Michich attacked in the Crna bend on Nov. 12 while, to aid this offensive, Milne's troops made local attacks and raids as a diversion on the Struma. Despite rain and snow the Serbs pressed on, turning successive positions, with the French, Rus sians and an Italian brigade on their left. Monastir was out flanked and on Nov. 19 was found evacuated—the first impor tant Serbian town to be regained. For a moment there was a real opportunity of exploitation, as the Bulgarians were in full retreat towards Prilep; but the immediate attacking forces were tired and hungry, and Sarrail suspended the advance—to the an noyance of the Serbs, who, in default of receiving fresh reserves, tried to press on unsupported until exhaustion stopped them.
By this time the Rumanian collapse, under pressure of the convergent German and Bulgarian attacks, was clear, and on Dec. 11 Sarrail received instructions to consolidate a defensive line embracing as much of the regained territory as possible. This line stretched from Lake Prespa—just north of Monastir north slopes of Kaimak6alan—to the Vardar, and thence by Doiran to the Struma and down to the sea. Its worst feature was that the commanding heights were held almost everywhere by the enemy. This front was to remain practically unchanged until Sept. 1918.
Reorganization.—Apart from the incident of a threaten ing Greek concentration in Thessaly—settled by a fresh ultima tum—the winter months of 1916-17 passed quickly, and the op portunity was taken to reorganize and regroup the forces. From the Gulf of Orfani to the Vardar the front was held solidly by the British, owing to Milne's insistence, but on the rest of the front Sarrail followed his usual plan of interspersing detachments of the various nationalities—presumably on the principle "divide et imperil." Whatever its personal advantages it was hardly conducive to prompt and effective action. Reinforcements had now brought the French up to a strength of eight divisions, while there were six Serbian and II- Italian divisions—making with the British 211 divisions, plus two Russian brigades. The total Allied strength was approximately while the Greek National Defence, or Venizelist army, was in process of formation. This concentration afforded adequate reserves for a resolute offensive in the spring.
Confronting the Allies were still the nominal German XI.
Army, and Bulgarian I. and IL Armies, comprising the equiva lent of one German and 13 Bulgarian divisions, of which prac tically half faced the British. Apart from the II. Army, these forces were under a German Commander-in-chief, Gen. Von Scholtz. On their side no large move was considered, partly be cause the Bulgarians had already achieved their principal ter ritorial aims, and merely desired to hold tight, while the Germans were satisfied with immobilizing so large an Allied force at no expenditure to themselves.
For the 1917 campaign Sarrail's scheme was for a preliminary flanking move on the extreme west, between Lakes Okhrida and Prespa, to shake the enemy's hold in the Monastir area; following this was to be the main fixing attack by the British on the Doiran front ; then the French, Russians and Italians in the south-west of the Crna bend were to advance; and finally the Serbs were to strike the decisive blow to the west again.
The preliminary move began on March 12 and was soon sus pended, achieving little apart from a creditable French local success on a spur west of Monastir. Then came the British turn —to attack the key position formed by the Dub and lesser ridges which commanded the passage between Lake Doiran and the Vardar. Milne had rejected an alternative proposal of Sarrail's that he should attack to gain Seres, which while attractive as a political advertisement had no military value, and being dom inated by the hills behind would have been difficult to hold. After a two days' artillery preparation, in vile weather, the Brit ish infantry advanced to the assault, on a two-division front (22nd and 26th), at 9.45 P.M. on April 24, the late hour being to gain surprise and protection. On the left the enemy's first position was gained and held, but in the centre and right the difficulties of the Jumeaux ravine and the strength of the re sistance foiled the attackers.
Worst of all, their sacrifice was in vain and their "fixing" role rendered abortive because the attack west of the Vardar was postponed by Sarrail, ostensibly for climatic reasons. Not until May 9 did the other attacks develop. Sarrail had rejected the Italian proposal for a flanking manoeuvre, in preference for a frontal blow, and this, made by the French and Italians, was a costly failure. The Serbian attack was even less effectual, in fact hardly developed, partly owing to internal political troubles then rife and partly to their want of confidence in the higher direction and in the genuineness of its intention to support their efforts. Once more the British, on the night of May 8, had delivered a fixing attack, and once more their heavy sacrifice had been purposeless. The offensive was definitely closed down by Sarrail on May The Bulgarians, content with the prestige of this successful repulse, attempted no counter-stroke, and as the Allied forces were neither in the mood nor the condition for further efforts, the front relapsed into stagnation for the rest of the year. The only minor incidents were a successful local advance in Sept. by the French on the extreme left, west of Lake Okhrida, and Milne's withdrawal of his right from the marshy valley to the foot-hills west of the Struma, a precaution to lessen the danger of malaria and dysentery. The focus of interest again became political—common action was taken to settle the simmering menace and intrigues of Greece. In June, Allied troops invaded Thessaly, but the abdication of King Constantine Was forced without fighting, and the Venizelist Government returned to power. The consequent reinforcement of the Allies by the Greek army came as a prospective counterpoise to the contemplated withdrawal of two British divisions in Sept. for the projected offensive in Palestine.