The Russian Revolution

The Strikes.

Of the actual development of the Revolution there is very little to say. Strikes for higher wages at some of the factories had been occurring sporadically for some time; and on March 8 no fewer than 130,000 men are said to have been out. To this number must be added a considerable figure to account for the women workers who were demonstrating on that day (The Women's Day). But though the number of the strikers and of their sympathizers was large and though several bakers' shops were demolished by the mob neither the leaders of the Duma on the one hand nor the Government and the Police on the other gave the matter any particular attention. The only precaution taken by the authorities was to prevent the demonstrators reach ing the centre of the city. The next day the strikers were still more numerous and probably amounted to 3o% of all the workers in Petrograd. Some sections of the crowd succeeded in reaching the centre of the city and their mood soon became sinister and threatening. On that day too the university students joined the movement, and though the watchword of the strikers remained 'The Zimmerwald Manifesto of 1915 is full of momentous declara tions. The following are some of them:— , "The war that has produced this chaos is the outcome of Imperial ism, of the endeavours of capitalist classes of every nation to satisfy their greed for profit by the exploitation of human labour and the treasures of Nature. . . .

"To raise welfare to a high level was the aim announced at the beginning of the war: misery and privation, unemployment and death, underfeeding and disease are the real outcome. For decades and decades to come the cost of the war will devour the strength of the peoples, imperil the achievements of social reform, and hamper every step on the path of progress. Intellectual and moral desolation, economic disaster, political reaction—such are the blessings of this horrible struggle of nations. . . .

"In this intolerable situation we have met together, we representa tives of Socialist parties, of trade unions, or of minorities of them, we Germans, French, Italians, Russians, Poles, Letts, Rumanians, Bul garians, Swedes, Norwegians, Dutch and Swiss, we who are standing on the basis, not of national solidarity, with the exploiting class, but of the international solidarity of the workers and the class struggle. . . . " "bread," it is asserted that a few cries were raised denouncing the autocracy and the war.

The third day (March so) proved the critical day. The strike became general and the strikers assumed an aggressive demeanour, raiding the police stations in the Viborg (factory) districts and disarming the police. In this quarter the police practically dis appeared and the political demonstration began to assume the character of an armed rising. On the same day occurred the decisive factor in the Revolution: the Cossacks who had in the traditional way been patrolling the streets as the bulwark of the autocracy suddenly manifested their neutrality and even their friendliness to the strikers. Next day Khabalov, the military gov ernor of the capital, received a telegram from the tsar, then at the front, ordering him to suppress the strike movement, and Golitsyn the prime minister received another empowering him to prorogue the Duma. Acting on the instructions he had received Khabalov tried to disperse the demonstrators by military force, employing in addition to the police cadet formations from the Guard regi ments. The crowds in the centre of the city were thus dispersed and about 150 men were shot down. This resort to force on the

part of the authorities, though it was not strong enough to crush the strikers, may well have intensified their revolutionary mood and must also have compelled every soldier in the city to con sider very seriously what his duty would be were he called out next day (March 12) to shoot them down.

Attitude of the Army.

From this point the sequence of events is very difficult to trace. One thing is certain—that the shooting did not break the strike. And when the news came that the Volynski, Preobrazhenski and other regiments had re volted and joined the demonstrators no one felt any doubt that the Revolution had taken place at last and that the autocracy was doomed. True, Khabalov tried to carry matters with a high hand by sending a force of i,000 picked men under the command of Col. Kutepov to arrest the mutinous soldiers; but, as he subsequently related, this force, though it was led by a very brave officer, melted, as it were, away. The fate of the Kutepov force is typical of the transformed mentality of the soldier class. Whole regiments, marching obviously with the avowed intention of obeying orders, no sooner came into contact with the demon strators than they suddenly fraternized and shared their arms with them. The Government then made no more efforts to deal directly with the situation in Petrograd but concentrated on holding out until such time as the troops which the tsar had prom ised to send from the front could arrive to crush the Petrograd garrison and the revolutionists. But though ministers tried to entrench themselves first at the Winter Palace and then at the Admiralty they could hold neither place and the same evening (March I 2) abandoned by the army they went into hiding and were eventually arrested and imprisoned.

The victory of the Revolution in the capital was seemingly complete. But the autocracy still survived and was in possession of sufficient forces to crush the revolt ; moreover the revolutionists were so intoxicated by victory and the disorganization at Petro grad was so complete that the dispatch of a small but disciplined body of troops should easily have revindicated the authority of the tsar. But there remained unsolved the great enigma what was the actual mental attitude to the Revolution of the soldiers at the front and their officers. Unable to read this the Duma lead ers hesitated to take over the power which the revolted populace urged them to assume. Instead of resorting to bold and still bolder measures, the only safe action in times of revolution, they made frantic efforts to induce the tsar and his generals to compromise with the Revolution and to accept at the eleventh hour their old demand for responsible government. Even after the Duma had allowed itself to be prorogued and the garrison had revolted Rodzianko, the Speaker, not only sent urgent telegrams to the tsar and the leading generals pointing out the necessity of saving the monarchy and the country by conceding the necessary reforms but even held consultations with the very ministers whom he had denounced as treasonable. The vision of the tsar was equally myopic. So blind was he to the real facts of the situation that even at this hour he flatly rejected the appeals of the Duma and refused to believe that the strike had culminated in a revolu tion. When he and his advisers at last learned that the revolt of the Petrograd troops had endangered the existence of the monarchy they immediately ordered a number of regiments from various parts of the front to proceed to the capital.