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Christian IV. raised an army in his own lands and in the Lower Saxon Circle in the spring of 1625. Tilly at once advanced to meet him. But he had only the Army of the League, the Emperor's troops being oc cupied in a war on Gabriel Bethlen of Transylvania. Then, like a deur ex machine, Wallenstein, duke of Friedland, came forward and offered to raise and maintain an army in the emperor's ser vice. It was an army like Mansfeld's in that it lived on the country, but its exactions were systematic and the products eco nomically used, so that it was possible to feed 5o,000 men instead of 20,000. This method, the high wages which he paid, and his own princely habits and commanding personality gave it a co hesion that neither a free company nor an army of mere Lower Saxon contingents could ever hope to attain.
In 1625, Wallenstein kept his new army well away from the risks of battle until he could trust it to conquer. It was fortunate for Ferdinand that he did so. Christian IV., who had been joined by Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick, had, in 1626, 6o,000 men. Wallenstein and Tilly together had only a very slight numer ical superiority, and behind them was nothing. Even the heredi tary provinces of Austria were threatening revolt and Gabriel Bethlen was again giving trouble. But on the other side the English subsidies failed, and the Protestant armies soon began to suffer in consequence. Tilly opposed Christian IV. ; Wallenstein, Mansfeld. The latter advanced upon Wallenstein, attacked him in an entrenched position at the Bridge of Dessau and was thor oughly defeated (April 15-25, 1626). He then wandered across Germany into Silesia and joined Bethlen. Wallenstein followed up, and by taking up strong positions, compelled Mansfeld and Bethlen to choose between attacking him and starving. So, with out a battle, he brought about a truce, whereby Bethlen was disarmed and Mansfeld was required to leave Hungary. Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick died soon afterwards, the one in Hungary, the other in Westphalia. King Christian, left alone and unable without English subsidies to carry on the war methodically, took the offensive, as Mansfeld had done, in order to live on the Thuringian countryside. But Tilly, with whom Wallenstein had left a part of his army, moved as quickly as the king, brought him to action at Lutter-am-Barenberge in Bruns wick and totally defeated him (Aug. 17-27).
With this, armed opposition to Tilly and Wallenstein in the field practically ceased, but their armies continued to live on the country. Christian of Denmark slowly gave up fortress after for tress to Tilly. Wallenstein, returning from the campaign against Gabriel Bethlen, drove Christian's army through Jutland and into the sea (1627). But Wallenstein, with his dreams of a united Germany free in conscience and absolutely obedient to the em peror, drifted farther and farther away from the League. Ferdinand thought that he could fulfil the secular portion of Wallenstein's policy while giving satisfaction to the Catholics. The princes and bishops of the League continued to oppose any aggrandizement of the emperor's power at their expense and to insist upon the re sumption of church lands. In this equilibrium the North German Protestant cities were strong enough to refuse to admit Wallen stein's garrisons. In 1628 Wallenstein, who had received the duchy of Mecklenburg on its rightful lord being put to the ban for his share in the Danish war, began to occupy his new towns, and also to spread along the coasts. But the Hanse towns rejected his over tures, and Stralsund, second-rate seaport though it was, absolutely refused to admit a garrison of his wild soldiery. The result was the famous siege of Stralsund (Feb. to Aug. 1628), in which the
citizens compelled the hitherto unconquered Wallenstein army to retire. The siege was, as the result proved, a turning-point in German history. The emperor's policy of restoring order had practically universal support. But the instrument of the restora tion was a plundering army. Even this might have been borne had Wallenstein been able to give Germany, as he wished, not only peace but religious freedom. When the Edict of Restitution (1629) gave back i so northern ecclesiastical foundations to the Catholics, men were convinced that one ruler meant one religion.
Rather than endure this the North Germans called in Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden and, just as Gustavus landed, the resentment of the princes of the League against Wallenstein's policy and Wallenstein's soldiers came to a head, and the emperor was forced to dismiss him. His soldiers were taken over by Tilly, and for the moment he disap peared from the scene. On Gustavus's side, a thoroughly trained army, recruited from good yeomen and stout soldiers of fortune, paid good wages, and led by a great captain, was a novelty in war that more than compensated for Tilly's numerical superiority. Gustavus, however, after landing at Peenemiinde in June, spent the rest of the year in establishing himself firmly in Mecklenburg and Pomerania, in order to secure the active support of the more important Protestant princes, so as to appear as an auxiliary rather than a principal in the German conflict. First the old duke Bogis lav of Pomerania, then George William of Brandenburg joined him, very unwillingly. He was soon afterwards allied with France, by the treaty of Barwalde (Jan. 1631). John George of Saxony, still attempting to stifle the war by a policy of neutrality, sent a last appeal to Vienna, praying for the revocation of the Edict of Restitution. Meanwhile Tilly had marched into north-eastern. Germany, where his lieutenant Pappenheim was besieging Magde burg. This city had twice defied Wallenstein's attempts to intro duce a garrison, and it was now in arms against the League. Gustavus, as yet without active allies, thought it impossible to go forward alone, and could only hope that his sudden and brilliant storm (April 3-13) of Frankfurt-on-Oder would distract Tilly from the siege. • Sack of Magdeburg.—But the hope was vain and when, realizing this, he moved directly to Magdeburg's relief, his passage through the territories of the Electors of Brandenburg and Saxony was delayed by the objections of the Protestant princes. While he was negotiating with them in turn, Magdeburg, although the citizens f ought desperately, was stormed, sacked and burned on the night of May io, 1631, amidst horrors that neither of the imperialist generals was able to check. The Catholics rejoiced as though for another St. Bartholomew's day, the Protestants were paralysed, and Gustavus, accused on all hands of having allowed the Magdeburgers to perish, sorrowfully withdrew into Pomerania. But Tilly, in spite of Pappenheim's remonstrances, turned west ward against Hesse-Cassel and other minor principalities whose rulers had declared for Gustavus. The king of Sweden, thereupon, advanced to Werben (at the junction of the Elbe and the Havel), where his army entrenched itself, and, in spite of sickness and famine, stoically awaited the attack. The desired result was achieved. At the end of July Tilly, returning from the west, made his appearance and was twice repulsed (July 13-23 and 18-28), losing 6,000 men out of 22,000. Thereupon, turning away from Gustavus's entrenchments, Tilly invaded Saxony, being reinforced en route by 20,000 men from Italy. The elector John George at once made an alliance with the Swedes.