Serbia

Kumanovo was much more than an ordinary victory. It re stored to Serbia that self-confidence which had been so gravely shaken by the rebuffs and scandals of the previous 3o years; and throughout the Yugoslav provinces of Austria-Hungary it was hailed as an atonement for Serbia's downfall on the field of Kosovo and as a pledge of her new mission as the Southern Slav Piedmont. Austria-Hungary at first adopted a waiting attitude, but as the Serbs approached the Adriatic she suddenly ordered a general mobilization, and suppressed all public expressions of feeling, while the official press of Vienna and Budapest adopted a menacing tone towards Serbia. Great prominence was given to the alleged insults offered to Prochaska, Austro-Hungarian Consul at Prizren, and for some weeks public opinion was allowed to be lieve that he had been shamefully mutilated by Serbian officers. It only transpired long after that Prochaska had been entirely un molested by the invaders, but had received definite instructions from Vienna to create an "incident" such as might provide a pre text for action. The Austro-Hungarian Chief of Staff and War Minister, Generals Conrad and Auffenberg, are known to have favoured a radical solution of the Southern Slav question by im mediate war with Serbia ; and similar views were held by the lead ing Ballplatz officials, Macchio, Kanya and Forgies. But both the emperor and Francis Ferdinand were averse to war, and Germany, finding Italy restive as to any change in the Balkan status quo, exercised a moderating influence over Vienna in con nection with the fourth renewal of the Triple Alliance (Dec. 7).

Meanwhile, the success of the Balkan Allies, and the general relief with which public opinion hailed the downfall of Turkish rule in Europe, led the Powers to accept the accomplished fact. The Turks, seeing themselves isolated in Europe, made overtures of peace as early as the 1 I th to King Ferdinand, who was not willing to consider them until his troops had been checked before Chatalja.

The Conference of London.—The armistice of Dec. 3 was followed by a peace conference in London on Dec. 16, at which Serbia was represented by NovakoviC, Nikoli6 and Vesni6. After a month of fruitless negotiations, complicated by a revolution in Constantinople, the Balkan Delegates broke off the negotiations on Jan. 28. The Council of Ambassadors initiated by Sir Edward Grey continued to sit in London, and devoted especial attention to the Albanian problem and to the friction produced between Albanians and Serbs by the latter's presence on the Adriatic.

When war was resumed on Feb. 3 the brunt fell upon Bulgaria, and the Serbs, being complete masters of Macedonia, were free to contribute 47,00o men and a siege train of 38 guns to the opera tions against Adrianople, which held out until March 26. The dispute which arose as to whether Shiikri Pasha had surrendered to the Bulgarians or to the Serbs was in itself quite unprofitable but was a symptom of the friction which was daily increasing be tween the two allies. The final phase of the war concentrated round Scutari, which Montenegro and Serbia made desperate efforts to reduce. Even the announcement that the Council of Ambassadors had definitely assigned Scutari to the new Albanian state, only strengthened the resolve of King Nicholas to create a fresh fait accompli. But Austria-Hungary upheld her veto, and on March 20 addressed a severe note to Montenegro and dis patched a strong naval squadron to the Southern Adriatic. Realiz ing the danger of Austro-Hungarian intervention, the Powers on March 31 joined Vienna in ordering Montenegro to cease hos tilities, and on her refusal established a naval blockade of her strip of coast. On April 23 Scutari surrendered to the Monte

negrins, but the Powers, after a crisis of some weeks, eventually compelled the Montenegrins to surrender it to Admiral Burney, as commander of the international fleet.

Negotiations were resumed in London on May 20. By the Treaty of London (May 3o, 1913) Turkey ceded to the four allies conjointly the island of Crete and all territory lying to the west of the Enos-Midia line, while the settlement of Albania and the Aegean Islands was referred to the Great Powers.

The Second Balkan War.

The Balkan Allies were now faced by the thorny problem of dividing the spoils. Macedonian auton omy, which the treaty had laid down as the ideal solution, was from the first abandoned by all parties. Between Bulgaria and Greece there was no territorial bargain, and no obvious means of reaching one, while Serbia as early as Jan. 23 formally raised the question of a revision of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty. She claimed compensation for four reasons: (I) that she had furnished her ally with military support far in excess of her bargain; ( 2) that she had absolved Bulgaria from her military obligations in Mace donia; (3) that she had loyally continued the war three months after her own work was done; and (4) that the acquisition of Adrianople by Bulgaria radically modified the basis upon which the bargain rested. But if her attitude can be justified, it must be on the broader ground that Austria's veto on her obtaining a port in Northern Albania had upset her whole basic calculation, leaving the Vardar valley her only possible alternative outlet ; and this involved her retention of Veles, Prilep, Monastir and Okhrida as well as the "disputed zone." While Russia strained every effort to avert a conflict, Bulgaria was encouraged by the openly Serbophobe tone of the official press in Vienna and Budapest ; and King Ferdinand had already ordered General Savoy to hasten the transference of the army from the Thracian to the Macedonian front, when on May 27, Pagi6, under pressure from the Serbian Opposition, publicly committed his Government to the demand for treaty revision. This hastened the resignation of the pacific Gvegov. His successor Danev opposed the suggestion that the Premiers should meet at St. Petersburg, con tended that Russia had already prejudged the case by even con sidering revision, and relied increasingly upon Austria-Hungary. Serbia and Greece, realizing the danger, concluded first a military convention, and then a definite treaty of alliance for ten years (June I). While the first of these provided for mutual military support in case of a Bulgarian attack upon either ally, the second extended the casus foederis to an attack by a third Power. Both the wording and the events of the moment make it clear that the inten tion was to guard against an Austro-Hungarian attack upon Serbia. The tsar's personal appeal to the kings of Serbia and Bulgaria in the name of "the Slav Cause," fell on deaf ears (June 8). On June 13 Bulgaria rejected the proposal of the Powers in favour of parallel demobilization, and her attitude stiffened still further after the speech of the new Hungarian premier, Count Tisza, who emphasized the right of the Balkan States to settle differences in their own way—even by war—and declared that Austria-Hungary could not allow any other Power to acquire special prerogatives in the Peninsula (June 19).