War of the Spanish Succession

In the next two years Bavaria was the centre of gravity of the French operations, and only campaigns of the methodical and non-committal kind were planned for Italy and the Low Countries. In this year began the Camisard insurrection, in the Cevennes, which necessitated the detachment of a considerable body of troops from Vendome's army in Italy.

In the Netherlands the French field army was behind the lines of Brabant, the Spanish troops in the lines of Flanders (Antwerp Ghent-Aire). Together the two considerably outnumbered Marl borough (90,000 against 50,000), but the duke managed to be first in the field. After capturing Bonn in May, Marlborough's plan was to break the immensely long line of defence of the French and Spaniards by the capture of Antwerp. One Dutch corps under Coehoorn was to assemble in the Sluys-Hulst re gion, and another under Opdam at Bergen-op-Zoom while Marl borough, after manoeuvring Villeroy's field army out of the way, was to join them before the fortress. Marlborough exe cuted his own share of the movement with his usual skill, but the Dutch generals enabled the French to emerge from the ma noeuvre with a handsome victory. Great projects were now enter tained by the French, nothing less than the capture of Vienna by a Franco-Bavarian-Hungarian army being the intention. The elec tor of Bavaria insisted that Villars should cross the Black Forest and join him, which Villars was unwilling to do thus early in the year, as two-thirds of his officers were as usual on leave or de tached on recruiting duties. Courtier though he was, the marshal would not stir even in spite of the king's orders until he was ready. At the end of April, leaving Tallard alone to defend Alsace against the margrave of Baden, Villars plunged into the defiles of the Black Forest and on May 8 joined the elector at Ebingen. All seemed favourable for the advance on Vienna, but at the last moment the elector half repented of his alliance with the enemies of Germany and proposed instead a junction with Vendome in Italy by way of Tirol. This proposal came to noth ing, the Tirolese were soon roused to revolt by the misconduct of the ill-disciplined Bavarians, and Vendome, who, like Luxembourg, was a giant in battle and a sluggard in camp, would not stir.

Hochstett, 1703.

Villars had posted a protective force at Ulm to contain the Margrave's army should it turn back upon him, and this, after an engagement at Munderkingen (July 31) induced the cautious Louis to return to the Rhine. Five weeks later, however, the Margrave returned in full force, and moving by the right bank of the Danube reached Augsburg on Sept. 6. The elector, return ing from his futile Tirol expedition, had already rejoined Villars at Dillingen, and the marshal persuaded him to attack the Austrian army that covered Vienna before the two imperial generals could join forces. The result was the battle of Hochstett (Sept. 20)

in which the elector and Villars won a great victory, at a loss of only ',coo men to the enemy's ii,000. Rarely indeed had an 8th century general so great an opportunity of finishing a war at one blow. But even Villars saw no better use for the victory than the unimpeded junction of his own army and Tallard's and win ter quarters in Wiirttemberg. But Tallard remained on the Rhine, and Villars in disgust applied to be recalled. The Mar grave, entrenched as usual, kept the field for another month and then retired to the Lake of Constance, where, in a still unex hausted district, he spent the winter. Tallard meanwhile invested Landau which surrendered on Nov. 12. Old Breisach, besieged by Vauban, capitulated on Sept. 6. Thus in Germany, though the grand advance on Vienna had come to nothing, the French had won important successes and established an army in Bavaria. In Italy, on the other hand, VendOme, although no longer opposed by Eugene, achieved nothing.

Rhine and Danube Campaign, 1704.

The campaign of 1704, though in the Low Countries and in Italy practically nothing was done, is memorable for what was perhaps the greatest strate gical operation in the 18th century, Marlborough's march to the Danube. At the outset the elector and Marsin (Villars' successor) were on the Iller, between Ulm and Memmingen, Tallard be tween Strasbourg and Landau, Villeroy as usual between the Bra bant lines and the Meuse. On the other side the Margrave Louis was in the Stockach-Engen region. Responsible for guarding the whole of the Middle Rhine as well as for opposing the elec tor he was weak everywhere, and his defence of the Rhine was practically limited to holding the "lines of Stollhofen," a de fensive position near Bilhl in Baden. With Breisach and Kehl in their own hands, the French were more or less closely in touch with their comrades in Bavaria, and Tallard convoyed a large body of recruits for Marsin's army through the Black Forest defiles. But in doing so he lost most of them by desertion, the Margrave's army dogged his march, and in fact no regular line of communica tion was established. Marlborough's purpose at any rate was quite definite—to transfer a large corps from the Low Coun tries to Bavaria and there in concert with the allies in that quarter to crush the elector decisively, but rather than be burdened with Dutch counsellors he chose to forgo the assistance of the Dutch troops. These were left under Overkirk to defend the Meuse, and English and English-paid troops alone took part in the venture.