The Russian Revolution

A few days later the question of the dynasty came up again in a dramatic fashion which incidentally demonstrated both the strength of the Soviet and its determination when necessary to use it in defiance of the government. The tsar had requested the new ministers to arrange for the departure of himself and his family to Great Britain, a request which the leaders of the Soviet heard of by mere accident. At once they decided to prevent this de parture and called on the Government to put the tsar and his family under arrest. But even before their protest could be dealt with they gave orders to the railwaymen to stop the imperial train and authorized one of their members, supported by a strong de tachment of armed workmen, to arrest the tsar. The actual usurpation of power in this instance however proved unnecessary; for the new ministers themselves proceeded to put the Emperor Nicholas and his family under arrest.

The Army and the World War.

Yet, while this and other incidents demonstrated plainly that the Provisional Government was a mere government of caretakers, it was felt that the Soviet could rely only on the workers of the capital and had still to re ceive the all-important support of the army. The struggle for this support that took place between the Duma and the Soviet was the paramount business of the next few weeks. The battle was fought out in the main on two planes, one the question of the new status of the army, the other the question of continuing or terminating the war. The leaders of the Soviet championed the civil rights now claimed by the soldiers ; while the Duma appealed to them in the name of national safety. That the semi-feudal con ditions which had hitherto prevailed in the barracks had now to be modified was obvious enough, and Guchkov, the minister of war, himself was preparing an official declaration to this effect.

But, while he was for confining the liberties of the soldiers within the strict limits of discipline, the leaders of the Soviet declared that these liberties must be vindicated unconditionally. This re solve to gain the adherence of the soldiers by supporting their claims at all costs was responsible for the issue of the notorious Prikaz (Order) No. 1', which has generally been regarded as the origin of the disintegration of the Russian army.

Now that all the relative facts are known many of the inter pretations given at the time to this order are discovered to be misleading. Nevertheless the main fact remains that it could only have been issued in an atmosphere of unscrupulous political in trigue. This practice of paying court to the army remained indeed the settled policy of the leaders of the Soviet right down to the outbreak of the Bolshevik revolt in Nov. 1917, when Trotsky

gained the unconditional allegiance of the Petrograd garrison by championing its claim to remain idle in the capital.

But despite all the privileges which the Petrograd Soviet had granted to the soldiers the devotion of the army at the front and even at the capital had to be conquered. At first the Provisional Government seemed to be the body which had won the support of the army. When the ministers proclaimed the necessity of a more vigorous prosecution of the war, the army rallied enthusiasti cally to their support. For about a fortnight regiments stationed at Petrograd as well as delegations sent by those in the provinces and at the front marched to the Duma commanded by their offi cers, proclaimed their readiness to serve the Revolution, and offered the Government their allegiance and joyful support. The political significance of these demonstrations was very consider able; for the soldiers never failed to warn the Soviet against encroaching on the authority of the Government and against cre ating a dyarchy in the country. But the army's enthusiasm for prosecuting the war soon began to cool ; while the propaganda made by the Soviet for the clarification of the Russian war-aims as a sure promise of terminating hostilities became increasingly popular.

On March 27 the Soviet issued a manifesto to the world de claring that Russia sought no gains from the war and was ready to conclude peace on the basis of "no annexations" and "no in demnities." From this time onward the question of peace terms became the main bone of contention between the Government and the Soviet, the Government adhering to the secret treaties made by the Allies, and the Soviet insisting on the denunciation of these treaties and agreeing to continue the War only for purposes of self defence. The pressure put on the Government to identify itself with the principles laid down in the Soviet's manifesto be came at last so strong that ministers felt compelled to make a pub lic declaration (April 9) in which Russia's war-aims were formu lated as the establishment of a permanent peace on the basis of the self-determination of the peoples. This declaration was hailed as a great victory by the Soviet, which thereupon demanded that the Provisional Government take "the next step" and should communicate this declaration to the Allied Powers, with a view to their adopting its principles. After some hesitation Milyukov, the foreign minister, made official communication of the declaration; but in the covering letter which he dispatched to the Russian am bassadors he asked them to reassure the Governments to which they were accredited by informing them that Russia's position with regard to the War remained unchanged.