were continual, and the majority were unfortunately attributable to the policy or tact lessness of Sarrail.
While the Allied leaders were debating ways and means, the opposing armies moved, on Aug. 17, to forestall and dislocate the Allied offensive, which they judged would synchronize with Rumania's intervention. The Bulgarians made their effort on the two wings. The eastern wing from Rupel drove back the French cavalry on the east of the Struma and pressed down towards its mouth. But they dissipated their force by detaching part to seize the coastal strip of Kavalla, and the stout resistance of the British prevented them forcing the river line. On the
western wing the position was more critical, for the Bulgarian advance from the Monastir area drove the Serbs out of Florina and reached Lake Ostrovo before they were ultimately held.
These reverses caused a further change in Sarrail's plan for the Allied offensive; the forces east of the Vardar were merely to contain the enemy, while those west of the Vardar carried out the offensive. Thus to all intents it became no more than a counter offensive to restore the impaired situation in this sector. To release additional French troops the British extended their line west from Doiran to the Vardar; Sarrail was thus enabled to form an offensive group (of 21 French divisions, one Serbian division and a Russian brigade) under Cordonnier, in addition to the Serbian striking force of four divisions.
On Sept. 10 various British detachments crossed the river Struma in raids at six points in order to divert the enemy's attention, and on Sept. i 1 the real attack developed west of the Vardar. The Serbs, skilled mountain fighters and inspired by the closeness of their native soil, made good progress, and on Sept. 14 gained the pass of Gorni6eyo, breaking through the hostile front. But the Cordonnier group was slower, partly be cause of transport difficulties and Cordonnier's own inclination for the secure methodical advances he had practised successively in France. As a result, however, the Bulgarians, broken by the Serbs at GorniCeyo, were able to fall back across Cordonnier's front and re-establish their lines on the Brod. Sarrail, incensed, ordered fresh attacks by both groups, which were repulsed with heavy loss—as Cordonnier, protesting, had prophesied.
Between Sept. 3o and Oct. 8 the British XVI. Corps (Briggs) advanced its front to the line Agho Mahale-Ormanli, as a fixing move, coincidently with a fresh attack on the main front by the French and Serbs from Kaimalaalan westward. The pressure of the Serbs turned the Bulgar left and forced a further slight with drawal, but a Franco-Russian attack on Oct. 6 failed. Cordonnier urged the idea of a wider turning manoeuvre, but Sarrail, in the mistaken belief that a Bulgarian collapse was imminent, ordered a fresh blow on Oct. 14. This was a costly failure and led to a violent scene between Sarrail and his subordinate. Cordonnier left for home a few days later. This internal friction caused a temporary breakdown of action, and the Serbs were left to fight unsupported, until Sarrail took the step of putting the whole at tacking force under the Serbian Gen. Michich—a man of real military genius and with the knack of inspiring not only Serbian but other national forces.