Thirty Years War 1618-1648

Predatory Armies.—There still remained for the army of Tilly the reduction of the smaller garrisons in Bohemia, which when finally expelled rallied under Mansfeld, the last general of a lost cause. Then there began the wolf-strategy that was the distinguishing mark of the Thirty Years' War. An army even of ruffians could be controlled, as Tilly controlled that of the League, if it were paid. But Mansfeld, the servant of a shadow king, could not pay. Therefore "he must of necessity plunder where he was. His movements would be governed neither by political nor by military considerations. As soon as his men had eaten up one part of the country they must go on to another." These movements were for preference made upon hostile territory, and Mansfeld was so far successful in them that the situation in 1621 became distinctly unfavourable to the emperor. Tilly and the League Army fought warily and did not risk a decision. Thus even the proffered English mediation in the German war might have been accepted but for the fact that in the Lower Palatinate a corps of English volunteers, raised by Sir Horace Vere for the service of the English princess Elizabeth, the fair queen of Bohemia, found itself compelled, for want of pay and rations, to live, as Mansfeld lived, on the country along the Rhine. This brought about a fresh intervention of Spinola's Spaniards who had been destined to the interminable Dutch war. Moreover Mansfeld, having thoroughly eaten up the Palatinate, decamped into Alsace, where he seized Hagenau and wintered in safety.

The winter of

passed in a series of negotiations which failed because too many interests, inside and outside Germany, were bound up with Protestantism to allow the Catholics to speak as conquerors, and because the cause of Protestantism was too much involved with the cause of the elector palatine to be taken in hand with energy by all Protestant princes. But Frederick and Mansfeld found two allies. One was Christian of Brunswick, the gallant young knight-errant, titular bishop of Halberstadt, queen Elizabeth's champion, and withal, though he called himself Gottes Freund, der Pfaffen Feind, a plunderer of peasants as well as of priests. The other was the margrave George Frederick of Baden-Durlach, reputed to be of all German princes the most skilful sequestrator of ecclesiastical lands. In April 1622, while Vere garrisoned the central fortresses of the Palatinate, Mansfeld, Christian and George Frederick took the field against Tilly, who at once demanded assistance from Spinola. The latter, though engaged with the Dutch, sent a corps under his subordinate Cordova. Mansfeld and the margrave of Baden defeated Tilly at Wiesloch (April 17-27, 1622). But soon the allies had to separate to find food. Then Cordova came up, and Tilly and the Spaniards combined defeated George Frederick at Wimpfen on the Neckar (April 26–May 6). Cordova chased Mansfeld back into Alsace, while Tilly went north to oppose Christian of Brunswick on the Main. On June 10-20 the latter's army was almost destroyed by the League Army at Hochst. Mansfeld, and with him Fred erick, had already set out from Alsace to join Christian, but when that leader arrived with only a handful of beaten men, the war was practically at an end. Frederick took Mansfeld and Christian back to Alsace, and after dismissing their troops, retired to Sedan. Henceforth he was a picturesque but powerless exile, and his lands and his electoral dignity, forfeited by the ban, went to the prudent Maximilian, who was created by the Emperor elector of Bavaria.

Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick.

The next act in the drama, however, had already begun with the adventures of the outlaw army of Mansfeld and Christian. After Hochst, had it not been for them, the war might have ended in compromise. James I. of England was busy as always with mediation schemes. Spain, being then in close connection with him, and the Protestant princes of North Germany being neutral, a diplomatic struggle over the fate of the Palatinate might have ended in a new con vention of Passau that would have regulated the present troubles and left the future to settle its own problems. The struggle would

only have been deferred, it is true, but meanwhile the North German Protestants remained powerless and inactive, while Tilly's army was kept in hand to deal with the adventurers.

These, after eating up Alsace, moved on to Lorraine, whereupon the French Government "warned them off." But ere long they found a new employment. The Dutch were losing ground before Spinola, who was besieging Bergen-op-Zoom, and the States General invited Mansfeld to relieve it. The adventurers moved straight across Luxemburg and the Spanish Netherlands to the rescue. Cordova barred the route at Fleurus near the Sambre, but the desperate invaders, held together by the sheer force of character of their leaders, thrust him out of their way (Aug. 1 v 29, 1622) and relieved Bergen-op-Zoom. But ere long, finding Dutch discipline intolerable, they marched off to the rich country of East Friesland.

Their presence raised fresh anxieties for the neutral princes of North Germany. In 1623 Mansfeld issued from his Frisian strong hold, and the threat of a visitation from his army induced many princes of the Lower Saxon Circle to join him. Christian was himself a member of the Circle, and although he resigned his bishopric, he was taken, with many of his men, into the service of his brother, the duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbuttel. Around the mercenary nucleus gathered many thousands of volunteers, for the towns and the nobles' castles alike were alarmed at the prog ress of the Catholics, who were reclaiming Protestant bishoprics. But this movement was nipped in the bud by the misconduct of the mercenaries. The authorities of the Circle ordered Christian to depart. He returned to Holland, therefore, but Tilly started in pursuit and caught him at Stadtlohn, where on July 28–Aug. 6, 1623 his army was almost destroyed. Thereupon the Lower Saxon Circle, which, like the Bohemians, had ordered collectively taxes and levies of troops that the members individually furnished either not at all or unwillingly, disbanded their army to prevent brigandage. Mansfeld, too, having eaten up East Friesland, re turned to Holland in Foreign Intervention.—The only material factor was now Tilly's ever-victorious Army of the League, but for the present it was suspended inactive in the midst of a spider's web of European and German diplomacy. Spain and England had quar relled. The latter became the ally of France, over whose policy Richelieu now ruled, and the United Provinces and (later) Den mark joined them. Thus the war was extended beyond the bor ders of the empire, and the way opened for ceaseless foreign interventions. From the battle of Stadtlohn to the pitiful end 20 years later, the decision of German quarrels lay in the hands of foreign powers. France was concerned chiefly with Spain, whose military possessions all along her frontier suggested that a new Austrasia, more powerful than Charles the Bold's, might arise. James, in concert with France, re-equipped Mansfeld and allowed him to raise an army in England, but Richelieu was unwilling to allow Mansfeld's men to traverse France, and they ultimately went to the Low Countries, where, being raw pressed-men for the most part, and having neither pay (James having been afraid to summon parliament) nor experience in plundering, they perished in the winter of 1625. At the same time a Huguenot rising para lysed Richelieu's foreign policy. Holland after the collapse of Mansfeld's expedition was anxious for her own safety owing to the steady advance of Spinola. The only member of the alliance who intervened in Germany itself was Christian IV. of Denmark, who as duke of Holstein was a member of the Lower Saxon Circle, and as king of Denmark was anxious to extend his influence over the North sea ports. Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, judging better than any the difficulties of affronting the empire and Spain, contented himself with carrying on a war with Poland.