Campaign on the Danube, 1704.—The duke had now man oeuvred himself with brilliant success from one theatre of war to another, and had secured every advantage to himself. From be fore Ulm he sidled gradually along the north side of the Danube in the hope of finding an unguarded passage. He and the Mar grave exercised the general command on alternate days, and when on his own day he arrived opposite Donauworth, knowing Louis's caution, he thought that direct attack was better than another two days' extension to the east. Moreover he needed a walled town to serve as a magazine. In the late afternoon of July 2 the army was flung, regardless of losses, against the entrenched hill of the Schellenberg at Donauworth, where the elector had posted a strong detachment. The attack cost 6,coo men, but it was successful, and of the 12,000 Bavarians on the hill only 3,00o returned to their main body, which had now moved from Ulm to Lauingen. Passing the river, the allies besieged and took the small fortress of Rain, and thence moved to the neighbourhood of Augsburg, thoroughly and deliberately devastating the country side so as to force the elector to make terms. The best that can be said of this barbarous device, is that Louis XIV. had several times practised it. Its most effective condemnation is that mili tary devastations, in these purely political contests, were entirely 'Even Villeroy it appears rose to the situation thus far, but the king only allowed him to send 25,00o men to Tallard.
unprofitable. Louis had already found them so, and had given up
the practice. In the present case Marlborough's own supplies ran short, and his convoys were harassed. The movements of the two armies were but trifling. Marlborough, though superior, was not decisively superior, and his opponents, well entrenched near Augs burg, waited for Tallard and (in vain) for Villeroy. Marlborough marked time until Eugene should join him.
There were now five armies in the field, two allied and three French. The centre of gravity was therefore in Villeroy's camp. If that marshal followed Tallard, even Eugene's junction with Marlborough would not give the latter enough force. If Tallard alone joined the elector and Eugene Marlborough, the game was in the hands of the allies. But none of the possible combinations of two armies against one were attempted by either side. Eugene when informed that Tallard was on the move slipped away from Villeroy to join Marlborough. Tallard and the elector, aware of Eugene's march, were content to join forces peaceably at Augs burg. Villeroy, in whose hands was the key of the situation, hesi tated and finally tried in vain to detain Eugene (who was already far away) in the Stollhofen lines. The last stage of the campaign was brief. Marlborough and Eugene had in mind a battle, Tallard and Marsin a war of manoeuvre to occupy the few weeks now to be spun out before winter quarters were due. The two allied armies met in the Danube valley on Aug. 6. If the enemy remained on the south side Eugene was to cross, if they recrossed to the north bank Marlborough was to follow suit. The margrave Louis of Baden had been sent off to besiege Ingolstadt as soon as Eugene had come within a safe distance. When therefore the French and Bavarians were reported opposite Eugene on the north side, Marl borough crossed at once, and without waiting for the margrave the two great soldiers went forward. On Aug. 2 (see BLENHEIM) they attacked and practically destroyed the armies of Tallard, Marsin and the elector.