THE RETREAT TO SALONIKA Faced with this critical situation, the French and British Gov ernments decided, albeit tardily, to succour Serbia with an expedi tionary force.
In this the French Government took the lead and nomi nated as commander Gen. Sarrail, the former chief of the III.
Army in the Verdun sector. Sarrail's political activities had earned him the distrust of the military authorities ; but the same factor, through his influence with the parties of the Left, made it difficult to ignore him completely. His removal by Joffre from the III. Army command placed the Government in a temporary dilemma, and they eagerly seized the opportunity of placating Sarrail and his political supporters by appointing him to a con veniently distant theatre of war.
While the constitution of Sarrail's force was still under discus sion, the Bulgarian mobilization on Sept. 22 forced the hands of the Entente Governments. A hurried order was sent for the dis patch to Salonika of contingents from Gallipoli, preliminary to the arrival of reinforcements from France. Preceded by staff offi cers, the British loth and French 156th Divs. began to disembark at Salonika on Oct. 5, and they were followed by the French 57th Division. On the same day, however, the Greek promise of aid to Serbia, made by M. Venizelos, was repudiated by King Constan tine, and the Venizelist Government fell—to be replaced by that of M. Zaimis, which took neutrality as its keynote. This reacted at once not only on the Franco-British plan but on their opera tions. The Greek officials, civil and military, at Salonika did their best, or worst, to obstruct the disembarkation of the Allied contingents.
To increase the confusion, the intended concentration point was several times changed by successive orders from Paris until, on Sarrail's arrival on Oct. 12, he decided, in view of his slender resources and the doubtful attitude of the Greek army in his rear, to concentrate no further forward than the Demir Qapu (Demir Kapija) defile. The limited object was to protect the railway and to ease the pressure on the Serbian forces to the north by repelling a Bulgarian advance from Strumitsa (Strumica)—which would sever that line and so the Serbian line of retreat. Mean
while, the British troops under Gen. Mahon began moving up to Doiran, in echelon behind the right of the French.
On Oct. 14 the vanguard of the French troops came into action at Strumitsa station (in Serbia), driving back a Bulgarian reconnaissance, and on Oct. 17, in response to Serbian urgings, a brigade was sent forward beyond the Demir Qapu defile as far as Krivolak. Reinforced by the arrival of the French 122nd Div. Sarrail began, on Nov. 3, an offensive northward to facilitate the Serbian retreat. But the seizure of the Babuna pass by the Bulgarians closed the channel of southward retreat for the main Serbian army, and finally shattered the hope that the Serbians might fall back on the relieving force, as was the advice of their allies.
Sarrail was thus faced with a difficult problem. On the one hand the gallant French efforts to break through towards the Babuna had failed and they were forced on the defensive, and, on the other, he received news of the Serbian decision to retreat westward through Albania towards the Adriatic. With his small force thus isolated he took the only possible decision—to fall back towards Salonika. This decision raised further problems. Were they to hold on there, or evacuate Greek soil altogether? With the disappearance of Serbia beneath the enemy flood, the Entente Powers could no longer claim that they were at Salonika merely to use a line of communication to which Serbia was by treaty entitled. The other justification, that they had come at the request of the Greek Government was now nullified by the downfall of Venizelos. Considerations of prestige and their desire to use Salonika as a base for diplomatic operations in the Balkans led the Entente Governments to remain, but without any clear policy as to the future.