As yet there was no declaration of war by either party. Prep arations were made by both sides during the year, most vigor ously of all by Louis, who set on foot no less than 450,000 regulars and embodied militia, and had always prided himself on being first in the field. But the debut was disheartening, and in the winter a fresh mishap befell the French. Eugene surprised Cremona on the night of Feb. I, 1702, and, after a confused fight, drew off, taking with him Villeroy as a prisoner. The rest of the French army thereupon retreated, while Eugene quietly resumed his winter quarters and his blockade of Mantua.
With the year 1702 the real struggle began. Villars and one or two others of Louis's counsellors urged the king to concentrate his attention on the Rhine and the Danube, where, they pointed out, was the centre of gravity of the coalition. This advice was disregarded, and with political aims, the largest French army was employed on the side of the Meuse, while the Rhine front was entrusted to smaller forces acting on the defensive. In Italy the balance of power remained unchanged, except that one of Louis's best generals, VendOme, was sent to replace the captured Villeroy. In the Low Countries, Ginckell, earl of Athlone, the interim commander of the allies (English, Dutch and minor German states), was at the outset outmanoeuvred by the French (Boufflers), and the momen tary threat of a French invasion had a lasting effect on the Dutch authorities, whose timidity thereafter repeatedly ruined the best laid schemes of Marlborough, who was obliged to submit to their obstruction and their veto. This handicap, moreover, was not the only one under which Marlborough suffered. Unless it is realized and borne in mind that the great captain was struggling against factiousness and intrigue in England and against jealousies, faint heartedness and disagreements amongst the states who lent their contingents to his miscellaneous army, the measure of his achieve ments in ten years seems small. But in fact it was marvellous. Under i8th-century conditions of warfare, and with an army so composed that probably no other man in Europe could have held it together at all, obstructed and thwarted at every turn, he yet brought Louis XIV. and France to the very edge of ruin.
In this theatre of war the French, in concert with the garrisons of the Spanish Netherlands, had fortified a line of defence more than 7o m. long from Antwerp to Huy, as well as another line, longer but of only potential importance, from Antwerp along the Scheldt-Lys to Aire in France. Besides the "lines of Brabant" Bouffiers held all the Meuse fortresses below Huy except Maes tricht. Marlborough concentrated 6o,000 men (of whom 12,000 only were British) about Nijmwegen in June, and early in July, having made his preparations, he advanced directly by Hamont on Diest. Boufflers hastily fell back, in order to regain the
Brabant lines. Marlborough, with the positive object of bring ing his opponent to battle at a disadvantage, won the race and awaited the arrival of Boufflers' tired army to strike it a paralysing blow. But at the critical moment the Dutch deputies forbade the battle, content to see the army that had threatened Holland with invasion driven off to a safe distance without bloodshed (July 22). After this experience Marlborough thought it prudent to pacify the Dutch by besieging the Meuse fortresses, several of which fell in rapid succession (September–October). Boufflers fell back within the defended area of the lines of Brabant, and the campaign closed with the capture of Liege by the allies (Oct. 12). Marl borough was created a duke on his return to England in Novem ber. He had checked the main enterprise of the French, and every man in the army knew that but for the Dutch deputies the enemy would have been destroyed.
On the Rhine the campaign was, except for two disconnected episodes, quite uneventful. The Imperialists under a methodical general, the margrave Louis of Baden, gathered in the Neckar country and crossed the Rhine above Spire. Catinat, now old and worn out, was sent to Strasbourg to oppose the threatened invasion of Alsace, and, like MacMahon in 187o, he dared not assemble his whole force either on the Lauter or on the Ill. The margrave invested Landau (July 29) and with a covering army occupied the lines of the Lauter about Weissenburg, which Catinat did not attack. Hence Landau, valiantly defended by Melac, had to be surrendered on Sept. 12. But at the same time the elector of Bavaria took the side of France, surprised Ulm, and declared a local war on the house of Austria and the "circles" of Swabia and Franconia. The margrave then, in order to defend his own country, hurried to Kehl with the greater part of his army, leaving a garrison in Landau and a corps of observation on the Lauter. To co-operate with the elector, Catinat had made up a corps out of every available battalion and squadron and placed it under Lieut.-General Villars. This corps drew away into Upper Alsace and the margrave followed suit until the two armies faced one another on opposite sides of the Rhine near Huningen. Villars crossed the Rhine and won the first victory of his brilliant career at Friedlingen (opposite Huningen). Soon afterwards he placed his army in winter quarters in Alsace, and Louis of Baden dis posed his troops in two entrenched camps opposite Breisach and Strasbourg respectively. In Italy VendOme, superior in numbers but handicapped by instructions from Versailles and by the neces sity of looking to the Italian interests of King Philip, gained a few minor successes over Eugene. A very hard-fought and inde cisive battle took place at Luzzara on the Po on Aug. 25.