Beginnings of Self-Government

The wars with the French brought the problem of colonial defence among the English into greater prominence than ever and added it to the other questions at issue. Against the Indians the colonists in the 17th century had provided for their own defence. Chiefly with this object in view, each Colony had de veloped a militia system. But such a force was not fitted for long campaigns or large operations : it was comparatively undisci plined; the commissariat was poor or totally lacking, and the men were able to remain away from their homes for only brief periods. The colonists possessed no navy. So poor were means of com munication and so isolated were the Colonies from one another, that co-operation was very difficult. Equally difficult was it to secure proportional contributions of money from the Colonies. Early in the French wars the British Government prescribed quotas both of men and money to be raised by the Colonies, but little attention was paid to these except by the Colonies in im mediate peril. Because of the limited amount of available money and the modest resources of the colonists heavy taxation was impossible. The assemblies resorted to the issue of bills of credit. to which they gave legal tender quality, and for the redemption of which in nearly all cases they made inadequate provision. The paper depreciated and in some Colonies became worthless. Great confusion resulted, involving loss to all, and among the sufferers were British merchants. Strained relations were produced be tween the assemblies and the colonial executive, who, acting under royal instructions, persisted in vetoing bills for additional issues of currency. For this reason, in addition to others, the assemblies withheld the salaries of governors and other officials, and in this way sought to coerce the executives. In some Colonies the assNnbly secured the right of electing the treasurer, and in most of them appropriations were made specific. Thus by skil fully utilizing their control over the purse, and that during a long period of war, the colonial assemblies were able materially to limit the authority of the executives. It was in such ways as these that the Constitutions of the provinces became developed and liberalized during the French wars.

The Canadian Government.

The quality of the rank and file of the Canadian militia was not essentially different from that of the British Colonies. But the Canadian Government was autocratic. The power of the French was also concentrated in a single large province. These conditions greatly promoted military efficiency. When taken in connection with their Indian alliances, they enabled the French to take the offensive in the earlier wars much oftener than did the English, and with much greater effect. The English frontier was more accessible and more ex posed than was the lower part of the valley of the St. Lawrence. Quebec was in every sense a citadel to which additional security was given during a large part of every year by the intense cold of the Canadian winter. But so superior were the training and enterprise of the French coureur de bois that, with his Indian allies, he was far better able than the English farmer or artisan to penetrate the wilderness, whether in winter or in summer, and massacre the exposed dwellers on the frontier. It was this class which gave the French the superiority in the long succession of raids by which the English frontier was laid waste.

Though the French by their skill and boldness achieved a remarkable success, their defects and weaknesses were equally evident. The flow of population from France to America was never great, and was diminished by the exclusion of Huguenots. The natural growth of population within New France was not rapid and the French colonists did not become sufficiently numer ous to maintain the interests to which their vast claims and pos sessions gave rise. At the opening of the last intercolonial war

the proportion of English to French colonists was approximately 15 to one. The resources of the British exceeded those of the French colonists to a corresponding degree. Had the decision of the questions at issue depended upon population and wealth alone, the issue could not long have remained doubtful. But they were so offset by other circumstances, already alluded to, that the result of the struggle was for a long time uncertain. The motherlands were to be the decisive factors in the problem, which thus depended to an extent on complications which existed in Europe or even on remoter seas and continents. When the climax of the struggle was reached the result might have been different if France at the time had not been so deeply involved in the politics of central Europe.

Of the first importance in reaching a decision were the fleets and armies of Great Britain and France, or those parts of them which were available for use on the continent of North America. During the larger part of the period under review the French neglected their fleet, while the English steadily advanced toward naval and commercial supremacy. But the first conspicuous service on the northern coasts was that which was rendered by Commodore Peter Warren and his squadron at the capture of Louisburg in 1745• In the next year a large French fleet was des patched to North America, but it accomplished nothing. In the last intercolonial war the operations before Louisburg in 1758 and at Quebec in 1759 decisively proved the superiority of the British Navy. The Colonies also, in the later stages of the strug gle, contributed loyally toward the result. France failed to make her natural military superiority effective in North America, and her power on that continent had to yield before the combined attacks of Great Britain and her Colonies by land and sea.

Colonial Revolt, 1763-76.

The Treaty of Paris (1763), by which the period of colonial wars was concluded, added vast stretches of territory to the dominions of Great Britain in North America. The Floridas, Canada and Louisiana as far west as the Mississippi river now came into the possession of the English. Of the islands which were occupied, the two most important—Guada loupe and Martinique—were restored to the French. The retention of Canada in preference to these involved an important change in the nature and objects of British colonization. Hitherto tropical colonies had been preferred to those in northern climes. But it was now bent upon continental expansion. Canada and the West were retained and the most important French islands were given back. The development of modern industry—the so-called indus trial revolution had already begun in Great Britain. Its effect was vastly to increase the population of the British Isles and to neces sitate an overflow into the unoccupied regions of the globe. Hence forth, as time progressed, colonies were to be valued as homes for a surplus population quite as much as sources of raw materials and food supplies. The retention of Canada and the West also coincided exactly with the desires of the continental Colonies. The chief gains of the war went therefore to them and not to the island colonies. They now possessed a continental domain which was adequate to their need for expansion, and their long-cherished desire to be rid of the French was gratified. The conquest of the French removed the sense of dependence on Great Britain for military aid previously felt by the northern Colonies in particular.