The Russian Revolution

But the loyalty and discipline of these troops had never been put to the test. The first detachments under General Ivanov were prevented by the railwaymen from approaching Petrograd while the picked regiments were never sent because before they could actually be moved the Revolution had developed such im petus and had gained such support even at the front that the attempt to crush it by military force was recognized as hopeless. The army indeed could no longer be relied on; and it may plau sibly be assumed that even if the troops had been despatched they would probably have mutinied and fraternised with the revolutionists. The regiments sent by Kornilov at a later stage to deal with Kerensky and the Soviet never fired a shot and were won over by speeches made by the very people they were com manded to crush.

The Duma Committee.

While the spokesmen of the Duma were marking time and hesitating to take the leadership of the Revolution the representatives of the workers, many of whom had been just released from prison, were taking immediate steps to organize the revolutionary forces and to put themselves at their head. At a later stage a considerable effort was made to prove that the Duma Committee was established prior to the Soviet Committee. Even were this claim well-founded it would not in validate the fact that while the Soviet Committee was conceived from the first as the organ and general staff of the Revolution the Duma Committee was appointed with the idea of restoring order and establishing relations with existing public administrations and organizations. That this creation of the Duma Committee was not a revolutionary act and was not tantamount to claiming the leadership of the Revolution is seen from the fact that Rod zianko the chairman of this Committee still continued his nego tiations with the old regime. It was indeed only late in the early morning of March 13, after prolonged discussions and with con siderable reluctance that the members of the Duma Committee made up their minds to constitute a government. Three consid erations were obviously instrumental in leading them to this de cision, first a clear consciousness of the elemental force of the Revolution, second the apprehension that the Petrograd Soviet might be tempted to assume power, and third the hope that by constituting themselves the ruling authority they might be able to cope with the increasing anarchy and to save the monarchy and even the dynasty.

The Soviet Committee.

Meantime the Soviet and Socialist Committee was developing remarkable energy in organizing its forces. Founded late on the afternoon of March 12 it had suc ceeded in opening its first plenary sitting the same evening with an attendance of approximately 25o members consisting of So cialist deputies of the Duma, the Worker Group of the Munition Committee, a number of prominent worker leaders representing the various shades of revolutionary opinion, and members of strike committees who had been active during the few previous days. Although this meeting of the Petrograd Soviet was chaotic and interrupted by delegates from more and more revolting regi• ments, who came to offer greetings and proffer allegiance, it man.

aged to appoint a strong executive committee which immediately took over the business of food supplies and the strategical defence of Petrograd against any possible attack from the autocracy. It also came to the decision to change its constitution by includ ing along with worker deputies army deputies. In this way the Soviet made a palpable bid for real power.

From this very moment, enlisting as it did the support of the workers and of the Petrograd garrison the Soviet Executive Com mittee was the depository of real power. Its members had been conscious of this fact and probably overestimated rather than underestimated their authority. But they made no overt or covert attempt to constitute a Revolutionary Government; and when the Duma Committee decided at last to assume the responsibility of forming the new Government their decision was unanimously welcomed by the leaders of the Soviet. The attitude which these aspiring politicians took up with regard to the question of govern ment is so surprising as to constitute one of the most intriguing problems of the Russian Revolution. Why the Petrograd Soviet refused immediately to proclaim itself the Government of Revo lutionary Russia can only be a matter of surmise. Speaking in the first All-Russian Conference of Soviets, which was held early in April 1917, Steklov, one of the prominent members of its first executive committee, ascribed the refusal to the uncertainty as to the attitude of the army which prevailed at that time. We were still doubtful," he said, "whether the revolutionary outbreak would succeed in establishing even a bourgeois regime. We were in the dark not only as to the feelings of the troops at the front but even as to that of the regiments stationed at Tsarskoe selo. . . ." But this explanation scarcely covers the whole of the ground. An orderly government, representing a compromise between the insurgent masses and the bourgeois classes, was obviously the sole bulwark against counter-revolution; and the desire for the estab lishment of such a government must undoubtedly have consti tuted the main factor in the unopposed assumption of power by the Duma. Still fear of the outbreak of a counter-revolution can not be regarded as an adequate explanation of the willingness of the Soviet's leaders to delegate power to the Duma. On the contrary fear of counter-revolution should have induced them to keep the power in their own hands. Their decision to step aside and to leave the formation of a government to the bourgeoisie, the class determined to arrest the onrush of the Revolution, would be unintelligible unless the fact is recalled that most of them were deeply convinced that the aim of the Revolution was solely to establish a democratic regime and that any attempt to associate the movement with Socialistic experiments or the dictatorship of the proletariat would ruin it and so repeat the disastrous failure of 1905.